Narrator

Joan Dunlop (b. 1934) is past president of the International Women’s Health Coalition, which played a vital role in making women’s sexual and reproductive health rights a central tenet of the 1994 UN Conference on Population and Development in Cairo and the Women’s Conference in Beijing in 1995. She worked for some years with John D. Rockefeller III at the Rockefeller Foundation.

Interviewer

Rebecca Sharpless directed the Institute for Oral History at Baylor University in Waco, Texas, from 1993 to 2006. She is the author of *Fertile Ground, Narrow Choices: Women on Texas Cotton Farms, 1900–1940* (University of North Carolina Press, 1999). She is also co-editor, with Thomas L. Charlton and Lois E. Myers, of *Handbook of Oral History* (AltaMira Press, 2006). In 2006 she joined the department of history at Texas Christian University in Fort Worth, Texas.

Restrictions

None

Format

Six 60-minute audiocassettes.

Transcript

Transcribed, audited and edited at Baylor University; editing completed at Smith College. Transcript has been reviewed and approved by Joan Dunlop.

Bibliography and Footnote Citation Forms

Audio Recording


Transcript

Population and Reproductive Health
Oral History Project

Joan Dunlop

Interviewed by Rebecca Sharpless
April 14–15, 2004
Lime Rock, Connecticut

Sharpless

All right, this is the fourteenth of April, 2004. My name is Rebecca

Sharpless, and this is the first oral history interview with Ms. Joan Dunlop.

The interview is taking place in Ms. Dunlop's home in Lakeville,

Connecticut. It's part of the Population Pioneers Project being sponsored by

the Hewlett Foundation. Joan, first of all, let me thank you for your

hospitality, and for doing this—

Dunlop

Thanks for coming all this way.

Sharpless

It’s my pleasure. And before we started the tape, we were talking about

ways to proceed, and we thought we’d start with your work with John D.

Rockefeller. So, let me just ask you, how did you come to work for John D.

Rockefeller?

Dunlop

I was working at the Fund for the City of New York, I think. And I received

a mysterious phone call; a phone call which was very indirect, saying to me

that somebody from the Rockefeller office—not clear who or what office—

would like to take me out to lunch. And I thought to myself, All right, well

fine, okay. And this was just a young woman who was about, I would say, at

least ten or fifteen years younger than I was—Peggy, and I'm going to block

on her last name.
Sharpless: We can throw it in later. That’s the beauty of the transcript.

Dunlop: Yes, okay. We went to the Algonquin, and she talked in very indirect terms about some position in the Rockefeller family office. I think in the process of this conversation, I did find out that the person who was doing the hiring was John D. Rockefeller III, about whom I knew almost nothing, and I knew very little about how the family office worked. I didn’t know anything about room 5600, which was the family office, and 30 Rock and—

Sharpless: Okay, and 30 [Rock], that’s Rockefeller Center?

Dunlop: Yeah, on the fifty-sixth floor of 30 Rockefeller Center. That’s how we used to refer to it: 30 Rock 5600 is the euphemism for the family office. And that must’ve been in about March and then followed five months of interviews and, I used to calculate, between twenty-five and thirty interviews—three of them with Mr. Rockefeller himself—over that period of five months.

Sharpless: And as you went through the interview process, did you figure out what they were wanting, what kind of position it was?

Dunlop: Well, yes. I mean it was essentially on his personal staff. It was a staff job, it wasn’t an executive secretary job. It was a staff job handling his interests in population. And he told me that he was interested in three things. He basically thought that abortion should be legal. This is before Roe [v. Wade]. He was concerned about international population issues, and he was chair of the board of the Population Council. And my role would be, sort of, secretary to the board, which I was very bad at. And, um, he was also concerned about sex education. He felt that sex education in the United States was a disaster, and something needed to be done about it. He’d been
very influenced by Mary [Calderone]. She was the creator of SIECUS, S-I-E-C-U-S, and he’d been quite influenced by her.

But in the process of these interviews, I was basically being vetted—it’s like going to work for the CIA or something. I was being vetted by the personnel office, by three or four of his colleagues who were—I was to be what they call an associate of the Rockefeller Family and Associates, which is like a firm. And as an associate, you have a certain status and a certain level. So the other associates, all of whom were men, were trying to vet me, you know, see what I was all about. And also, my predecessor, who had been the person who really wanted Mr. Rockefeller to have a woman on his staff—I think they made a concerted decision, although JDR always said, “Oh no, you were the best person. There was no question you were the best person,” et cetera. But, they did search; they searched the names through all kinds of connections. And the way they got to me was extraordinary.

