CHAPTER 31

The Psychology of Collective Action

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Abstract

Personality and social psychology research on motivation for collective action is reviewed and integrated into a model presented in Figure 31.1. The personality work effectively identifies correlates of collective action without necessarily providing explanations of motivation. The social psychological work provides convincing motives for collective action but downplays individual difference variables. The integration of these two traditions addresses these gaps and allows for a deeper, more complex understanding of the phenomenological experience of the development of group consciousness and links to collective action. Promising areas for potential future research are discussed.

Keywords: activism, collective action, group consciousness, politicized collective identity, relative deprivation, stratum consciousness, nigrescence, personality, motivation, feminism

Introduction

The question of why people become involved in collective action has been the subject of ongoing interest in psychology. This chapter reviews and integrates the personality and social psychological literatures on motivation for participation in collective action. Research on collective action by personality psychologists historically used individual differences in personality characteristics and life experience variables to explain involvement in collective action (e.g., Block, Haan, & Smith, 1972). This tradition, while allowing psychologists to identify personality characteristics that distinguished activists from nonactivists, did not explain why these individual differences in personality characteristics were associated with collective action. Research on collective action by social psychologists was rooted in theories of social identity, relative deprivation, and resource mobilization theory (see van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008, for a meta-analysis and review) and provided obvious motives for individual participation in collective action. However, this tradition downplayed individual difference variables.

Integrating individual difference variables into the study of motivation for collective action allows a deeper, more complex understanding of this motivation and can explain why some group members develop group consciousness and become politically active whereas others do not.

This chapter combines the work on collective action in personality and social psychology by integrating four social psychological theories into a schematic model presented by Duncan (1995, 1999). This model posits group consciousness variables (from social psychology) as mediating the relationships between individual difference variables (from personality psychology) and participation in collective action and provides a compelling motive for this participation (see Figure 31.1). In this model, group consciousness is used as an overarching term that encompasses social psychological variables related to group identification and common fate, critical analysis of a group’s position in society, and a collective orientation toward redressing power imbalances between groups.
Figure 31.1 illustrates two paths to collective action, direct (Path C) and indirect (Path B). It integrates the research in personality and social psychology on collective action by showing how individual difference variables contribute to group consciousness (Path A) and how group consciousness, in turn, can motivate collective action (Path B). Research suggests that these indirect paths may be taken most often when basic needs are met, and there are no immediate, life-disrupting crises threatening a particular group (e.g., during “movements of affluence”; Kerbo, 1982; see, also, Duncan, 1999; Duncan & Stewart, 2007). The figure also suggests that personality and life experiences can directly affect behavioral outcomes (Path C), which is most likely to occur when there is little time to articulate a coherent ideological reason for action (e.g., during “movements of crisis”; see Kerbo, 1982, and Duncan, 1999). Reciprocal effects are also possible in this model. That is, this model acknowledges that group consciousness can develop and personality can change as a result of participating in collective action. For example, Agronick and Duncan (1998) found that between the ages of 28 and 43, women showed increased dominance, self-acceptance, empathy, psychological mindedness, and achievement via independence, as measured by the California Psychological Inventory, as a result of their participation in the Women’s Movement (reversed path C).

Research in social psychology is largely concerned with Path B, whereas the research in personality psychology is largely concerned with Paths A and C. In the remainder of this chapter, I review four social psychological models of group consciousness, three of which elucidate the phenomenological experience of group consciousness on an individual level. I then review and integrate the personality research on collective action with the social psychological work, ending with a discussion of some promising avenues for future research.

Social Psychological Models of Group Consciousness and Collective Action

Social psychological models dominate current psychological research on collective action (see, e.g., the December 2009 issue of the Journal of Social Issues). For example, findings culled from 69 published
social psychological studies utilizing 182 independent samples were reviewed and organized in a meta-analysis by van Zomeren et al. (2008), who found that the literature could be organized into three broad domains, which examined the effects on collective action of: (1) perceived injustice, (2) identity, and (3) efficacy variables. They tested a model of collective action (referred to as SIMCA, or social identity model of collective action) that showed that identity was related to collective action, and that perceived injustice and perceived efficacy mediated the relationship between identity and collective action. In the meta-analysis, collective action was operationalized as attitudinal support for protest, protest intentions, or behaviors aimed at redressing the cause of the group’s disadvantage (e.g., signing a petition, attending a demonstration). An overview of perceived injustice, identity, and efficacy variables is provided below.

**Perceived Injustice**
Van Zomeren et al. identified two developments in the relative deprivation literature relevant to collective action. First, they noted that perceptions of injustice based on group memberships rather than individual characteristics were more likely to be related to collective action (Smith & Ortiz, 2002). Second, relative deprivation researchers began distinguishing between cognitive measures of injustice (i.e., perceptions of unfairness or discrimination; e.g., Corning & Myers, 2002; Kawakami & Dion, 1993) and affective measures of injustice (i.e., dissatisfaction, fraternal resentment, group-based anger, or perceptions and feelings of relative deprivation; e.g., Gill & Matheson, 2006; van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004). Based on the argument that group-based emotions (e.g., anger) bridged the relationship between appraisals and specific action tendencies (van Zomeren et al., 2004; Yzerbyt, Dumont, Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003), van Zomeren et al. (2008) hypothesized that affective measures of injustice would be better predictors of collective action than would cognitive measures. In the meta-analysis, cognitive injustice was operationalized as perceptions of procedural and distributive fairness, and affective injustice was operationalized as relative deprivation. Van Zomeren et al. found that affective measures of injustice were indeed more powerful predictors of collective action than cognitive ones. In an analysis of a subset of data containing injustice, efficacy, and identity variables, they found that injustice mediated the relationship between identity and collective action.

**Social Identity**
Theories of social identity (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) emphasized the importance for individual well-being of maintaining a positive evaluation of one’s group. Collective action was posited as one way in which members of low-status groups in society could maintain positive evaluations of their groups in societies that devalued them. Note that this observation was relevant for groups with impermeable boundaries, under situations that were seen as illegitimate and unstable. Under these conditions, group identification was seen as a potential predictor of collective action.

Simon and colleagues (Simon et al., 1998; Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Stürmer & Simon, 2004) argued that a *politicized* group identity (i.e., identification
with a social movement organization) was essential to predict collective action. Simon et al. (1998) found that identification with the gay movement, rather than the wider social group (gay people), was important for predicting collective action and intentions to act. In their meta-analysis, van Zomeren et al. (2008) operationalized nonpoliticized group identities in two ways: (1) the cognitive centrality of the group identity, and (2) attachment or affective commitment to the disadvantaged group. Further, politicized identity was operationalized as cognitive centrality or affective commitment to a social movement organization or as an activist. Van Zomeren et al. found that politicized identities were better direct predictors of collective action than nonpoliticized identities. In addition, in a subset of data containing injustice, efficacy, and identity variables, the relationship between identity and collective action was mediated by perceived injustice and perceived efficacy. They argued that possessing a politicized group identity exposed individuals to group-based perceptions and emotions (e.g., injustice and efficacy), which would then lead to collective action.

Simon and Klandermans (2001) emphasized the role of power struggles in collective action. In the case of politicized collective identity, “group members should intentionally engage, as a mindful and self-conscious collective (or as representative thereof), in such a power struggle knowing that it is the wider, more inclusive societal context in which this struggle takes place and needs to be orchestrated accordingly” (p. 323). Similar to sociological constructs of collective identities, this work emphasized the notion that groups struggling for power do it in a context whereby they attempt to persuade wider society of the justness of their cause. Subašić, Reynolds, and Turner (2008) elaborated this idea by arguing that social change can only occur when the minority gains the support of the “silent majority.”

