Rethinking Coalitions: Anti-Pornography Feminists, Conservatives, and Relationships between Collaborative Adversarial Movements

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This research was partially supported by the Center for Advanced Study in Behavioral Sciences. The author thanks the following people for their comments: Martha Ackelsberg, Steven Boutcher, Kai Heidemann, Holly McCammon, Ziad Munson, Jo Reger, Marc Steinberg, Kim Voss, the anonymous reviewers for Social Problems, and editor Becky Pettit. A previous version of this paper was presented at the 2011 Annual Meetings of the American Sociological Association. Direct correspondence to Nancy Whittier, 10 Prospect St., Smith College, Northampton MA 01063. Email: nwhittie@smith.edu.
Abstract

Social movements interact in a wide range of ways, yet we have only a few concepts for thinking about these interactions: coalition, spillover, and opposition. Many social movements interact with each other as neither coalition partners nor opposing movements. In this paper, I argue that we need to think more broadly and precisely about the relationships between movements and suggest a framework for conceptualizing non-coalitional interaction between movements. Although social movements scholars have not theorized such interactions, “strange bedfellows” are not uncommon. They differ from coalitions in form, dynamics, relationship to larger movements, and consequences. I first distinguish types of relationships between movements based on extent of interaction and ideological congruence and describe the relationship between collaborating, ideologically-opposed movements, which I call “collaborative adversarial relationships.” Second, I differentiate among the dimensions along which social movements may interact and outline the range of forms that collaborative adversarial relationships may take. Third, I theorize factors that influence collaborative adversarial relationships’ development over time, the effects on participants and consequences for larger movements, in contrast to coalitions. I draw on the case of the relationship between anti-pornography feminists and conservatives during the 1980s, charting the dynamics of their interaction across arenas and over time.

Keywords: social movements, women’s movement, pornography, coalitions, conservatism
Social movements interact in a wide range of ways, yet we have only a few concepts for thinking about these interactions: coalition, spillover (mutual influence without shared collective action), and opposition. The concept of coalition has come to carry excessive conceptual weight as the term for a wide range of relationships between movements. Many social movements interact with each other as neither coalition partners nor opposing movements. In this article, I argue that we need to think both more broadly and more precisely about the relationships between movements. In order to understand modes and consequences of collective action more fully, I suggest a framework for conceptualizing movements’ interaction and analyze non-coalitional interaction between opposing movements. Although social movements scholars have not theorized such interactions, they are widely recognized with the colloquy “strange bedfellows” and are not uncommon (Smith 2008). They differ from coalitions in their forms, dynamics over time, relationship to larger movements, and consequences. Understanding their dynamics is intrinsically important, as is understanding coalitions or countermovements, for understanding specific social movements as well as the broader forces that influence movements’ interactions with each other. Here, I draw on the case of the relationship between anti-pornography feminists and anti-pornography conservatives during the 1980s to conceptualize the dynamics of non-coalitional interactions and develop an analytical approach that may be applied more broadly.

Most scholarship understands social movements that work together as coalitions. Coalitions occur when “two or more social movement organizations work together on a common task,” ranging from an event to a specific campaign to a long-term collaboration (Levi and Murphy 2006; Van Dyke and McCammon 2010). Growing and productive
scholarship on coalitions has added to our understanding of how social movement organizations (SMOs) work together within the same larger movement and across movement boundaries (Bystydzienski and Schact 2001; Gilmore 2008; McCammon and Campbell 2006; Obach 2010; Rochon and Meyer 1997; Van Dyke 2003; Van Dyke and McCammon 2010). Coalition partners possess overlapping networks that “allow for the exchange of information between organizations” in order to coordinate actions, share resources and enhance members’ credibility, develop “an agreed-upon framing of the issues,” and are ideologically congruent (Gilmore 2008; Levi and Murphy 2006; Van Dyke and McCammon 2010: xvi).

Coalitions rest on compatible ideology or collective identity. In a qualitative comparative analysis of a wide range of case studies, Nella Van Dyke and Holly McCammon (2010: 305) found that either “aligned organizational ideologies or the presence of a threat to movement goals” were necessary conditions for coalition. Most coalitions grew from ideological alignment. While a shared threat could activate pre-existing social ties between SMOs and lead to coalition, even threat did not produce coalition across substantial ideological difference (McCammon and Van Dyke 2010). Indeed, studies find that even relatively small differences in ideology or collective identity can be challenging, such as those between liberal and radical feminists, immigrant and welfare rights groups, and labor and environmental organizations (Bevacqua 2008; Obach 2004; Reese 2005).

Feminist and conservative activism against pornography is widely cited as the sole instance in which a coalition occurred despite ideological opposition (Duggan and Hunter 1995; Ferguson 1986; Lynn and American Civil Liberties Union 1986; Nobile
and Nadler 1986; Page 1986; Strossen 2000; Van Dyke and McCammon 2010; West 1987). Yet, I show, while antipornography feminist and antipornography conservative movements shared a similar goal – the reduction or elimination of pornography – they did not possess the characteristics of a coalition. They differed in the ideological and strategic bases for this goal, their ties to elites, and the specific legislative and policy changes they supported. Unlike coalitions, they did not have pre-existing ties, overlapping networks, or compatible collective identities, and they did not develop agreed-upon frames or coordinate strategically. They explicitly opposed each other’s larger social movements, ideologies, and agendas and did not engage in shared collective action. At least around the issue of pornography, however, they were not countermovements either. Instead, they interacted sporadically because of their similar goal and because this goal drew them into the same state contexts. Such groups that are simultaneously friends and enemies, known in popular culture by the portmanteau “frenemies,” are widely recognized but rarely analyzed systematically. Here, I call them collaborative adversarial movements, to call attention to their ongoing opposition even as they interact in delimited ways around shared goals.

Pornography opponents’ status as iconic strange bedfellows makes them a fruitful case study for conceptualizing non-coalitional interactions between social movements. They are not unique, however. Collaborative adversarial movements converge around a number of other significant issues, including women’s suffrage, environmentalism, prison reform, civil liberties, same-sex marriage, anti-globalization, human trafficking, crime victimization, and other issues (Barbaro 2011; Bernstein 2010; Peterson 2000; Rentschler 2011; Smith 2008). Collaborative adversarial movement relationships emerge when
otherwise-opposed movements share a position on a specific issue. For example, Andrea Smith (2008) documents the “unlikely alliances” that draw together Native American activists and the Christian Right, while Jonathan Peterson (2000) shows that opponents of globalization include both leftists and conservative nationalists. Throughout the paper, I use the anti-pornography case to conceptualize the dynamics of non-coalitional interactions between social movements while developing a theoretical framework that can be used as the basis of a comparative research agenda. I conclude by discussing the importance of collaborative adversarial relationships in other cases and their impact on social movement dynamics more broadly.