I had worked in city government in the office of the budget director, and for a period of time, I got to know a man called Lew Feldstein. Lew Feldstein and I became colleagues and friends; we worked together. And his wife, Hilary, had been in high school with David Lelewer, who was my predecessor at the Rockefeller family office. And Lelewer, in his efforts to reach out, called Hilary, and Hilary said, “I think you’d better talk to Lew, and you better talk to this woman, Joan Dunlop.” And that’s how it happened. It was totally serendipitous, I mean, or by accident; coincident accident.

And anyway, it turns out later that one of the reasons why they took
such a long time making up their mind—in those days my hair was dyed blonde, and it didn’t really work. It was my then husband’s idea of what—my hair was a sort of mousy brown color. And JDR was worried about that and thought that it was too flashy. (Sharpless laughs) But the most wonderful thing about this is that, I would say—nine months into the job after I was hired, he said to me one day as I was sitting in his office—and I would always be sitting in the chair beside his desk and then he would say, “You know, I collect a lot of paintings.” Very modest, gentle person. And of course, I knew that he had this great collection of portraits, which I’d actually seen.

And he said, “The frame is really important. And, you know, you have a very pretty face, but the frame of your hair is not right for your face.” It’s just, what do you think about this? I mean, not sexual harassment exactly but, you know, it was an issue that, in this day in age, nobody would have ever dared to say, I think. And I was taken aback. I thought, “Oh, my god, I’ve got to do something about this.” So, anyway, I went to Kenneth, of all places, here, and I said, “Get rid of this hair color. Put it back to what it was before.” And then when I finally changed it, which was quite dramatic, JDR, of course, never said anything. (Sharpless laughs)

But anyway, the more important point about the two stories, I think, that are important about being hired by him [are] one, he said to me, “There’s something wrong with the population field. It’s not working.”

**Sharpless**

He knew that already?

**Dunlop**

Yes, he knew it already. And later on when I said to him, “Why did you hire
me? I have no background,” he said, “The field needs new blood and the fact that you didn’t know the field was, as far as I was concerned, an advantage.” And also, I’d never been to college, so I had no academic training. So he said, “Take a year and go around and go to meetings and listen to people and tell me what you think is wrong.” So that was my first assignment. So that was that.

Then within the first week that I was there, and [I was] sitting in my office, Mrs. Rockefeller shows up and stands at my door in this wonderful mink coat, I remember, and she said, “Can I speak to you?” And I, of course, jumped up and said, “Yes, of course, come in. Shut the door,” et cetera. She said, “I’m very glad to see you here. I’ve wanted him to have a woman on his staff for many, many years, for a long time. But I want to say to you that you must tell him the truth. He’s not being told the truth. And in order for you to tell him the truth, you must consider yourself to be his equal”—which was, when you think about it, stunning. And also it was pressure because, at that point, I had no idea we were going to get into the controversy that we did get into later. And there were many times when I had to draw on that conversation, thinking to myself, Now I’ve got to tell him that I think this is what’s going to happen and, you know, still be in a very good state. It was fantastic advice.

So my efforts to try to figure out what the population field was all about—and by going to the Population Council board meetings and listening to these conversations—and there was a lot of talk about contraception. And this was the early seventies, so the women’s movement
was really flexing its muscle, and I wished I’d saved them, but I would get anonymous notes from staff in the Population Council women telling me how they were being passed over for a promotion or how they were being discriminated against in one form or another. And then I would listen to these conversations about contraception and it was very hard not to feel repulsed because women were being treated as objects and a means to an end. And I used to describe it as saying, you know, there’s this rising birth rate and the way to attack it is technology, through the women as a vehicle. And women’s lives, and why women have children, or what the rationale for it [may be], or what they felt, or were their concerns [were], never came into it at all, ever.

And then I became increasingly puzzled by this, because I had come out of, not the civil rights movement exactly, but I had worked for some extraordinary people in the Ford Foundation and then in city government, and I’d worked also for Dr. Kenneth Clark, the African American psychiatrist. And I had learned a lot about racism, my own and what it was and how to read it. And I felt the racism in this field. I just could—it was palpable. And also, I thought that it was also terribly innocent, in a curious way. People did not understand what they were saying or what their values implied. And I was beginning to tear my hair out, so I went to Susan Beresford, who was not president of the Ford Foundation in those days, but I had known her for many years. We were sort of contemporaries at Ford because she was on the domestic side of the Ford Foundation. And I knew from my past history that the international side of the Ford and the
domestic side never talked to one another. And I said, “Susan, I’m totally bewildered by this. I cannot fathom it. I don’t know what’s going on here. It’s as though people who did international work have lived in a different planet and that the civil rights movement of the last ten years or fifteen years in the United States never touched them. They lived elsewhere, outside of the Earth. Their heads were turned away from the U.S. And I can’t figure out what’s going on here.”