This recent work is extremely useful in organizing and modeling social psychological efforts to understand collective action. However, this work does not represent well the phenomenological experience of individual motivation for collective action, which I describe as “group consciousness.” Below, I review three social psychological theories that elaborate the phenomenological aspects of group consciousness and connections to collective action. The first, Gurin, Miller, and Gurin’s (1980) theory of stratum consciousness, describes four critical elements necessary for the development of group consciousness. The second, Cross’s (1971; Cross & Vandiver, 2001) theory of nigrulence, describes in detail the phenomenological experience involved in the individualized process of developing a stable politicized group identity. The third, Crosby’s (1976) conceptualization of relative deprivation, describes in great detail the five elements necessary for the development of feelings of injustice, and also illuminates the individual level factors that might moderate the relationship of relative deprivation to collective action. The integration of these social psychological theories adds to our understanding of the phenomenological experience of motivation for collective action on an individual level.

**Stratum Consciousness**

Based in social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), stratum consciousness was defined by Gurin and her colleagues (P. Gurin, 1985; Gurin et al., 1980) as composed of four elements: (1) identification with a group, that is, recognition of shared interests among the group or a sense of common fate; (2) power discontent, or belief that one’s group is deprived of power and influence relative to a high-status group; (3) withdrawal or rejection of legitimacy, or belief that disparities based on group membership are illegitimate (also called system blame); and (4) collective orientation, or belief that group members should work together to eliminate those obstacles that affect them as a group. Gurin later added cognitive centrality to this model (Gurin & Markus, 1989).

This definition of stratum consciousness was used to describe the gender consciousness of women and men, age consciousness of older and younger people, race consciousness of African Americans and whites, and class consciousness of blue-collar and middle-class workers (P. Gurin, 1985; Gurin et al., 1980). They found that group identification was related to the other three elements of the model (power discontent, rejection of legitimacy, collective orientation). This conceptualization was also supported in the political science literature by Klein’s (1984) description of the societal level elements of feminist consciousness.

The latter three elements of stratum consciousness (power discontent, rejection of legitimacy, and collective orientation) compose a political ideology, one that recognizes the group’s position in a power hierarchy, rejects other groups’ rationalizations of relative positioning, and embraces a collective solution to group problems. It is the combination of these three elements along with identification with a group that creates group consciousness on the individual level. Note that in this description of group
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belief that one’s group
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zation out of the group fairly easily. However, involuntary
group members do not possess this option (see

Tajfel’s (1978) conceptualization of social identity
posits that group identity is subsumed by personal
identity. Social or group identity describes
“that part of an individual’s self-concept which
derives from his knowledge of his membership of a
social group (or groups) together with the value
and emotional significance attached to that
membership” (p. 63). Simply identifying with a group is not
e nough to create group consciousness; group identifi-
cation must be politicized to produce group
consciousness. Consider, for example, identification as
a feminist; many women identify strongly as women
without possessing a feminist consciousness, because
identification with the group “women” is not neces-
sarily accompanied by an assessment of the unequal
position of women as a group (Henderson-King &
Stewart, 1994).

In various situations, different identifications
may become more salient than others and this
salience may be related to awareness of oneself as
a minority (Markus & Kunda, 1986). For example,
being the only psychologist in a room full of physi-
cists may make one very aware of one’s professional
identification. At a gay rights rally, sexual orienta-
tion would be salient for all participants, gay and
straight. For gay people, the salience of sexual identi-
yty might be organized around feelings of power
discontent or relative deprivation. For straight
people, on the other hand, the privilege of their het-
rogenous sexual orientation might be more salient.
For members of high-status groups, then, group
consciousness may be organized around awareness of
a privileged identity.

According to Markus (1990), aspects of the
universe that are designated as parts of one’s identity,
or “me”:

become coordinates or frames of individual
consciousness. Other “non-me” aspects can be made
salient and focal, but those that are claimed as “me”
have a durable salience. The “me” aspects are
perpetually used as benchmarks for organizing and
understanding the rest of the universe. (p. 183)

During the development of group consciousness,
a group identification may take on a durable
salience. For example, when race consciousness is
developing, race becomes a benchmark against
which information gleaned from the environment is
judged and interpreted. Gurin and Markus (1989)
showed that women who found gender to be salient
described themselves as women more quickly, and expressed
higher levels of confidence in these descriptors than
women who found gender less salient, thus display-
ing the centrality of gender to the cognitive organi-
ization of information.

In addition, group identifications are organized
in relation to each other. One’s experiences as a man
depend on other group characteristics; for example,
whether one is a white man or a black man. Feminist
scholars have termed this phenomenon intersection-
ality (Cole, 2009; Dill, 1983; Stewart & McDermott,
2004). The question of salience of identifications
can become very complicated when identifications
are understood in relation to each other. How identifi-
cations with groups and individuals become
politicized is a complicated issue, and one that needs
elaboration.

The Development of Politicized Group
Identifications: The Example of Negrescence
Cross’s (1971; Cross & Vandiver, 2001) theory of
negrescence contributes to our understanding of
group consciousness by describing the process involved in politicizing a group identification. Although Cross's model was originally developed to describe the development of a politicized racial identification, his model has been adapted to describe the development of other types of group consciousness as well (e.g., ethnic consciousness, feminist consciousness, gay/lesbian consciousness; see Constantine, Watt, Gainor, & Warren, 2005, for a review). There are, of course, differences in the oppressive circumstances facing different low-status groups; thus the process of politicization may deviate more or less from Cross's description.

Cross's model involves five stages, and documents the development of new, low-status group politicized identities. Briefly, preencounter describes the worldview of a nonpolitcized individual as a person who views being a low-status group member as either irrelevant to daily life or as an obstacle, and seldom a symbol of culture and tradition. The encounter stage marks the awakening of the individual to the realities of the unequal position of her or his group in society, and often involves anger at society and high-status groups (similar to Gurin et al.'s, 1980, power discontent and rejection of legitimacy). The encounter stage begins the process of identity change to accommodate a new, collective ideology that interprets personal experiences of oppression as due to group membership rather than personal characteristics. Immersion/emersion involves a total rejection of dominant culture values, and an uncritical acceptance of those of the low-status group. Successful negotiation of this stage involves heavy reliance on the collective, where the individual finds companionship, solace, and models of "how to be" a good politicized group member. Cross's stage 4 involves internalization of the new identification, which describes the worldview of the newly politicized person. Individuals no longer rely on the collective for self-definition; they have internalized the meaning of their group identification and are ready to operate once again in the dominant culture. Finally, internalization-commitment is characterized by an active and continuing commitment to redressing injustices encountered by the group, and is not embraced by every person (Cross, 1991).