[A] Conceptualizing Non-Coalitional Interactions

To conceptualize non-coalitional interactions, I first separate congruence of ideology or collective identity from interaction in order to distinguish types of movement-movement relationships. Second, I differentiate among the multiple dimensions along which social movements may interact and outline the range of forms that non-coalitional relationships may take. Third, I theorize factors that influence collaborative adversarial relationships’ development over time, the mutual influence on participants, and their consequences for larger movements, in contrast to coalitions.

[B] Types of Movement Relationships

Treating movement interaction and congruence of ideology and collective identity as orthogonal dimensions yields nine types of movement-movement relationships. I emphasize congruence of ideology and collective identity because these are key
dimensions that underlie coalitions (Van Dyke and McCammon 2010). Congruence consists of broad compatibility, with shared values and beliefs, but not necessarily complete overlap. Radical and liberal feminists, or labor and environmental activists, would thus be congruent because of their shared membership in a progressive social movement sector. Organizations are neutral when their stances toward each other’s ideologies, values, beliefs, or collective identities are neither congruent nor opposed.

Table One categorizes movements’ relationships based on ideological congruence (congruent, neutral, or opposed) and interaction (interaction toward shared goal, no interaction, and opposition). Each dimension is a continuum, represented here by ideal types.

[Table One about here]

Coalitions occupy two of the 9 resulting squares, in which movements that are congruent or neutral in ideology or collective identity collaborate toward a shared goal. The other two types of relationships between ideologically congruent movements, spillover and niche competitors (rival organizations within the same movement), are recognized types of interaction distinct from coalition, as are opposing movements (Edwards and Marullo 1995; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996; Meyer and Whittier 1994; Minkoff 1993). Movements with neutral stances toward each other’s ideology and collective identity may interact or not. When they do interact, their pragmatic alliance can be considered a coalition, but as McCammon and Van Dyke (2010) show, its path may be distinct and is facilitated by shared social ties, or bridging capital (Putnam 2000). Pragmatic opponents may have strategic differences or connections to opposed allies. Disengaged movements are likely quite common within the overall social movement sector.
Among movements that oppose each other’s ideology and/or collective identity some do not interact (detente), and others work against each other (opposing movements). Collaborative adversarial movement actors, the focus of this paper, are ideologically opposed yet share a goal. Their interactions are more narrowly delimited than those of coalitions and are a mixture of cooperation and conflict. Considering their modes of interaction brings us to a second theoretical distinction, the multiple dimensions across which SMOs may interact.

[B] Dimensions of Social Movement Interaction and Forms of Collaborative Adversarial Relationships

While most coalition scholarship specifies a focus on SMOs, here I consider a wider range of social movement dimensions (Van Dyke 2003; Van Dyke and McCammon 2010). Movements may interact across one dimension but not another. Interaction across different dimensions is related (e.g., movements whose leaders overlap are more likely to share frames or engage in shared collective action), but not determinative. Movements may converge along each dimension fully, partially or covertly, or not at all.

Coalitions interact or are compatible in the majority of dimensions: interaction between SMOs and movement leaders, social ties or overlapping social movement communities, congruent ideology and collective identities, development of shared frames, a joint focus on a specific campaign or goal, joint collective action, and both specific and overall goals. They may have shared or distinct elite and movement allies. Coalitional interaction can range from long to short term and from single-campaign to broad based
(Levi and Murphy 2006). Opposing movements generally do not overlap on any of these dimensions.

Collaborative adversarial movements interact along a narrower range of dimensions than do coalitions, coordinate only covertly or partially, and simultaneously oppose each other along some dimensions. Unlike countermovements, they share a goal, although they may seek this goal for different reasons and through different specific policies. Their form varies depending on the dimensions of each social movement that interact; some relationships may entail interaction among leaders but not organizations; others may be connected primarily through rank-and-file or social networks. Anti-pornography feminist and conservative organizations exemplify one such pattern. Table Two shows the interaction of feminist and conservative opponents of pornography along these dimensions. Most of their limited interaction was covert or partial; they remained opposed or disconnected along many of the dimensions that define coalitional interactions. Their interaction varied across arenas, and changed over time, as detailed below.

[Table Two about here]

[B] Collaborative Adversaries in Social Movement Context

Social movements are themselves internally diverse and coalitional, made up of numerous SMOs with different specific goals, ideology, strategies, and tactics (Rochon and Meyer 1997). Organizations within one movement or congruent movements may form coalitions of varying duration and intensity. Coalition partners are affiliated with larger parent movements (such as the women’s or environmental movement). While
coalitions may occasionally be movement-wide, they are more often confined to specific SMOs. They do not lead to ideological critique or factionalism within the broader social movements, although there may be strategic disputes about resource allocation or tactics (Levi and Murphy 2006; Obach 2010).

In contrast, collaboration with “the enemy” may spark critique of participants and even factionalism within their parent social movements, as well as strategic disputes about the risks of “getting in bed with the enemy.” Such collaboration is exceedingly unlikely to extend to the larger movements as a whole. Participants in collaborative adversarial relationships must manage these tensions. They do so by through distancing strategies such as keeping direct cooperation covert and advocating for their goal in different locations or through separate elite allies. These strategies shift over time and may be conscious and deliberate or simply result from participants’ pre-existing differences.

Despite their limited and covert interaction, collaborative adversarial relationships have the potential to influence both sides’ frames, strategies, or tactics. Such influence may be mutual or unidirectional. It is limited by participants’ interest in continuing to appear opposed to each other and the reputational risks they face within their parent movements, as well as by genuine opposition.

Unlike coalitions, collaborative adversaries are unlikely to simply part on friendly terms. The relationship is inherently unstable because the parties oppose each other in some regards and because they face potential reputational costs from collaborating with each other. When one parent movement is stronger than the other, this imbalance further destabilizes the relationship and shapes outcomes. The relationship may persist if an
issue is long-lasting with little resolution (such as the relationship between some progressive environmentalists and some evangelical Christians on the right around environmentalism (Smith 2008)). They may devolve into straightforward opposing movements when the specific issue or goal is resolved (often in favor of one party’s preferred solution) or becomes less salient. This is essentially what happened in the pornography case. In order for collaborative adversarial relationships to develop into full-fledged coalitions, participants must either undergo ideological conversion or split from their larger movements, or both.