And she said, “Well, there’s a very bright young woman here called Adrienne Germain. She’s working for Bud Harkavy. I think you should go and talk to her.” So that was in 1973, probably. And I went to see Adrienne, and I said, “Would you like to come out to dinner?” At the time, she was flabbergasted. Nobody ever asked her out to dinner before, least of all from the Rockefeller office. And we went to a Chinese restaurant, and she started talking. And I thought to myself, That’s it, that’s the problem. She had her finger right on it, as far as I was concerned. And then I went back to Mr. Rockefeller, and I said, “There’s a problem. This is the problem. The [population] field was shot through with unintended sexism and racism, and there was a stranglehold on money and ideas, and it’s held by six people. The money’s held by Rei Ravenholt.”

**Sharpless**

USAID. [U.S. Agency for International Development]

**Dunlop**

Yeah, USAID; by Bud Harkavy at Ford, who was—Ford had a lot of money; by the Rockefeller Foundation—I can not remember the name of the head of the population program at the Rockefeller Foundation in those days; and then by a man called Bob Bates, who worked for the Rockefeller
Brothers Fund, who was less controlista in his attitude. But still, there was this cluster of money. And then the ideas were held by Barney Berelson, who was in the Population Council; by Ron Freedman of Michigan; and Ansley Coale at Princeton. But those six people had a grip on both the ideas and the money.

When Barney wrote a piece that was very famous called “Beyond Family Planning,” saying that you couldn’t get beyond family planning, that was the only means to reduce population, Adrienne wrote a critique of it, which he suppressed. I don’t know whether Adrienne talked to you about this, but it’s a very important piece. And I don’t know whether she still has this document; I hope she does. She’s a much better archivist than I am.

She was quite young, yes.

Twenty-eight or younger than that, even, maybe. It was the first time that she began to feel that this was a struggle for ideas as much as it was for values. So, that was my—and I don’t even remember exactly when I had this conversation with Mr. Rockefeller, and I don’t even think I put this down on paper, because I was too afraid of it, I thought it was too controversial.

Yeah, I said to him, This is what I think is going on here.

Then along comes Carmen Miró, who was a prominent demographer, and this organization called the IUSSP, the International Union for Scientific Study of Population. And the Bucharest conference was coming up in 1974, and there was going to be, for almost the first time, an NGO [nongovernmental organization] parallel meeting. And she was running the IUSSP program at the nongovernmental conference. And she asked JDR to
speak to the nongovernmental conference on the role of the developed world. And she came to me as a staff person. And I said I thought he might be interested. And then I said to her, “I want to come and talk to you about what he might say.” And I insisted on meeting with her away from my office and in her hotel room. I knew she was something—not a Marxist exactly, but she had very, definitely, Latin American views of this.

**Sharpless** Where was she from?

**Dunlop** She came from Panama. And I said, “I think if he’s going to speak, it must be something significant, and this question of women is a real problem, and I think that this is the kind of thing he needs to say, but I need your help. If I’m going to do this, we have to have an understanding that this is what he’s going to say.” And she got it totally, and she was thrilled and said, “Yes, absolutely. Go for it.” So, then I went back and he said yes, he’d like to do it, because actually he wanted to be head of the U.S. delegation. But Nixon was in the White House, and there was no way Rockefeller was going to be head of the U.S. delegation. So he knew that he would get some prominence from this, which is what he also wanted, as well as the issue. He wasn’t completely naïve. So we started working this speech, and it took six months to write it. And Adrienne was one of the—she really wrote the piece on women, (laughs) and when you read it now, it reads like pablum. I mean it was just totally (laughs)—it seems very, very tame as of today.

**Sharpless** That was in 1974?

**Dunlop** Yeah, 1974. And the team that worked on it—I put together a team of people. Adrienne was one. Steven Salyer, who later married Adrienne, was
another person, and I had gotten to know him because when I came to work for JDR, he had just finished being head of a U.S. Commission on Population and the American Future to look at the United States and population issues. On that commission, he selected a lot of the people, but with Moynihan to be on it. And Steve Salyer—we wanted young people, and Steve was then nineteen. So, I met Steve when I came into this job, and he was interested in economic development issues. And then the third member of the team was a man called Jerry Barney, who worked for the Rockefeller Brothers Fund whose interest was environment and sustainable development.