The models of race consciousness described by Cross and feminist consciousness described by Downing and Roush (1985) have been supported in several studies (Carter & Helms, 1987; Parham & Helms, 1981, 1985a, 1985b; Rickard, 1989, 1990). For example, Rickard (1989, 1990) showed that college women categorized as possessing preencounter identifications were more likely to belong to conservative and traditional campus organizations (Right to Life and College Textiles and Clothing organizations), hold traditional views about dating, and endorse negative attitudes toward working women. College women categorized as having internalized politicized (feminist) identifications were more likely to belong to the National Organization of Women and the campus Gay Lesbian Alliance, hold nontraditional views about dating, and feel more positively toward working women. More recent research is consistent in linking feminist identities to political activism in white and black women and men (Duncan, 1999; Duncan & Stewart, 2007; Liss, Crawford, & Popp, 2004; White, 2006).

In later modifications of Cross's theory, it was suggested that a stage model may not be appropriate to describe the ongoing process of politicizing a group identification; rather, it may be more useful to think of these stages as descriptors of experiences of group consciousness that occur in conjunction with one another, and not always in the same order (Parham, 1989; White, 2006; Worrell, Cross, & Vandiver, 2001). Nonetheless, Cross's original model of nigrescence discusses in detail some of the issues that individuals face when developing politicized group identifications. Once a politicized group identification is established (stages 2–5 of Cross's model), how might it get transformed into collective action?

**Relative Deprivation Theory**

Cross's (1976) formulation of relative deprivation elaborates the power discontent and rejection of legitimacy aspects of the stratum consciousness model (Gurin et al., 1980). In addition, it provides a link between group consciousness and collective action. Relative deprivation describes the negative emotions experienced by individuals who feel unjustly deprived of something they desire (Crosby, 1976; J. Davis, 1959; Gurin, 1970; Runciman, 1966). According to Cross's model, relative deprivation occurs when five preconditions are met. These five preconditions are necessary and sufficient to experience relative deprivation:

1. see that other possesses X (some desired good),
2. want X,
3. feel that one deserves X,
4. think it feasible to obtain X, and
5. lack a sense of responsibility for failure to possess X.
Crosby (1976) reviewed a large body of empirical literature to support her model. In an expansion of Crosby's model, Crosby and Gonzalez-Intrall (1984) included feelings of deprivation on the behalf of members of other groups ("ideological deprivation," Clayton & Crosby, 1992) and resentment over a third party's undeserved possession of goods. Jennings (1991) posited that these two extensions of relative deprivation theory might account for participation in social movements by members of groups who do not directly benefit from the achievement of the movement's goals (see, also, Iyer & Ryan, 2009).

In Crosby's early work, group identification, a central element of Gurin et al.'s (1980) model, was not mentioned as a necessary precondition for the experience of personal relative deprivation; in later work on maternal (group) deprivation, Clayton and Crosby (1992) discussed the essential role of group identification. However, group identification has always been implicit in Crosby's (1976) notion of relative deprivation. For example, in preconditions 1 and 3 (see that other possesses X, feel that one deserves X), comparison between one's situation and that of another occurs, and this comparison may be based on an awareness that the two individuals belong to the same group or to different groups.

When the group comparison occurs at a political level, or the justification for the inequity is explicitly political, the relative deprivation that develops is very similar to Gurin et al.'s (1980) notion of stratum consciousness (except that Crosby does not assume a collective orientation). If a group identification becomes politicized through the process of group comparison (group identification), awareness of inequities (power discontent), and rejection of responsibility for these inequities using a political analysis (rejection of legitimacy), then relative deprivation and stratum consciousness look similar. For example, in Crosby's (1982) empirical examination of gender discrimination, men were paid more than women working the same jobs. In this study, women workers assumed that their salary levels were determined independent of gender, and so compared their salaries to both male and female employees. Because these women saw "workers" to be the relevant group within which to compare salaries, and not "women workers," their salaries were found to be deficient, and they developed politicized gender identifications.

Crosby (1976) outlined the possible outcomes for the individual and society after relative deprivation, identifying variables that could moderate the relationship between relative deprivation and its outcomes. Depending on personality and environmental factors, relative deprivation could lead either to nonviolent personal or social change or violence against the self or society. In group consciousness terms, personal and environmental conditions could moderate the relationship between group consciousness and personal or collective action, either by stymieing group consciousness or by channeling it into nonviolent or violent personal or collective action.

Crosby implicated two potential personality moderators in her analysis, intro/extraaptitude, and personal control. Specifically, she argued that after developing relative deprivation, individuals' tendency to turn their anger either inward (introactive) or outward toward society (extraactive) and whether they had high or low personal control would affect their future behaviors. The intro/extraactive dimension appears to be related to system blame. People who direct their anger outward should be more comfortable with systemic explanations for their group's low status.

Personal control is similar to political self-efficacy. An individual with high personal control "feels that he cannot change his lot nor affect society" (Crosby, 1976, p. 100). Crosby argued that for extraactive individuals with high personal control encountering open opportunities for change, constructive social change was more likely than relative deprivation. On the other hand, if opportunities were blocked, or the individual had low control, violence against society might result. If the person were introactive, either stress symptoms (if low control or blocked opportunities) or self-improvement (if high control and open opportunities) were the likely results of relative deprivation.

For example, actions taken by activists in the U.S. South during the early civil rights movement focused attention on the unconstitutional segregation in schools, on buses, and in public spaces. Protesters were extraactive, had strong political self-efficacy, and sensed that opportunities were open for change. Peaceful social change resulted. On the other hand, during the late 1960s, when civil rights activists began working on desegregating housing in the northern United States, the target of their efforts was harder to pinpoint. Few laws were being broken, but the disparities between whites and blacks in housing conditions were extreme. Similar to the protesters in the early civil rights movement, these later protesters were extraactive and had strong political self-efficacy, but found that
their efforts to change housing situations were ineffective (opportunities for change were blocked). Some activists turned to violent social protest as a result (see, Hampton, Fayer, & Flynn, 1990, for first-person accounts of the civil rights movement.)

Integration of Social Psychological Theories

Table 31.1 presents the central elements of the four theories I have discussed in order to illustrate their commonalities and differences. Central to all of the social psychological models is a sense of power discontent and rejection of individualistic explanations for these power differences—perhaps best summarized as feelings of relative deprivation (encompassing element 1 of SIMCA, all elements of relative deprivation theory, elements 2 and 3 of stratum consciousness theory, and element 2 of nigrescence theory). A sense of identification with a disenfranchised group is key to making these comparisons in the first place, for without the proper reference group, there is no feeling of relative deprivation. Element 2 of SIMCA, element 1 of stratum consciousness, and elements 2 and 3 of nigrescence theory explicitly recognize the importance of group identification.

The four theories differ in their articulation of the connections between these feelings of deprivation or consciousness and action orientation and behavior taken on behalf of the group. For example, stratum consciousness theory specifies that a collective (rather than individualistic) orientation toward action is required, and SIMCA specifies that group-based efficacy is important to produce collective action. Crosby's (1976) relative deprivation theory, on the other hand, does not explicitly consider collective versus individualistic action orientations, but emphasizes instead different outcomes for the self and society of individualistic versus systemic explanations for power differences. Nigrescence theory does not specify the nature of action but simply labels it as the ultimate achievement in demonstrating an integrated identity.

These theories are most useful in explaining why people might participate in collective action when taken in conjunction with each other. The injustice aspect of SIMCA and relative deprivation theories describe a negative emotional state and consequences for action of such emotions, but do not explicitly identify the sense of common fate (provided by the social identity element of SIMCA, stratum consciousness, and nigrescence theories) that is necessary for experiencing such emotion at the group level. The efficacy element of SIMCA and stratum consciousness theories include the collective element necessary for converting feelings of deprivation into collective action, but do not articulate an explicit connection to action or outline a process of how such consciousness might develop on an individual level. Nigrescence theory fills in the latter gap, providing a detailed description of how individuals can develop politicized group identifications. Thus, all four models are useful for understanding why some people—above and beyond their demographic characteristics—might participate in collective action.