Next, after discussing data and methods, I analyze anti-pornography feminists’ and conservatives’ interaction in different arenas and along different movement dimensions, focusing on collective action, ties between leaders, elite allies, frames, and goals. I identify the groups’ mutual influences and strategies for managing the tensions in relationships with each other and with parent movements.

[A] Data and Methods

Data include published primary sources, archival materials, and government documents. Published primary sources relating to both antipornography conservative and antipornography feminist movements include publications from all sides, compiled through comprehensive subject searches in major movement publications, memoirs, and other retrospective and contemporaneous accounts. ²

Because the main locations of interaction between the two movements were state contexts, government documents are an important source of data. These include transcripts of Congressional hearings on pornography, agency publications, Commission
reports, and amicus briefs for Supreme Court cases. Congressional Committee and
Subcommittee hearings analyzed include all hearings on pornography held between 1981
and 1991. This is the period during which the major events and hearings related to
pornography and sexuality occurred and when antipornography feminism and
antipornography conservatism were most highly mobilized (Duggan and Hunter 1995;
MacKinnon and Dworkin 1997; Strub 2011). I compiled a comprehensive list of
relevant hearings using a subject search on Lexis-Nexis and coded them to the witness
level. I read all hearings to assemble a comprehensive picture of legislation and
testimony, and selected several for close analysis based on the appearance of
antipornography conservative or feminist witnesses or their substantive importance.³
Congressional hearings are a good indicator of policymakers’ interest in an issue (King,
Bentele, and Soule 2007; Soule and King 2006). They also provide a setting in which
activists and advocates enter the state directly to make their strategic and discursive case.
They are thus a rich source of qualitative data on how witnesses and organizations frame
their positions and their claims of connection to each other (Allahyari 1997; Brasher
2006; Gring-Pemble 2003; Holyoke 2009; Miller 2004; Molotch and Boden 1985;
Naples 1997).

I identified amicus briefs for all Supreme Court cases dealing with pornography
with a subject search in Lexis-Nexis, collected all amicus briefs for the cases, and coded
them by authors’ affiliation.⁴ In addition, I include briefs filed at the district and
appellate levels for one case dealing with a key municipal antipornography ordinance
because of its unique substantive importance.
I use the Final Report of the Attorney General’s Commission on Pornography, contemporaneous reports, and archival materials from the collections of former Attorney General Edwin Meese and Women Against Violence in Pornography and Media (WAVPM) to analyze movement involvement with the Commission (Meese, Edwin Papers; Women Against Violence in Pornography and Media Papers). For the analysis of activists’ efforts around municipal legislation dealing with pornography, I rely on secondary and published primary sources as well as archival materials, including correspondence between antipornography leaders and organizational documents.

While other scholars have written about antipornography activism, none have analyzed Congressional hearings, witness patterns, or amicus briefs (Bronstein 2011; Downs 1989; Strub 2011). These original data allow me to unpack the interaction of the movements within the state with more analytical nuance.

[A] Conservative and Feminist Opposition to Pornography

Antipornography conservative and antipornography feminist movements were both highly mobilized during the 1980s and received considerable media publicity and attention from lawmakers. They differed from each other in their basis for objecting to pornography, composition, goals, and ties to larger movements. In this section, I provide a brief overview of these movements. In discussing them, I refer to non-state actors such as SMOs and unaffiliated activists, not to other opponents of pornography such as elected officials, prosecutors, or bureaucrats.

Religious conservative organizations had long opposed pornography; growth in the pornography industry during the 1970s heightened their concern and their increased
political clout drew them into policy campaigns. Secular conservatives largely seconded religious right opposition (Strub 2011). Pornography was objectionable to conservatives because of its depiction of nonmarital sexuality and its incitement of lust and masturbation, which they saw as part of a larger set of challenges to the family and children’s innocence. They defined pornography broadly, to include almost any representation of sexuality or nudity. Longstanding antipornography conservative organizations grew and new ones emerged following President Reagan’s 1980 election. These included Citizens for Decency Through Law, the Religious Alliance Against Pornography, and Morality in Media, and were closely connected to larger organizations such as the Moral Majority and to evangelical Christian congregations (Strub 2011). The movement included only a few nationally visible charismatic leaders – notably Focus on the Family’s James Dobson – but many skilled organizational leaders and clergy. Activists used both legal and protest strategies. Although limited constitutionally, they sought increased enforcement and broadening of obscenity law and zoning statutes in order to force pornography out of business or underground. They also sought to decrease consumption of pornography by defining it as a violation of sexual morality and to drive pornography outlets out of business through boycotts and other pressure tactics.

Feminist opposition to pornography emerged from the women’s movement’s concern with violence against women and sexism in the media (Bronstein 2011). Antipornography feminists saw pornography as central to women’s oppression because of its portrayal of women as degraded, objectified, and enjoying rape and pain, which they believed shaped the larger view of women as less than human and promoted violence against women. Major antipornography feminist organizations formed during
the late 1970s, including San Francisco’s Women Against Violence in Pornography and Media and New York’s Women Against Pornography (Bronstein 2011; Brownmiller 1999; Duggan and Hunter 1995). Charismatic leaders, mostly unaffiliated with SMOs, were central to antipornography feminism, and included Catharine MacKinnon, Andrea Dworkin, Susan Brownmiller, Gloria Steinem, and Robin Morgan. The feminist antipornography movement sought to raise consciousness among women and men to end pornography consumption, to drive pornography out of business, and to eliminate rape. Many advocated legislation defining pornography as a violation of women’s civil rights which, by allowing women to bring suit against distributors or producers of pornography, would force pornography out of business or underground. Like antipornography conservatives, antipornography feminists also used strategies such as protests, tours of neighborhoods with adult bookstores and theaters, and slide-shows of pornographic images designed to raise awareness about pornography.

Into the early 1980s, antipornography feminism was closely associated with the rest of the women’s movement, but, unlike antipornography conservatism, which had negligible opposition from the larger conservative movement, many feminist organizations and individuals opposed anti-pornography feminism on freedom of expression grounds, out of concern that sexual freedom would be restricted for women or sexual minorities, or because they opposed collaborating with conservatives or the state (Duggan and Hunter 1995). These intense internal feminist battles shaped both the larger women’s movement and the relationship between feminist and conservative opponents of pornography, as I discuss in the conclusion.
[A] Collaborative Adversaries: The Relationship between Antipornography Feminists and Conservatives

The movements’ interaction differed across arenas and over time. In local protests, which began before any contact between the two groups, they did not work together. The relationship emerged around local government, where they cooperated occasionally, discreetly, and in separate locations and times. Very shortly afterwards, both parties entered federal contexts, where they drew on separate elite allies and used distinct but occasionally overlapping frames to advocate for different but related goals. Over time, their interaction was nonexistent in the early 1980s, peaked in the mid-1980s as the movements sought to exploit each other’s political strength, and diminished by the late 1980s as conservatives gained (and thus needed feminist rationales less) and antipornography feminism waned, isolated both from conservative opposition to pornography and the rest of the women’s movement.