So the four of us wrestled with this text, which was a difficult process. It was also difficult because I knew that Barney Berelson wouldn’t like it. I also knew that Barney wanted to do, post-Bucharest, was not something that I thought made any sense for JDR in the current climate.

**Sharpless**

And what was that?

**Dunlop**

He wanted to really put together, actually, I think, for Bucharest something similar to the World Leaders Statement [in Support of the International Conference of Population and Development], a sort of rhetorical statement about population growth and population control. And I thought that was a stale idea, and it wouldn’t go anywhere, it wouldn’t get any attention. And I then began to be suspicious that Barney was looking for things to keep JDR busy and that some of the busyness that the population professionals—they saw Rockefeller—and in retrospect, I understand why—they saw him as their, in a sense, agent. They didn’t respect his intelligence and they didn’t—
that’s not quite it—they didn’t respect his scholarship, and they didn’t really, in a sense, respect him, I came to the conclusion. They were using him for their purpose.

Sharpless
What we would call a sugar daddy.

Dunlop
Well, he had the money and he had the status, but he also had the platform. He was who he was, and he was important as a platform. But they wanted to be sure that they programmed him, and when I came in with different ideas, they didn’t like me one bit. Anyway, I was a woman, but they didn’t like what I was saying to him. They felt that I had seduced him, literally I think, and kind of as a coda to that, Joan Cooney, the creator of Sesame Street, who was on another committee that I’d put together having to do with sexual development, which I’ll tell you about later, came up to me and said, “Don’t worry. I know there’s lots of rumors about you having an affair with JDR. I’ve told everybody they’re quite wrong. It’s not an issue.” So I thought that was sort of interesting.

Sharpless
It’s a woman, and she has power, she must be—

Dunlop
Well, also, she’s much younger. And so I was thirty-eight when I went to work for him, and he was, whatever, in his late sixties. So that was an issue that was rolling around there. But they basically didn’t like my ideas, and they thought that I was, basically, Marxist, which of course I didn’t know anything about Marx. I mean, I was totally stupid, really ignorant. I was just here with what I saw as reality. (laughs)

So, but going back to Mrs. Rockefeller. When we got this speech—I think this is in the JDR file with me—but when we got the speech to its
final draft, and Barney was going to come in and take a look at it, I knew that it was going to be a row, and he was fighting it tooth and nail. He didn’t want it. He didn’t want JDR to make the speech. And he simply didn’t want to have this motley crowd, you know, writing it. From his perspective, you can actually see that. I can really understand that now from my advanced years. But his capacity to deal with it—he could not deal with me at all. We couldn’t even have a conversation.

Sharpless
He really lost his temper, didn’t he?

Dunlop
Yeah, he lost his temper. And actually—he was drawn off by my adorable colleague Porter McKeever, who understood what I was doing, who was another one—he was a senior associate around John Rockefeller. And he drew Barney’s fire away from me and was one of the most honorable and wonderful things, I think, you know—it’s something I will never forget. I can see it, I can see McKeever sitting and saying, “Barney, what’s your problem? I don’t understand what your problem is with this. There’s nothing wrong with this speech.” Blah, blah, blah, blah. Well, anyway, I had told JDR before that this was going to happen. So this again goes back to Mrs. Rockefeller. I said, “We’re going to have this problem. Barney’s not going to like it. And you’re going to have to choose between him and me.” I was going to be that blunt. I mean, I said it just like that. And he knew it. So, for whatever reason, he decided to go with us.

Sharpless
And you don’t know why?

Dunlop
I think he has instinct. He has instinct about people and about values, and his insight was remarkable. He might not have even been able to articulate,
or wanted to articulate what he really thought. But he had a suspicion before he even hired me. I used to say to people, “Listen, I didn’t hire him. He hired me. He knew who I was.” You know, they checked me out backwards, forwards, around the bend. They weren’t about to get anybody in that office they didn’t check out in every dimension. So he knew where I was coming from, he knew what my previous mentors had been, he knew I had this background of being outspoken and being involved—I wasn’t particularly involved in women’s rights particularly, but I certainly had a reputation for being independent-minded. So it was predictable, I think, in many ways.