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Table 31.1 Key Elements of Four Social Psychological Theories Used to Explain Motivation for Participation in Collective Action
Individual Differences, Group Consciousness, and Collective Action

The social psychological models described above are essential for understanding motivation for participation in collective action (Path B in Figure 31.1). However, the personality psychology approach to understanding participation in collective action has articulated the individual difference variables important to group consciousness (Path A) and collective action (Path C), and developed completely independently of the work in social psychology. Early work in personality psychology attempted to identify individual difference variables that distinguished 1960s student activists from nonactivists (e.g., Block, Haan, & Smith, 1973). Current work in personality has moved beyond these early efforts to document group differences. Instead, it dovetails nicely with the social psychological work on social identity, allowing us to identify personality correlates of group consciousness and collective action (e.g., Curtin, Stewart, & Duncan, 2010; Duncan, 1999, 2010; Duncan & Stewart, 2007).

The personality literature on collective action was largely empirically based, with no coherent unifying theory. In this section, then, I use the model described in Figure 31.1 to organize and review the personality literature related to group consciousness and collective action (Paths A and C). Throughout this section, I integrate the personality work with the social psychological theories of group consciousness and discuss evidence for how individual characteristics might be mediated or moderated by group consciousness. I consider individual differences in both life experiences (including family background characteristics, developmental stage, experiences with discrimination, low-status group memberships, resources, access to social movement organizations) and personality characteristics (including personal political salience, political self-efficacy, generativity, authoritarianism, cognitive flexibility, impulsivity, autonomy, openness to experience, optimism, and need to evaluate).

Typically, personality and social psychology are integrated in such a way as to consider the person x situation interaction (Higgins, 1980). In social psychological experiments, the situation is manipulated, and individual differences in personality characteristics are assumed to be randomly distributed across conditions. In personality psychology, the situation is assumed to be constant and the personality characteristics of individuals vary. However, in this review of the personality characteristics related to group consciousness and collective action, I treat situational variables (defined as naturally occurring life experiences rather than experimental manipulations), as individual difference variables. That is, in the following discussion, I consider how variations in life experiences between individuals have differential effects on the development of group consciousness and collective action.

LIFE EXPERIENCES

Family Background Characteristics

Consistent with theories of generational continuity, studies of 1960s student activists found that early participants in 1960s social movements tended to come from politically liberal families of origin (Acocella, 1984; Block, Haan, & Smith, 1969; Braungart & Braungart, 1990; Flacks, 1967; Glass, Bengtson, & Dunham, 1986; Jennings & Niemi, 1968, 1982; Middleton & Putney, 1963), and liberal or nonreligious families (Astin, 1968; H. Astin, 1969; Block et al., 1973; R. Braungart, 1969; Flacks, 1967; Geller & Howard, 1969; Heist, 1965; Lichter & Rothman, 1981–82; Solomon & Fishman, 1964; Watts, Lynch, & Whittaker, 1969; Watts & Whittaker, 1966). It is likely that liberal family background contributes to participation in collective action indirectly, by increasing the chance that individuals will be taught systemic explanations for social problems, thus increasing group consciousness (a mediated effect).

Research on the childrearing style of the parents of student activists showed that these early activists came from relatively warm and permissive homes where discipline per se was not emphasized, where parents were likely to involve the child in family decisions, and where the environment was accepting and affirming (Block et al., 1973; Braungart & Braungart, 1990; Flacks, 1990). These characteristics, which differentiated early movement participants from nonparticipants, may have contributed indirectly to the development of group consciousness by allowing the activists the freedom to explore ideas encountered in the social environment, rather than directly influencing participation in collective action. Of those politicized students with permissive parents might have been more likely to translate their group consciousness into action (a moderated effect). In addition, there is support for direct (modeling) effects as well. That is, some studies have found that parents' active commitment to collective action as a "way of doing" social change encourages children to do the same (Duncan & Stewart, 1995; Katz, 1968; Thomas, 1971).

Developmental Stage

Erikson's (1962) articulation of eight universal psychosocial stages suggests that there may be particular
times in life when an individual is especially open to experiences that might lead to group consciousness. Stewart and Healy (1989) hypothesized that social events experienced in late adolescence and early adulthood affect perceptions of opportunities and life choices, which can be incorporated into personal identity (R. Braungart, 1975; Duncan & Agronick, 1995; Fitzgerald, 1988; Schuman & Scott, 1989; Stewart & Goldsteinberg, 1990), and that events experienced in later (mildlife) adulthood affect perceptions of new opportunities and choices, which can create opportunities for identity revision (Duncan & Agronick, 1995; Stewart & Healy, 1989; see also Stewart & Deaux, chapter 26, this volume). According to Stewart and Healy's (1989) theory, an individual is more likely to develop group consciousness during early adulthood or mildlife, when identity formation or revision is apt to occur; this is true for both high-status and low-status group members. In addition, the likelihood of developing group consciousness should drastically increase if, during a "receptive" psychosocial stage, an individual experiences a social event focused on issues that resonate to a particular group membership. For example, research suggests that women who were young adults during the women's movement were more likely to develop feminist consciousness than women who were in early middle adulthood at the time of the movement, because the younger women were in a receptive developmental stage (Duncan & Agronick, 1995). Likewise, young adults growing up when there is no women's movement, or when there is a movement against gains for women, should be less likely to develop feminist consciousness (Duncan & Stewart, 2000; Zucker & Stewart, 2007). Thus, developmental stage may moderate the relationship between exposure to a social movement and the development of group consciousness and collective action.

**Personal Experiences with Discrimination**

Cross's (1971; Cross & Vandiver, 2001) encounter stage specifies that personal experiences with discrimination often lead to the process of politicizing a group identification. Members of low-status groups in society have been shown to be more aware of group memberships than are high-status group members, increasing the likelihood that they will identify with these groups, be exposed to a collective ideology, and develop group consciousness (Duncan, 1999; P. Gurin, 1985; Gurin et al., 1980; Lykes, 1985). There is also evidence that various gendered life experiences are related to the development of feminist identities in women. For example, research has found that experiences of abortion (Stewart & Goldsteinberg, 1990; Zucker, 1999), sexual victimization (Ross & Cleveland, 1997), and divorce (Faith, 2007) are related to women's politicization, presumably because these experiences call into question the legal, social, and economic equality of women relative to men. Thus, they would be directly related to feelings of relative deprivation. Discrimination, then, is related to both identity and injustice, and probably is related indirectly to collective action, by increasing the probability that group consciousness will develop.

**Low-Status Group Memberships**

Politicalization of low-status group identifications among people who are also high-status group members (e.g., feminist identification in white women and race identification in black men) may increase awareness of oppression in general, based on reflection about high-status group memberships. Lykes (1985) suggested that participating in social movements designed to challenge oppressive structures could lead members of high-status groups to embrace a collective orientation, and perhaps lead to group consciousness around low-status group memberships (Path C to reverse Path B).