The following sections examine the movements’ relationship in each of these three arenas: non-interaction in protest, delimited backstage interaction in local settings; and separate and strategic engagement in federal contexts. These patterns suggest some paths that non-coalitional interactions can take; other case studies will yield additional patterns.

[B] Collective Action Outside the State: Lack of Interaction

Organizations from both movements engaged in collective action outside the state, but not together. Extensive feminist antipornography activism during the late 1970s and 1980s focused on direct action, writing, and persuasion, and was aimed at other feminists,
sympathetic women and men, consumers of pornography, and pornographic districts. New York’s Women Against Pornography (WAP) and San Francisco’s Women Against Violence in Pornography and Media (WAVPAM) organized marches and tours in red light districts; activists poured blood or ink on pornographic magazines, boycotted businesses that advertised in or sold *Playboy* or *Hustler*, and wrote books and pamphlets arguing that pornography constituted “woman hating,” in Andrea Dworkin’s words (Bronstein 2011; Brownmiller 1999; Duggan and Hunter 1995; Dworkin 1976; Dworkin 1991 [1979]). Similarly, antipornography conservative activists organized pickets and boycotts of 7-11 (ostensibly the nation’s largest retailer of pornographic magazines) that were framed by participants as based on Christian morality and protection of children and did not include feminist participants (Frame 1984; Rabey 1984).

The groups did not publicize or praise each other’s protests, let alone coordinate or cosponsor them. WAP received and responded to some letters of interest from antipornography conservatives, and some individuals likely joined the organization as paper members and perhaps attended marches or tours, but conservative organizations did not affiliate with WAP or cosponsor protests; the papers of the other major feminist antipornography SMO, Women Against Violence in Pornography and Media, contain no correspondence with conservative antipornography SMOs (Bronstein 2011; WAVPM papers).\(^5\) No articles about WAP’s red light district tours or slideshows appeared in the conservative press, nor about the conservative protests at 7-11 in the feminist press.

Both antipornography feminists and antipornography conservatives wanted to drive pornographic outlets out of business and were using similar tactics. They did so as
part of separate and opposed parent movements. Neither a coalitional nor a collaborative adversarial relationship developed until antipornography feminists began a municipal legislative campaign.

[B] Interaction in Local Government: Delimited and Backstage Interaction

In 1983, legal scholar Catherine MacKinnon and activist and author Andrea Dworkin wrote a municipal ordinance defining pornography as a violation of women’s civil rights and providing civil means of enforcement which they intended as a model that could be disseminated widely. It rested on antipornography feminist ideology, casting pornography as a violation of women’s rights in itself that also led to rape, domestic violence, and child sexual abuse (MacKinnon and Dworkin 1997). Framed around injury to women and civil rather than criminal law, the ordinance appealed to conservatives who hoped it would side-step First Amendment limitations to obscenity law. Versions passed in Minneapolis and Indianapolis in 1984; the Minneapolis mayor issued a veto, while the Indianapolis ordinance was promptly ruled unconstitutional (Downs 1989; Strub 2011).

Both feminists and conservatives worked for the ordinances, but not in coalition. Their collaboration was backstage and leader-centered, and their activism was geographically separated and sequenced, with first feminist SMOs and then conservative ones mobilizing, as the ordinance campaigns grew in different political contexts. In Minneapolis, where the ordinance was first introduced in the fall of 1983, supportive elected officials were Democrats and liberal Republicans. Activists from local women’s movement organizations turned out in support and organizers enlisted prominent feminist Gloria Steinem to lobby councilmembers (Dworkin n.d.a; Dworkin n.d.b; Leidholdt n.d.;
MacKinnon n.d.; Steinem n.d.). No conservatives spoke before the City Council in favor of the Minneapolis ordinance except the local president of Minnesota’s Morality in Media, who later retracted his statement.7 No other connections with conservatives developed, save for an endorsement in print by Phyllis Schlafly after the ordinance was introduced in Indianapolis (Bronstein 2011).

In contrast, conservatives dominated the Indianapolis campaign, begun several months later. MacKinnon, the sole feminist involved, worked with the ordinance’s sponsor, Councilwoman Beulah Coughenour, an antifeminist Republican and ally of religious conservative mayor, William Hudnut, who was praised in the religious conservative press for his commitment to cracking down on obscenity (Downs 1989; Rabey 1984). MacKinnon apparently helped substantially with the ordinance’s wording, testified before the City Council to introduce and explain the ordinance, and assisted with organizing witnesses who testified to the effects of pornography, but “worked more behind the scenes” and did not lobby individual members, some of whom assumed she was a conservative herself (Downs 1989:113). Indianapolis’s Moral Majority and Citizens for Decency Through Law mobilized members to attend a crucial vote, while local feminist organizations and individuals did not participate, nor did national women’s movement figures or organizations such as NOW or even WAP (which only endorsed the ordinance from afar) (Downs 1989; Duggan and Hunter 1995).

The dynamics and dimensions of interaction between the movements in these campaigns differ from those seen in coalitions. The ordinance campaign in Indianapolis entailed limited collaboration between an antipornography feminist leader (MacKinnon) and a conservative councilwoman. Otherwise, feminist activists – but not conservatives –
mobilized in Minneapolis, while conservative activists – but not feminists – mobilized in Indianapolis. The goal was shared, but the movements’ involvement was separated in time and space and SMOs did not interact or coordinate. Even MacKinnon’s work in Indianapolis was backstage and separate from the larger antipornography feminist organizations.

Unlike a coalition, even backstage collaboration carried risks for leaders’ reputations. Councilwoman Coughenour worried about collaborating with “radical feminists,” telling a journalist at the time: “That does give me real pause for thought because I’m a world apart. It is dangerous. It’s very dangerous” (Downs 1989:110). MacKinnon, criticized by feminists for the collaboration, repeatedly defended herself and downplayed Coughenour’s conservatism (MacKinnon 1997; Strub 2011). Unlike coalition brokers, individuals who facilitate coalition through their ties to both parties, these individuals did not have pre-existing ties to both sides, nor did they foster trust or negotiate with the parties about the structure of their collaboration (Obach 2010, Levi and Murphy 2006).

Several factors enabled the collaboration despite the movements’ differences. The geographically separate and sequenced nature of this interaction allowed both sides to support an identical goal. Flexible framing placed the ordinance within each group’s distinct self-definition. As each side framed pornography primarily in terms of its harmful effects on women, they retained but downplayed their divergent ideologies and the connection between ending pornography and their differing goals. Simultaneously, the movements’ differences of ideology and collective identity, lack of shared social ties, and different outside allies precluded more extensive collaboration.
[B] Interaction in Federal Contexts: Separate and Strategic

The relationship changed as it moved into national contexts. Antipornography activists on both sides targeted federal policy on pornography, primarily through the 1986 Attorney General’s Commission on Pornography (commonly known as the Meese Commission) and Congressional hearings and legislation on pornography during the 1980s. This section analyzes the relationship’s participants, elite allies, frames, and goals at the federal level. These are key dimensions for non-coalitional interactions and ones for which the dynamics differ sharply from coalitions. Antipornography feminists and conservatives stayed mostly separate from each other and strategically sought to advance their own interests even as they both worked against pornography.

Congress held twenty-seven hearings on pornography between 1981-1991; topics included phone sex lines, record labeling, child exploitation, and pornography more generally. The Attorney General’s Commission on Pornography met for about a year in 1985-1986, held hearings around the country, and issued a lengthy report. Both Congress and the Commission tilted right. The Commission was appointed by President Reagan, reported to Attorney General Edwin Meese, and was dominated by conservative opponents of pornography (Attorney General’s Commission on Pornography 1986; Strub 2011; Vance 1990). Although Congress was divided between Republican and Democratic control until 1988 (when Democrats gained control of both chambers) and both Democratic and Republican Committee Chairs organized hearings on pornography, Reagan’s presidency pulled Congressional action rightward as well.
In contrast to the municipal campaigns, at the federal level the two movements had little direct interaction—and no collaboration—among individual leaders or SMOs. No longer separated in time or space, both sides sought to influence the same state bodies, but their elite allies were largely separate. They continued to have different and opposed ideologies and collective identities and to calibrate their relationships with parent movements. Conservatives, however, sometimes borrowed language from feminist frames, decrying the harm pornography caused women. Antipornography feminists, in contrast, did not incorporate conservative frames. Unlike their support for similar municipal ordinances, here the two movements promoted related but different goals and were in unequal positions relative to political power. Conservatives advanced the view that pornography was a moral violation to be regulated through obscenity law while feminists promoted the idea of pornography as a violation of women’s rights and explicitly opposed obscenity law.

[C] Participants

Both antipornography feminists and conservatives spoke before the Commission and in Congressional hearings along with other witnesses, such as people who had appeared in pornography, those who had been victimized by assailants using pornography, and law enforcement officials. Overall, antipornography feminist and antipornography conservative witnesses were equally represented before the Commission and in Congressional hearings from 1981-1991, but many more feminists were unaffiliated individual activists while many more conservatives represented SMOs. Thirteen nongovernmental witnesses from each perspective testified before Congress between
1981-1991. All except one of the conservative witnesses were affiliated with antipornography SMOs, while only four of the feminist witnesses were associated with SMOs. The pattern among witnesses before the Meese Commission was similar, with 11 antipornography feminist and 16 antipornography conservative witnesses testifying (Attorney General’s Commission on Pornography 1986). All the antipornography conservative witnesses before the Commission were affiliated with SMOs, compared with five of the antipornography feminist witnesses, and many of the feminist organizations with which they were affiliated were small, local groups that never appeared before Congress, compared with larger and enduring groups on the right such as Citizens for Decency through Law that were regularly part of the policy process.  

The participants in the relationship from each side, in sum, differed. The internal debate within the women’s movement meant that major women’s movement organizations stayed away from the issue of pornography while major conservative SMOs actively participated. The impact of infighting (Ghaziani 2008) on participants in collaborative adversarial relationships distinguishes them from coalitions. In turn, this affects the relative influence of each side. Social movement organizations have more leverage in the policy process because they imply constituent support and are better able to forge ongoing relationships with Congressional staff and officials. Antipornography feminists thus went into the relationship with less power than their counterparts. The difference in their power was magnified by their different elite allies.

[C] Elite allies and network ties
Both feminist and conservative opponents of pornography testified before and sought to influence the Meese Commission and Congress, but their elite allies differed. In Congress, the pattern of hearings at which they were called shows their separate allies. Antipornography conservative SMOs had strong Congressional ties, with representatives appearing at most hearings that addressed pornography at length under both Democratic and Republican committee chairs. Antipornography feminist SMOs and individuals had much weaker Congressional ties, appearing at only four hearings; the majority of witnesses were concentrated in only one hearing in 1984 at the peak of publicity for the municipal ordinance and its feminist authors (U.S. Congress 1985). Only one hearing included movement witnesses from both perspectives, and there the two antipornography feminist witnesses were unaffiliated individuals testifying about their own negative experiences with pornography, while the conservative activists were from major SMOs (U.S. Congress 1989). Otherwise, antipornography conservative and antipornography feminist witnesses appeared in separate hearings. Further, only one other committee chair (Republican Arlen Specter) called witnesses from both movements even at separate hearings.

Similarly, in the Attorney General’s Commission, each movement had a tie to one or more Commission members, but not directly to each other. Antipornography conservatives had strong ties to their counterparts on the commission: Commissioner James Dobson of Focus on the Family, Chair Henry Hudson, and Executive Director Alan Sears. After the end of the Commission’s work, Sears went on to direct the major antipornography organization, Citizens for Decency through Law. Antipornography feminists had no direct representation on the Commission, but found a sympathetic ear in
Commissioner Frederick Schauer. While WAP suggested potential witnesses to the Commission Chair, the group never established the kind of link to him that the conservative organizations enjoyed.\(^9\)

Despite their ties to elites who were tied to each other, these indirect ties between SMOs and leaders in each movement did not facilitate deeper coordination. This relationship, based on working with separate elite allies in the same contexts, differs from coalitions, in which SMOs work together to influence the same elites or work together to influence allies from different policy domains such as labor and the environment (Borland 2010; McCammon and Van Dyke 2010; Obach 2004). Because conservatives’ allies were stronger and more numerous, antipornography feminist influence was limited. Again in contrast to coalitions, each group sought to advance their interest over the other’s even as they converged in their opposition to pornography.