Membership in multiple low-status groups may be related to higher levels of group consciousness because each low-status group membership increases the likelihood of recognizing any sort of structural oppression (Cole, 2009; Gurin et al., 1980; Lykes, 1985). At the same time, multiple low-status group membership may be related to lower levels of collective action around a particular group membership as the individual divides his or her time among multiple causes (Dill, 1983). Collective action around issues of specific concern to members of particular combinations of multiple low-status groups (e.g., working-class women) may alleviate the problem of division of time; however, many members of multiple low-status groups find themselves having to prioritize causes (Beale, 1970; Collins, 1989, 1991; hooks, 1981). Nonetheless, low-status group membership should contribute to group consciousness, which, in turn, might lead to collective action.

**Material Resources**

Resource mobilization theory (McCarthy & Zald, 1977) contends that social movements arise when enough economic and human resources are mobilized for a particular cause. Kerbo (1982) posited that this is especially true for movements of affluence.
or conscience; that is, social movements arising during economically stable time periods. On the individual level, one of the most consistent findings about both white and black student political activists is that they came from economically privileged family backgrounds (A. Astin, 1968; Block, Haan, & Smith, 1969; R. Braunagel, 1969; Geller & Howard, 1969; Gurin & Epps, 1975; Orum & Orum, 1968; Pinkney, 1969; Searles & Williams, 1962). However, these relationships might be moderated by group consciousness; that is, politicized individuals with higher incomes may be more likely to participate in collective action, at least for movements of conscience. Ability to mobilize material resources is distinguished here from group-based efficacy. It is likely that resource mobilization acts to moderate relationships between group consciousness variables and collective action, whereas group-based efficacy (or the feeling that one's group can make change) mediates relationships between individual difference variables, identity, and collective action.

**Education and Work Experience**

Studies about the development of group consciousness in low-status group members have shown that education and work experience are related to higher levels of ethnic and gender consciousness (Caplan, 1970; Carroll, 1989; P. Gurin, 1987; Sears & McConahay, 1973). Thus, education may indirectly increase participation in collective action, by increasing group consciousness. Education specifically about a group’s low-status position in society has also been shown to increase levels of group consciousness (e.g., Women's Studies courses increase feminist identifications; Bargad & Hyde, 1991; Henderson-King & Stewart, 1999).

**Access to Social Movement Organizations**

Social movement organizations often have at least two complementary goals: to increase group consciousness and organize collective action. Access to an organization where participants feel comfortable and accepted can thus facilitate participation in collective action in at least three different ways. First, by recruiting interested, but not necessarily politicized, individuals, social movement organizations can involve individuals in collective action directly (and perhaps also lead participants to develop group consciousness; Path C and reverse Path B). Klandermans and Oegema (1987) found that informal networks of friends and acquaintances active in the peace movement were important in motivating interested, but not necessarily politicized individuals to attend an anti-nuclear arms rally. Second, by raising individuals’ group consciousness, and then providing a cohesive plan for action, social movement organizations may increase participation in collective action indirectly (Paths A and B; Zurcher & Snow, 1992). Third, belonging to a social movement organization may also help sustain individual active commitment to a cause (Path C; Gerlach & Hine, 1970; Kanter, 1973; Wilson, 1973). Thus, participation in social movement organizations may have direct effects on collective action, as well as effects mediated or moderated by group consciousness.

**PERSONALITY CHARACTERISTICS**

**Personal Political Salience**

The tendency to attach personal meaning to the larger social world has been associated with political activism and responsiveness to social movements in college students and midlife women (Cole & Stewart, 1996; Cole, Zucker, & Ostrove, 1998; Currin et al., 2010; Duncan, 1999; Duncan & Agronick, 1995; Duncan & Stewart, 1995, 2007). For example, in four samples of educated midlife women, group consciousness mediated the relationship between personal political salience and activism related to the politicized identity (after controlling for education and income). That is, for white women, feminist consciousness mediated the relationship between personal political salience and women’s rights activism. Further, for white women, politicized racial identity mediated the relationship between personal political salience and civil rights activism (Duncan & Stewart, 2007). This represented some of the first evidence we have for the utility of group consciousness variables for predicting activism by high-status group members on behalf of low-status groups.

**Political self-efficacy**

The relationship between political self-efficacy and political participation is well documented (Cole & Stewart, 1996; Cole et al., 1998; Finkel, 1985; Verba & Nie, 1972). People high in political self-efficacy believe that their actions can effectively influence the political process, that what they do politically makes a difference (Renshon, 1974). High political self-efficacy probably interacts with Gurin et al.'s (1980) concept of collective orientation to produce collective action. Though typically considered to produce a political variable, individual differences in political self-efficacy affect levels of activism. Individuals possessing both group consciousness and high political self-efficacy should be more likely...
to act on their beliefs, whereas individuals possessing group consciousness but low political efficacy may choose not to act, believing their actions will be ineffectual (a moderated effect). It is likely that group-based efficacy operates by increasing individuals' sense that their political actions make a difference. Individuals act, certainly in conjunction and under the auspices of groups, but it is individual actors who make social change. In addition, some researchers have found that the combination of high efficacy and high political trust is related to conventional political participation, while high efficacy and low trust is associated with participation in forceful and unconventional social change (Crosby, 1976; Erikson, Luttbeg, & Tedin, 1988; Shingles, 1981). These relationships probably also moderate the relationship between group consciousness and collective action.

Generativity

Generativity, or the desire to contribute to future generations, can be expressed in work, family, and political domains (Erikson, 1963). Generative individuals, desiring to contribute to a better world, should display an interest in participating in social movements concerned with justice and equality. Higher scores on measures of generativity have been related to political activism in college-aged and midlife adults (Cole & Stewart, 1996; Hart, McAdams, Hirsch, & Bauer, 2001; Peterson & Duncan, 1999; Peterson & Klohn, 1995; Peterson, Smirle, & Wentworth, 1997; Peterson & Stewart, 1996; Stewart & Gold-Steinberg, 1990). It is likely that group consciousness either mediates or moderates this relationship. It might be that generative individuals are drawn to ideologies that attribute social problems to systemic causes, which could lead to collective action. It is also likely that highly generative individuals with high group consciousness may be more likely to participate in collective action than either highly generative individuals with low group consciousness or politicized individuals scoring low on generativity.

Authoritarianism

In general, authoritarianism has been negatively associated with political activism, except in a few studies where it was positively related to pro-life activism. For example, right wing authoritarianism (RWA) was negatively associated with activism for women's rights (Duncan, 1999; Duncan, Peterson, & Winter, 1997) and antiracism (Duncan & Stewart, 1995), but Duncan et al. (1997) found a positive relationship between RWA and attending pro-life rallies. Peterson et al. (1997) found a positive relationship between RWA and petition signing, letter writing, and donating money for pro-life causes. In both of these cases, overall participation in pro-life causes was low, even though the samples were not particularly liberal ideologically. In terms of other conservative activism, Duncan and Stewart (1995) found no relationship between RWA and participation in Support Our Soldiers (SOS) rallies during the first Gulf War, and Peterson et al. (1997) found no relationship between RWA and activism for the Republican Party. In sum, it appears that authoritarianism is usually unrelated to political activity, but when authoritarians are active, it is for conservative causes. Finally, Duncan (1999) found that the relationship between low RWA and women's rights activism was mediated by feminist consciousness. Some sort of conservative group consciousness might mediate the relationship between RWA and participation in conservative causes, as well. Research on the psychology of conservative activitiss is sparse, and therefore an area ripe for research.