[C] Frames

Activists from the two movements who testified before Congress and the Commission articulated their own movement’s frames for understanding and opposing pornography. Their testimony clearly illustrates these distinct frames, as well as instances of overlap and borrowing over time. Antipornography feminists emphasized the pervasiveness of rape, child sexual abuse, and domestic violence, the ubiquity of male power, and the centrality of pornography to women’s subordination. In a typical example, quoted prominently in the Commission’s Final Report, leader Andrea Dworkin decried the misogyny in pornography and its effects on women as a class:
I live in a country where if you film any act of humiliation or torture, and if the victim is a woman, the film is both entertainment and it is protected speech. Now that tells me something about what it means to be a woman citizen in this country, and the meaning of being second-class…. [Pornography] keeps us socially silent, it keeps us socially compliant, it keeps us afraid in neighborhoods; and it creates a vast hopelessness for women, a vast despair (Attorney General’s Commission on Pornography 1986:198-199).

The antipornography feminist frame consistently emphasized women’s subordination and pornography’s role in it. For example, at a 1984 Senate hearing on the “Effect of Pornography on Women and Children,” Dorchen Leidholdt, a leader of WAP, laid out the antipornography feminist critique of pornography, in dialogue with Subcommittee Chair Arlen Specter:

Ms. Leidholdt. … these [pornographic] magazines may indeed be sex discrimination, may indeed foster the second-class status of females in the society.…

Senator Specter. Excuse me. You think that women as a class are…having their legal rights violated by the way women are depicted in magazines like Playboy?

Ms. Leidholdt: I think we are having our civil rights violated and I also think that we are also having our human rights violated because much pornography literally depicts the torture of women.…

Senator Specter. And it leads to abuse of women by people in society who read the magazines?
Ms. Leidholdt. I think it leads to very systematic sexual abuse of women and children and I also think it keeps women as second-class citizens. It keeps women inferior. It keeps men perceiving and treating women as inferior and therefore it keeps us inferior in society.

When Specter asked Leidholdt if “these magazines” were obscene, Leidholdt critiqued the obscenity frame for not focusing on harm to women (U.S. Congress 1985).

In contrast, conservative antipornography witnesses espoused their own position but sometimes also borrowed from antipornography feminist frames (Vance 1990). Some witnesses took straightforward conservative positions, testifying against pornography based on its effects on morality and family life, causing men to deviate from their roles as providers and husbands into an obsession with sexual deviation that they imposed on their wives and sometimes on their children. For example, Brenda MacKillop, a former Playboy bunny, described the negative effects of pornography on her: “Playboy is more than a pornographic magazine with pictures of naked women. It is a philosophy that enticed me to throw aside my Judeo-Christian ethic of no premarital sex and no adultery and to practice recreational sex with no commitments….” (Schlafly and United States Attorney General's Commission on Pornography 1987:92-93).

Other conservatives melded the frames, mostly between 1984 and 1988, during the peak of antipornography feminist mobilization when they were exposed to the feminist frame through their indirect contact on the Commission and the local ordinance campaigns. Conservative activists briefly highlighted the “harm” that pornography did to women, pointing to pornography’s effects on women as a moral justification for stepped-up action against pornography. But despite borrowing the notion that women were
harmed by pornography, the conservative frame based the argument about pornography’s harms on a religious conservative morality rather than on feminist critiques of sexism. For example, in 1987 Alan Sears (then Legal Counsel for Citizens for Decency through Law and formerly the Commission’s Executive Director) testified before the Democratic-controlled House “Hearing on Women, Violence, and the Law.” Sears combined selected parts of antipornography feminist frames with conservative themes, emphasizing a range of harms that pornography produced for women: “loss of jobs or promotions, sexual harassment at the workplace, financial losses, defamation, loss of status in the community, the promotion of racial hatred, the loss of trust within the family…. the related divorces, the promiscuity, compulsive masturbation, prostitution and other sexual harassment” (U.S. Congress 1988). Only “sexual harassment” and “promotion of racial hatred” are clearly taken from antipornography feminist critiques. The remaining harms referred to effects on men who use pornography and thus on their wives and families; loss of jobs, for example, referred to job loss due to compulsive pornography use, a common theme in the religious conservative press. The remedy Sears suggested, in marked contrast to antipornography feminist demands, was increased enforcement of existing obscenity statutes.

Conservatives’ incorporation of antipornography feminist frames was short-lived. By a 1988 hearing, Sears cited negative effects on the “health of women,” but defined these effects through conservative morality. Rather than focusing on violence against women, he emphasized the negative effects of gay sex on family life, claiming that married men who go to adult bookstores and have sex with other men, “after having anonymous sexual activity and exposing themselves at great risk to sexually transmitted
diseases, including.... AIDS, then return to their homes and further transmit these
diseases to their innocent family or girl friends” (U.S. Congress 1989). Similarly,
antipornography conservative Jerry Kirk, explaining his commitment to working against
pornography, summarized the “victims” on whose behalf he worked, proclaiming, “Every
one of those little children, every one of those young people, and women, and marriages,
and families are worth it” (U.S. Congress 1989). While women were one of the
categories of victim, they were one among many and the antipornography conservative
concern with marriage, family, and children was prominent.

In sum, in contrast to coalitions, where SMOs develop agreed-upon frames
(Gilmore 2008; Van Dyke and McCammon 2010), antipornography feminists did not
employ conservative frames, but consistently opposed them. Antipornography
conservatives, meanwhile, strategically emphasized pornography’s harms to women
alongside its other ills, but in terms of degradation rather than oppression. Conservatives
adopted this language because of their exposure through the ordinance campaigns,
showing how collaborative adversarial relationships can influence frames. Yet they did
not retain these frames over time, but rather deployed them strategically when
antipornography feminist mobilization was highest, likely, Whitney Strub (2011)
suggests, as an attempt to cast pornography as more than a rightwing issue.

[C] Policy Goals

Although they shared the broad goal of eliminating pornography, the two
movements advocated different specific policies federally: zoning and obscenity
prohibitions vs. codifying the view that pornography violated women’s civil rights. As
we have seen, antipornography feminists promoted the civil rights approach and critiqued obscenity and zoning law in both Congressional hearings and before the Commission. Conservative activists sought to attack pornography by any means, but after the Indianapolis civil rights ordinance was deemed unconstitutional in 1986, they abandoned it and focused on obscenity and zoning, which antipornography feminists continued to oppose. Legislation introduced during this period paralleled conservative policy goals, aiming to expand obscenity law around specific categories, such as child pornography, and new media, such as telephone, video, cable TV, and computer pornography. Antipornography conservative organizations – but not antipornography feminists – testified in favor of this legislation and covered it favorably in conservative publications.

Legislation against pornography, whether based on MacKinnon and Dworkin’s civil rights approach, obscenity law, or zoning, has been subject to extensive litigation. The amici curiae briefs filed on these cases show little collaboration between antipornography feminists and conservatives. The Indianapolis ordinance case is the only one in which antipornography feminists and conservatives filed briefs on the same side of the same case. The only supporting amicus curiae brief at the district level for that case was a joint brief from Catharine MacKinnon and Linda Marchiano, whose account of violent coercion into performing in the pornographic film “Deep Throat” had been widely publicized and who likely only signed the brief (American Booksellers Association v. Hudnut 598 F. Supp. 1316 [S. Dist. Ind. 1984]). But at the appellate level, Morality in Media and other antipornography conservative organizations filed briefs, as did MacKinnon (American Booksellers Association v. Hudnut 771 F.2d 323 [7th Cir. 1986]).
In contrast, eight cases before the Supreme Court focused on pornography between 1981-1991, for which forty amici curiae briefs were filed by non-governmental parties. Of these, eleven supporting increased measures against pornography were filed by religious conservative antipornography organizations, four by ideologically neutral organizations dealing with child pornography, and one by Marchiano with a non-feminist lawyer. Most remaining briefs opposed expansion of antipornography law. No briefs were filed by antipornography feminist organizations or individuals. Antipornography feminists’ abstention reflected the cases’ orientation around conservative policy goals. The cases dealt with attempts to expand zoning restrictions or obscenity law, such as by seizing profits through RICO, forbidding nude barroom dancing, expanding definitions of child pornography, or making telephone sex lines illegal. These were approaches that antipornography feminists opposed.

In sum, while feminists and conservatives had supported the same municipal legislation, once the civil rights ordinance was ruled unconstitutional, they divided. Conservatives reverted to their previous policy goals and found support from the policy recommendations of the Attorney General’s Commission on Pornography and the Justice Department’s stepped-up obscenity enforcement (Strub 2011), while antipornography feminists continued to push for legislation based on how pornography oppressed women. A coalition, in which the parties share specific goals, ideology, collective identity, or frames, would entail support for at least some of the same policy goals. Collaborative adversarial movement actors who agree on a specific policy goal, such as opposing the Patriot Act or the Defense Against Marriage Act, are more likely to file joint or concurring amicus briefs even if their broader goals diverge. In the pornography case,
the parties instead agreed on a broad goal but not on the specific policies through which
to achieve it.

[A] Discussion

The case of antipornography feminism and antipornography conservatism
illustrates one path for non-coalitional relationships between opposed movements.

Actors in the two movements partially collaborated along some of the dimensions of
social movements identified in Table Two, opposed each other on others, and ran along
parallel but separate tracks on others. Their interaction and strategies for managing
tension varied by campaign and arena and changed over time. The two movements’
relationship has some things in common with coalitions: they targeted some of the same
institutions, shared a general goal, and sometimes borrowed frames. It has some things in
common with opposing movements: each sought to advance their own point of view over
the other’s, disputed the other’s claims, had different political allies, and saw their goals
as contributing to diametrically opposed agendas. Ultimately, the lack of fit with these
analytical categories points to the limitations of the categories for understanding social
movements’ relationships with each other.

I have argued for a broader and more precise framework for understanding
movements’ relationships with each other that has three components. First, types of
relationships between social movements are distinguished based on the intersection of the
extent of their interaction and their congruence in ideology and collective identity.
Collaborative adversarial relationships, although probably less common than coalitions or
opposing movements, are an important type. Second, movements’ interaction or overlap
with each other should be analyzed across multiple dimensions. Regardless of the type of relationship, social movements can vary in the dimensions along which they converge. Third, these relationships are interactive, change over time, and take shape in the context of larger social movements that are themselves coalitional.

Seemingly-unlikely relationships between ideologically opposed social movements are not uncommon. Such interactions include those between disability and anti-abortion activists, evangelyicals and progressives on the environment and the death penalty (Smith 2008), civil libertarians on the left and the right, conservatives and liberals on same-sex marriage (Barbaro 2011), nationalist industrialists and leftists against globalization (Peterson 2000). They occur around human trafficking (Bernstein 2010), charter schools (Beem 2001), homeschooling (Stevens 2003), opposition to genetically-modified organisms and agribusiness, a variety of prison and inmate labor issues (Smith 2008), child sexual abuse (Whittier 2009), and victim’s rights (Rentschler 2011).

Such non-coalitional movement interactions can take various forms, depending on which movement dimensions overlap. In the antipornography case, leaders but not SMOs occasionally cooperated covertly; the sides did not coordinate tactics, but sometimes shared frames and partially shared a goal. But these dimensions can combine in various ways. For example, rank and file members might interact cooperatively within a neighborhood, while leaders and organizations formally oppose each other. Ideologically neutral organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union might facilitate collaboration between ideologically-opposed groups, such as those on the Right and Left opposing drones. In addition to the dimensions of overlap, actors vary in their strategies for managing the inherent tensions of the relationship. The antipornography
groups used a variety of distancing strategies, including backstage interaction, mobilizing in separate times and locations, advocating different policies, and simply not interacting. Both sides, but especially feminists, sought to defend their reputations against charges of betrayal from their parent movement. Their relationship changed even over a relatively short period as both sides assessed the advantages and risks of collaboration and strategic borrowing. These are likely to be common tensions and they shape such relationships’ form, duration, and intensity.

Re-conceptualizing such relationships outside the framework of coalitions allows us to better explain interactions in which the parties simultaneously oppose each other and work together. As I have suggested, the factors that influence coalitions’ origins, collaborative form, work with elites, frames, and outcomes are different from those that influence collaborative adversarial movements. Whereas coalitions emerge from network ties and ideological congruence (Van Dyke and McCammon 2010), adversaries, who have neither ideological congruence nor robust network ties, may be brought together by political opportunities around specific issues or a broad-based threat (as in revolutions). Unlike the opportunities and issues that coalitions engage, however, those that facilitate non-coalitional relationships must be ideologically capacious (that is, possible to interpret from divergent points of view, such as religious freedom) or ideologically neutral, such as a locally focused issue. Whereas coalitions develop “rules and institutional arrangements” for their cooperation, share resources, lend each other credibility, and explicitly work together on events or ongoing projects (Levi and Murphy 2006: 658; Van Dyke and McCammon 2012), collaborative interactions between adversaries do not. They do not develop a coordinating structure, rarely share resources, undermine the
other’s credibility as often as they strengthen it, and work together on particular campaigns even as they work separately or oppositionally on others.