Other Personality Variables

Research showed that students politically active during the early to mid-1960s scored higher than nonactivists on three additional measures of personality: cognitive flexibility, autonomy, and impulse expression (Baird, 1970; Block et al., 1973; G. Curtin, 1971; Heis, 1965; Kaz, 1968; Whittaker & Watts, 1971). It is likely that the relationship between collective action and cognitive flexibility and autonomy was mediated through group consciousness. That is, much of the student activism during the early to mid-1960s (when most of these studies were conducted) was based on ideologies and actions that were not widely endorsed at the time, and, in fact, often labeled "anti-establishment." Autonomous and flexible thinkers were probably more likely to be attracted to such unconventional ideologies, some of which may have led to group consciousness, which in turn may have led to collective action. On the other hand, group consciousness may have moderated the relationship between impulse expression and participation in collective action, as more impulsive students might have felt freer to act on their awareness of inequities than more cautious students.

Other personality variables that have been related to activism include openness to experience (Curtin et al., 2010), optimism (Galvin & Herzog, 1998; Greenberg & Schneider, 1997), and need to evaluate (Bizer, Krosnick, Holbrook, Wheeler, Rucker, &

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Petty, 2004), all of which might be mediated or
 moderated through group consciousness. In six
samples of young, middle-aged, and older adults,
Curtin et al. found that openness to experience was
related to activism. In the younger samples, there
was both a direct and indirect effect, and in the
older samples, the effects were mostly indirect. For
the indirect effects, the relationship between openness
to experience and activism was mediated by
personal political salience, or the tendency to attach
personal meaning to social events (Duncan, 2005).
Curtin et al. argued that openness to experience
may be a precursor to attaching personal meaning
to social events, which is strongly related to activ-
ism, both directly and indirectly (through group
consciousness).

In their study of 209 animal rights activists,
Galvin and Herzog (1998) found that activists
scored higher on a measure of dispositional op-
timism than two unrelated samples of college students
and cardiac patients. They found a small but signifi-
cant positive correlation between optimism and
overall belief that the movement would be successful.
Similarly, Greenberg and Schneider (1997) found
that, compared to those who participated less,
people who participated more in protecting
their neighborhoods (through volunteering, attend-
ing meetings, contacting an elected official, or by
calling the police) scored higher on dispositional
optimism. Optimism might moderate the relation-
ship between injustice and collective action, or be
related to collective action indirectly through its
effects on efficacy.

The need to evaluate is described as an individual
difference variable that reflects an individual’s pro-
propensity to create and hold attitudes about a variety
of objects. In their analysis of 1998 and 2000
National Election Study data, Bizer et al. (2004)
found that the need to evaluate was positively related
to electoral activism (attending rallies, wearing but-
tons, encouraging others to vote, working for a can-
didate) and either voting, or saying that one planned
to vote in an upcoming election. Need to evaluate,
then, is related to political information seeking, which
might lead to perceptions of injustice, a
mediated effect.

**Integrating Personality and Social Psychological Work on Group Consciousness and Collective Action**

Table 31.2 brings together the personality research
on individual difference variables with the social
psychological models presented earlier. It summarizes
the individual difference variables, identifies the rel-
relevant aspects of group consciousness to which they
are hypothesized to be related, and states whether
effects on collective action might be mediated
through group consciousness or moderate the effects
group consciousness on collective action. The
left-hand column lists the individual difference vari-
bles reviewed in this chapter that are related to
group consciousness and collective action. The
middle column lists the elements of group con-
csciousness related to collective action. For example,
included in the injustice category are relative depriv-
vation, power discontent, system blame, and
encounter. Included under identity are group iden-
tification and ingroupness, and under efficacy, col-
collective orientation. The right-hand column specifies
whether the effects on collective action are hypo-
thesized to be mediated by group consciousness vari-
bles or whether they moderate the relationship
between group consciousness and collective action.

One way to use this table is to consider how
various individual difference variables are related to
collective action via the group consciousness vari-
bles. It was only by combining the personality and
social psychological research on group conscious-
ness and collective action that these relationships
were possible to theorize. These could be mediated,
moderated, or direct relationships, depending on
the variables. For example, Duncan (1999; Duncan
& Stewart, 2007) found that personal political
salience (a personality variable) was related to col-
lective action indirectly, through its effects on polit-
icized group identifications (specifically through
group consciousness). On the other hand, access to
social movement organizations would most likely
moderate the relationship between a politicized
group identification and collective action. However,
most of these relationships are only hypothesized,
and need to be investigated. Another promising
avenue for future research is to document which
individual difference variables relate to particular
group consciousness variables. Some possibilities
are listed in Table 31.2. This table provides research-
ers with many potentially exciting possibilities for
future research integrating the personality and social
psychological models of collective action.

**A Note About Terminology**

One of the most difficult challenges involved in
writing this chapter (and working in this area more
generally) was reconciling differences in terminol-
ogy and meaning by personality and social psychol-
ologists. The constructs discussed are closely related,
Table 31.2 Individual Difference Variables, Group Consciousness Variables, and Their Hypothesized Effects on Collective Action

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individual Difference Variables</th>
<th>Related Group Consciousness Variables</th>
<th>Hypothesized Effect on Collective Action</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Life Experiences</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal family of origin</td>
<td>Injustice</td>
<td>Mediation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warm, permissive family</td>
<td>Injustice</td>
<td>Mediation, moderation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modeling of activism</td>
<td>Efficacy</td>
<td>Moderation, direct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developmental stage</td>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>Moderation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination</td>
<td>Injustice, identity</td>
<td>Mediation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low-status group membership</td>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>Mediation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material resources</td>
<td>Efficacy</td>
<td>Moderation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Injustice, identity</td>
<td>Mediation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to social movement</td>
<td>Injustice, identity, efficacy</td>
<td>Mediation, moderation, direct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Personality</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal political salience</td>
<td>Injustice, identity, efficacy</td>
<td>Mediation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political self-efficacy</td>
<td>Efficacy</td>
<td>Moderation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generativity</td>
<td>Injustice</td>
<td>Mediation, moderation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RWA</td>
<td>Injustice</td>
<td>Mediation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive flexibility</td>
<td>Injustice</td>
<td>Mediation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy</td>
<td>Injustice</td>
<td>Mediation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impulsivity</td>
<td>Efficacy</td>
<td>Moderation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openness to experience</td>
<td>Injustice (personal political salience)</td>
<td>Mediation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Optimism</td>
<td>Injustice, efficacy</td>
<td>Mediation, moderation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need to evaluate</td>
<td>Injustice</td>
<td>Mediation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

and yet a variety of terms have been used to describe them. The most important of these were related to the group consciousness variables. Starting with the earliest use, Gurin et al. (1980) used "stratum consciousness." Duncan (1995, 1999; Duncan & Stewart, 2007) used both "group consciousness" and " politicized group identifications." Simon and Klandermans (2001) used " politicized collective identities." These terms are very closely related but are not identical. Politicized collective identities implicated, as integral to their definition, collective action in a larger social context, whereas group consciousness was defined as an individual difference variable that could lead to behavioral outcomes, but did not include action as central to its definition. In addition, the definition of politicized collective identity was expanded to include identification with social movement organizations (Simon et al., 1998). To date, stratum and group consciousness have been used to describe the identities of members of particular demographic groups, rather than members of political organizations. Keeping the various group consciousness elements separate, as most of the social psychological research has done, allows for a fine-grained analysis of particular processes involved in motivating collective action. Combining these
elements into a politicized group identification variable, as personality psychologists have done, has allowed the incorporation of additional, individual-level variables into analyses. Both approaches are valid, and the approach recommended for researchers depends on the research question.

Future Directions
The integration of the personality and social psychological research on motivation for collective action has made it clear that there are many potentially exciting and fruitful avenues for future research. Among the many different possible directions for future research to explore are the following: (1) mapping out the similarities and differences in volunteerism and collective action; (2) understanding collective action undertaken by allies, or members of groups who do not share an identity with the low-status group; (3) collective action based on voluntary (or hidden) group memberships; (4) complicating models of collective action with an understanding of intersectionality; (5) application of existing models of collective action to right-wing or conservative collective action; and (6) understanding how the manipulation of group consciousness components affects the likelihood of collective action. Each of these potential research topics is considered below.

Similarities and Differences in Volunteerism and Collective Action
Snyder and Omoto (2008) defined volunteering as “freely chosen and deliberate helping activities that extend over time, are engaged in without expectation of reward or other compensation and often through formal organizations, and that are performed on behalf of causes or individuals who desire assistance” (p. 3). Snyder and colleagues have conducted research on the importance of match between individual motivations for participation (e.g., affirming values, enhancing self-esteem, making friends, acquiring skills, community concern) and how well the volunteer activity fulfills those motivations. They found that match between motivation and volunteer opportunity led to positive outcomes (Clary & Snyder, 1991; Snyder & Omoto, 2000, 2001). This research fits into the tradition of relating personality variables to collective action, or Path C of Figure 31.1.

Snyder and Omoto (2008) argued that identity can play a part in motivating volunteerism, just as it motivates collective action for political causes. It is probably true, as well, that the motives for volunteerism outlined by Snyder and colleagues could be applied to motivation for collective action. Both of these questions could be investigated in future research.

There are at least two ways that volunteer work and collective action differ, however: (1) volunteerism is usually concerned with helping needy individuals, without necessarily challenging political or social systems, whereas collective action is usually about challenging such systems (see, e.g., Simon & Klandermans, 2001); and (2) volunteerism does not usually require identification with the group of the individual one is helping, only empathy, whereas collective action usually entails politicizing a group identification.

For example, the definition of volunteering given above makes no mention of the “power struggle” between groups mentioned as critical for politicized collective identities (Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Subašić et al., 2008). In other words, although volunteer activities may be undertaken because of an ideological commitment to redressing injustice, such activities do not necessarily have to involve power discontent and rejection of legitimacy, to use Gurin et al.’s (1980) terms.

In addition, volunteerism can be undertaken on behalf of either members of one’s ingroup or outgroup, and does not necessarily involve the politicization of a group identification. Research shows that dispositional empathy and liking are related to increased volunteering (Baron, 1998; M. Davis, 2005), with empathy being more closely linked to ingroup helping and liking linked to outgroup helping (Stürmer, Snyder, & Omoto, 2005; Stürmer, Snyder, Kropp, & Siem, 2006). However, as discussed above, most models of collective action recognize the central role played by politicized group identifications (Duncan, 1999; Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Stürmer & Simon, 2005; van Zomeren et al., 2008).

One avenue of future research could examine the links between volunteering and the development of group consciousness. That is, it would be useful to identify the characteristics of volunteer experiences that lead to the rejection of the legitimacy of individualistic explanations for social problems. For example, it is possible to volunteer for a mentoring program for “at risk” youth (e.g., Big Brothers/Big Sisters) and have both mentor and mentee benefit on an individual level without any subsequent questioning of the circumstances that lead some children to be deemed “at risk.” Other volunteers could do so in the context of a community-based learning class that involved learning about systemic reasons...
for the circumstances that lead to "at risk" youth. One might expect that the latter type of experience would be more likely to expose individual volunteers to ideologies that could then lead to group consciousness around the causes of social problems.

**Collective Action Taken by Allies, or Outgroup Members**

Another aspect of the volunteer-collective action relationship could be fruitfully studied by investigating collective action taken by high-status group members on behalf of low-status group members, or "allied" collective action (e.g., straight allies of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgendered, and queer groups). Allied collective action is concerned with helping low-status group members by challenging the system, rather than by helping individuals. Such activism may require an identification with the low-status group, but it may be based more on a critical analysis of privilege, or with a more generalized ideology, rather than personal experience with discrimination (or anticipation of personal gain). Crosby and Gonzalez-Ingal (1984) argued that feelings of deprivation on the behalf of members of other groups ("ideological deprivation") were rare, but Jennings (1991) posited that it might account for participation in social movements by members of groups that do not directly benefit from the achievement of the movement's goals. In fact, such ideological deprivation could be coupled with a superordinate group identification (Subašić et al., 2008) and collective orientation to create a politicized group identification, but one based on humanistic values (or identification with all humanity; McFarland, 2010). Recent research shows that identification with opinion-based groups is related to intentions to act collectively (Blau, McGarty, Reynolds, & Muntele, 2007; McGarty, Blau, Thomas, & Bongioorno, 2009; Musgrove & McGarty, 2008). Perhaps such identification is similar to ideological deprivation. Regardless, factors motivating allies to participate in collective action on behalf of low-status group members is an understudied area, and one ready for research.

**Collective Action Based on Voluntary (or Hidden) Group Memberships**

Much of the work identifying motivational antecedents to participation in collective action has been based on work with impermeable and stable group memberships (Tajfel, 1978). Although not generally mentioned, these group memberships are typically visible to outside observers. However, there are also instances of collective action that occur based on more permeable and unstable group memberships; for example, groups that form around solving a particular, temporary problem. Whether a politicized group identification is useful or necessary in these cases is an empirical question (McGarty et al., 2009).

A related, but also infrequently studied question revolves around the relationship of invisible low-status group memberships, or what researchers call "concealable stigmas" (Frale, Platt, & Hoey, 1998; Pachankis, 2007) to collective action. Research has shown that politicizing such group memberships (e.g., gay identity) is a powerful predictor of collective action (Stürner & Simon, 2004, 2005). Research on people with concealable stigmas shows that the strain of having to "come out" in every new situation is related to negative mental health outcomes (Frale, Platt, & Hoey, 1998; Pachankis, 2007). Staying invisible, then, may be less preferable than visibly identifying with a low-status group. However, the factors that lead some members of groups with concealable stigmas to politicize their identities and some not to do so is understudied and an exciting potential avenue for future research.