Policy outcomes for such groups, unlike coalitions, reflect the relative strength of the parties and their allies and typically tilt toward one member over the other. In the case of pornography, the power and influence of the religious right within the state shaped antipornography feminists’ and conservatives’ relative influence. While antipornography feminists made claims, conservative control of the state kept them as outsiders and limited their outcomes. Antipornography conservatives had more influence via their ties to the Republican-controlled Senate, Presidency, and Justice Department. Because collaborative adversarial movements share a goal in a specific campaign but often oppose each other’s other larger goals, outcomes must be assessed both for the collaboration and for each participant, in contrast to assessing outcomes for coalitions or for opposing movements. To be sure, such campaigns are likely less effective than those organized through coalitions. Without organizational structures to coordinate joint action or shared frames, members often work at cross-purposes. While their breadth potentially promotes wider support, allying with the enemy can also diminish support, as happened with feminist opposition to anti-pornography feminism.

Outcomes for participants also differ from coalitions and countermovements. Unlike countermovements, participants may influence each other’s frames and goals. Unlike coalitions, they can lead to threat to participants’ reputation and conflict or even factionalization within their parent movements. The implications for the larger social movement sector are therefore starkly different from those of coalitions. Collaborative adversarial relationships may dissolve over time and participants return to opposition, but
the fractures between participants and their parent movements can persist. Alternately, the participants might ally more closely over time and influence larger movement realignments.

Understanding strange bedfellows around pornography as collaborative adversaries, as described here, rather than as a coalition changes our understanding of this movement. It was the feminist antipornography movement’s interaction with the conservative state, more than with conservative SMOs, that led to the allegations of a coalition between feminists and the right (West 1987). But although movements can form coalitions with state actors, such as sympathetic Party members (Almeida 2010), this was not a coalition with the state, but rather an effort by anti-pornography feminists to influence policy outcomes that occurred when conservative activists were attempting to do the same. The inclusion of both movements’ frames in state discourse during the 1980s was the result of their simultaneous influence on the state, with antipornography conservative influence dominating due to their stronger state influence (Diamond 1995; Vance 1990). Similarly, feminists and moral conservatives have often interacted, historically and in the present, around moral reform, child abuse and neglect, sex work, and human trafficking (Bernstein 2010). Rather than viewing such interactions as necessarily coalitional, considering the changing and complex nature of non-coalitional interactions can deepen the questions we ask about their emergence and change over time, enrich our understanding of their interactions, and change how we assess outcomes.

Further research into the origins, forms, dynamics, and consequences of interactions between unlikely partners should show their variety and patterns. They may be more or less opposed to each other, with relationships at different points on a
continuum between collaborative adversarial movements and coalition. Coalitions between relatively distant but not opposed movements, such as labor and environmental organizations, may also share similar dynamics (Obach 2004). A research program examining the causes, nature, and outcomes of coalitions is well underway (Van Dyke and McCammon 2010). We need to develop a similar research program for other types of movement interaction. Coalitions in the classic sense are probably more common, but broadening our analytical lens allows us to understand movements’ relationships with each other more thoroughly.
Table One: Types of Movement Relationships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interaction between Social Movements</th>
<th>Congruence of Ideology and Collective Identity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Congruent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interaction toward shared goal</strong></td>
<td>Coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No direct interaction</strong></td>
<td>Spillover</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Opposition</strong></td>
<td>Niche competitors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table Two: Dimensions of Movement Interaction, Anti-pornography Feminists (APF) and Anti-Pornography Conservatives (APC)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Movement Dimension</th>
<th>Type of Interaction or Compatibility</th>
<th>Overt, substantial</th>
<th>Covert, Partial</th>
<th>None or opposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Movement Organizations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaders or movement elites</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social ties or movement community</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective identity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frames</td>
<td></td>
<td>APCs used parts of APF frames</td>
<td>APFs opposed APC frames; APCs used religious and moral arguments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective action</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific issue and goals</td>
<td>Shared: eliminate pornography</td>
<td></td>
<td>Disagreed on zoning and obscenity law</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Goals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite allies</td>
<td>Some overlap, mostly separate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other movement allies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No overlap or coordination between SMOs

Separate

Different and opposed

Different and opposed

Separate

Disagreed on zoning and obscenity law

Different and opposed: women’s liberation vs. strengthened families and religious morality

Separate and mutually opposed
REFERENCES


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Notes

1 This is a broader definition of congruence than used in some coalitions literature, which treats radical and liberal feminists as not ideologically aligned (McCammon and VanDyke 2010).

2 Media coverage is based on comprehensive search and analysis of coverage of pornography from 1981-1991, in the following publications: Human Events, Christianity Today, National Review, National Catholic Reporter, American Spectator, World, Christian Century, Commentary, Ms., off our backs.


4 I eliminated cases that cited pornography case law when dealing with a different issue, had no or few amici, dealt with sex offender registration and notification (SORNA), or dealt with live entertainment or sex work but did not engage with obscenity or zoning. I excluded briefs filed by cities, states, governors’ or mayors associations in my counts of feminist or conservative briefs.

5 WAP received material assistance from city government aiming to “clean up” New York’s Times Square (Van Gelder 1980). Bronstein (2011: 276-277) reports that in Pittsburgh, local antipornography conservatives sought to “claim common ground with feminists to disguise their sexist goals” and that to discourage such affiliation by the
Right, the Pittsburgh antipornography feminist group changed their name from WAP to Women Against Sexist Violence in Pornography and Media.

6 The ordinance defined pornography as a violation of women’s civil rights, subject to investigation by municipal Human Rights Commissions upon complaint by any woman who claimed she had been harmed by a specific piece of pornography. Those who appeared in pornography, were raped by assailants incited by pornography, and others who alleged direct harm from pornography also could bring civil suit against the producers or distributors of pornography. The Indianapolis ordinance was overturned; the overturn was upheld on appeal and affirmed without hearing by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1986. Similar ordinances were later proposed in a handful of other cities, without success (Bronstein 2011).

7 Based on my own coding of the witnesses’ testimony, as reprinted in MacKinnon and Dworkin (1997). Downs (1989) and Brest and Vandeberg (1987) reported the retraction by the Morality in Media witness.

8 Total Congressional witnesses 263; Commission total 322. Witness counts exclude statements by Subcommittee members and materials in Appendices. All witnesses are counted for the total, but government employees (prosecutors, inspectors, etc.) and elected officials are not included in the counts of antipornography feminist or conservative witnesses even if they made antipornography feminist or conservative arguments, as are witnesses who opposed pornography from neither feminist nor conservative perspectives and feminist witnesses who did not oppose pornography. Three witnesses from religious denominations’ family life divisions included in conservative total.
Bronstein (2011) shows that WAP files contain a list of “twenty-eight potential witnesses” sent to the Commission and that WAP “received a certificate of appreciation” from the Justice Department for this help (p. 327).