**Complicating Models of Collective Action with an Understanding of Intersectionality**

In a recent article, Cole (2009) addressed the complexity of multiple group memberships for psychological research, and her insights are valuable for collective action researchers. She described intersectionality as "analytic approaches that simultaneously consider the meaning and consequences of identity, difference, and disadvantage" (p. 170). That is, all people possess multiple social identities, some of which are high-status and some of which are low-status. For example, white women are advantaged due to race and disadvantaged due to gender. Feminist theorists have discussed the dilemmas for collective action inherent in intersectional identities since the 1970s (e.g., Beate, 1970; Combahee River Collective, 1977/1995). Hurtado (1989) explicitly recognized that a low-status group's position relative to a high-status group could differ based on additional group memberships. In her case, Hurtado discussed the ways in which white women and women of color had different relationships to white men, and that those differences affected the type and form of their oppression. Cole (2009) provided specific recommendations for researchers interested in dealing with intersectional identities in the research process (see, also, Greenwood, 2008). The group do no attend negoti our action rean...
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Understanding Right-Wing or Conservative Collective Action

Another area crying out for research is understanding the antecedents of right-wing or conservative political activism. There is some, mostly qualitative, work produced by sociologists and political scientists; for example Ginsburg’s (1998/1999) research on pro-choice and pro-life activists in Fargo, North Dakota, and Ezekiel’s (1995) research on U.S. neo-
Nazis and Ku Klux Klan members. In psychology, some researchers have examined the correlates of pror war activism (Duncan & Stewart, 1995), or looked at levels of right and left wing authoritarianism in radical left and radical right activists (Van Hiel, Duriez, & Kossowska, 2006). In Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, and Sulloway’s (2003) meta-analysis, they found that several psychological variables, including intolerance of ambiguity, death anxiety, low openness to experience, uncertainty intolerance, needs for order, structure and closure, low integrative complexity, and fear of threat and loss, were related to conservatism (see also, Van Hiel, Onraet, & De Pauw, 2010). They argued that conservative ideology was rooted in a psychological resistance to change and justification of inequality, and that the psychological variables mentioned above helped conservatives manage uncertainty and threat.

To my knowledge, no researcher has attempted to systematically apply group consciousness theories to understand conservative or right-wing activism. (However, see Duncan, 2010, for a case study using these theories to describe the activism of Ingo Hasselbach, a former Neo-Nazi). It would be useful to see if such models applied to activists on the right.

Crosby and Gonzalez-Inial (1984) discussed the application of relative deprivation theory to explain backlash, or resentment over an outgroup’s undeserved possession of goods. It is quite possible, even likely, that a politicized group identification can be developed from relative deprivation based on an assessment that a low-status group who had gained some absent rights (e.g., women gaining access to educational opportunities) was actually getting something they did not deserve, or that their gain of rights took away some previously enjoyed privilege of the high-status group. That is, it is possible that relative deprivation can develop in members of high-status groups based on erroneous perceptions of status. For example, in Klatch’s (1987) qualitative analysis of conservative women activists, it was clear that these women had a strong (traditionally feminine) gender identification, possessed a sense of relative deprivation about how their conservative moral values were being represented in society, and organized collectively to protest injustices. Similarly, in her study of contemporary conservative women activists, Schreiber (2008) explicitly noted that these activists had appropriated from feminists the language of identity politics, and possessed politicized (traditionally feminine) gender identities. Exploring the group consciousness of conservative activists more systematically, and how relative deprivation based on false assessments of status can be sustained, are fascinating research questions (see, e.g., Duncan, 2010; Ezekiel, 1995).

Implications for Increasing or Decreasing Collective Action

Knowing the components that comprise group consciousness, relative deprivation, or politicized collective identities suggests ways in which societal structures can interfere with these elements to restrict the collective action of low-status group members. On the other hand, it also suggests strategies that can be used by social movement organizations to politicize potential recruits. One of the main ways in which the collective action of low-status groups is kept low in the United States is through limiting system blame or the relative deprivation precondition—"lack a sense of personal responsibility for not having X" (Crosby, 1976, p. 90). Belief in meritocracy is powerful in the United States, and there is very little serious discussion of structural impediments to individual achievement (Kluegel & Smith, 1986). Thus, when members of a particular group are relatively powerless, they mostly believe it is their own fault—that if they exerted enough effort they would succeed. Related to meritocracy beliefs is the profound belief in individualism in most capitalist countries. Thus, even if a group member feels a sense of discontent, it is fairly unlikely that collective solutions will be embraced, unless the group has a history of collective action. Even in cultures where meritocracy beliefs and individualism are not as entrenched as in the United States, other aspects of relative deprivation may be limited.

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Another powerful way in which the development of low-status group consciousness is hindered is by limiting groups’ access to comparison groups that could lead to accusations of unfair treatment. For example, statistics from the U.S. government show that some of the lowest paying jobs are positions as child care workers, maids, and teacher assistants. They also happen to be female dominated jobs. In the case of teacher assistants, 89% of job holders are women (Weinberg, 2004). Women teacher assistants earn, on average, $15,000 a year, whereas men earn, on average, $20,000 a year in the same positions. Because there are so few men in this field, women do not have ready access to a relatively better paid comparison group that could lead to a sense of injustice, which could lead them to develop relative deprivation and group consciousness. (see, e.g., Alksnis, Desmarais, & Curtis, 2008; Major, 1989.)

To solve the problem of lack of reasonable comparisons in gender segregated professions, comparable worth activists have tried to change the relevant comparison group from other women working in exactly the same profession to men working in jobs requiring equivalent levels of education and experience. Such comparisons usually show women at a disadvantage. One major purpose of social movement organizations is to provide individuals with the missing preconditions of relative deprivation, providing alternative, systemic explanations for group members’ lack of power and influence, and encouraging and modeling collective action as a strategy for redressing power imbalances.

Research has shown that education about systemic causes of powerlessness in a particular group increases group consciousness and collective action. For example, Henderson-King and Stewart (1999) compared two groups of women who wanted to take Introduction to Women’s Studies—one group was admitted to the class, the other was wait-listed. Before and after the semester-long class, Henderson-King and Stewart measured several different aspects of feminist identity. At the end of the semester, they found that the women who had taken the women’s studies class scored higher than their wait-listed counterparts on feminist identification, power discontent, a composite of common fate and system blame, sensitivity to sexism, and feelings about feminism. Experimental studies focused around systematically removing and replacing Crosby’s (1976) five relative deprivation preconditions could go a long way toward providing practical suggestions for social movement organizations looking to increase participation in their organizations.

Conclusion
In this chapter, I reviewed and integrated the personality and social psychological research on motivation for collective action. Using the model presented in Figure 31.1 allows us to fill in the gaps in both literatures to arrive at a more complete understanding of why some people develop group consciousness and get involved in collective action whereas similar others do not. The identity and injustice-based theories offered by social psychologists (Crosby, 1976; Cross, 1971; Cross & Vandiver, 2001; Gurin et al., 1980; van Zomeren et al., 2008) offer compelling motives for participation in collective action. However, these theories are not good at explaining individual variation in group consciousness and collective action. Personality psychologists, on the other hand, document which individual difference variables distinguish between activists and nonactivists, and how predictive of collective action each might be; however, they do not necessarily explain how these differences motivate collective action. Taken together, these research traditions in social and personality psychology can describe individual motivation for participation in collective action.

This integration of theories has pointed out several areas that need further elaboration and research. These include understanding the relationship between voluntarism and collective action; understanding collective action undertaken by allies and based on voluntary group memberships; complicating models of group consciousness and collective action with an understanding of intersectionality; applying existing models to understand right-wing or conservative activism; and understanding how manipulating aspects of group consciousness increases or decreases the likelihood of collective action. Each of these potential research topics is possible using a combination of experimental and survey research techniques.

Finally, the approach I have taken in this chapter, reconciling seemingly disparate, but similar, constructs by integrating them in a model that respects both individual and group level differences, is one that researchers studying other aspects of psychology might fruitfully employ. Using experimental methods to identify how a particular process works under controlled conditions is essential to understanding psychological phenomena. Equally important is understanding and respecting the variability within groups represented by personality psychology’s study of individual difference variables. Only when these are taken together can we expect to gain a full understanding of human behavior.
References