But then Steve and I went ahead to Bucharest, I think, and Adrienne, the three of us went ahead—we were a kind of advance team—leaving Jack Harr, who was the writer and also an associate of Mr. Rockefeller’s [and who had] done most of his writing with him and for him over the years—to write the press release. And when we got the press release in Bucharest, I was furious, because it didn’t express what the speech had said. So Steve and I rewrote it, and we never told JDR, we never told Jack Harr. I did tell Porter McKeever the morning after, and he said, “Oh, mea culpa, forget it.” And I said, “Listen, we rewrote the whole thing.” And that was sort of my final—not final—but that was a strike for freedom that I really remember that as being one of the first times in my career where I knew I had to take a very strong stand.

**Sharpless**

That press release couldn’t go out as it was written.

**Dunlop**

And I don’t know that we still have the original. I mean, I don’t know that I have this in my files, these two different documents. They may well be, I’m
Sure, in the Rockefeller archives somewhere.

**Sharpless**

Well, when you think about it, Mr. Rockefeller was uniquely situated to be the person to make this sort of—

**Dunlop**

Sure.

**Sharpless**

I mean, he was beholden to no one.

**Dunlop**

Right. And, of course, the press picked—what they basically said is, Rockefeller abused his views about population and makes—what is that Nixon’s statement?—reappraisal or something. And that got on the front pages of papers all over the world. And I was slightly aghast. And he was thrilled, he was very happy. (laughing) But the population establishment was furious. And Adrienne had to take the brunt of this, because people knew she was closer to the population professional field than I was. I was in a sort of ivory tower in many ways. And so they didn’t come after me particularly; they went after her.

**Sharpless**

Well, explain to me. Okay, so you and Adrienne went on to Bucharest.

**Dunlop**

Right.

**Sharpless**

And what was it like when Mr. Rockefeller delivered the speech? What was it like being in the hall?

**Dunlop**

Place was jammed. Absolutely jammed—

**Sharpless**

This was an NGO meeting?

**Dunlop**

Yes, and I was in a kind of student—

**Sharpless**

So, were many of the official delegates there, or was it just—

**Dunlop**

No, I don’t remember the official delegates. I don’t know that they were—there were Romanian police and, you know, all of the front two rows were
all the security people. The security was incredibly tight. The fear was really coming from the left, in a way. Indeed he was accosted on the stairs at one point by somebody. But it was a lecture hall, I think, in the university, and there were two or three balconies above. And it was hot we were all highly nervous. (both talking)

**Sharpless**

Was Mr. Rockefeller nervous?

**Dunlop**

No, he had a very calm and, sort of, not detached demeanor, but close to it.

Mrs. Rockefeller was there as well. I never found out what she thought about it all.

**Sharpless**

Do you think he knew he was about to throw a bomb?

**Dunlop**

I think he must’ve. He had consulted enough of the people. Barney wasn’t the only person who told him it wasn’t a good idea. But, you see, I also think in those days, he had a whole project in the office on youth and young people and the role of young people in public policy, and I think he had been also much influenced by his younger daughter, Alida, about how to think about the future and what was going on in the world and women. And later on I introduced him to a lot of women leaders: Germaine Greer, Gloria Steinem, the people who were prominent, were making the news. I wanted him to understand what this women’s movement was really all about. And I think that he just—I think he knew it. However, he wasn’t quite ready for the backlash. So later on, he did almost equivocate. But the real problem was, what was going to happen with the Population Council and with Barney Berelson.

**Sharpless**

One more thing about Bucharest. The room was there, it was packed, it was
hot. What was the feeling in the room at the reception of the speech?

**Dunlop**

It was divided, first of all because people from developing countries, particularly Latin America, were thrilled. I mean, they came up to me afterwards and said, “This is fantastic. We can now do all kinds of things we never could do before. And he’s given us another umbrella, or another rationale, not just his rationale of quote unquote population control.” So, from the developing world, there was strong enthusiasm. From the population establishment, for lack of a better expression, there was cold silence, I think it’s fair to say. I’m not sure that they even clapped. We knew though. I used to say that Fred Jaffe and Jeanie Rosoff took Adrienne out to the woodshed, basically, and, you know, gave her all kinds of grief about this. Because what they saw was that the streams of money, the appropriations, especially coming out of USAID, which were enormous in those days, were going to get diffused, and that this narrow concentration on family planning was going to get channeled off or undermined in some way and that the rationale, which had been so carefully crafted with the Congress, was going to start to unravel.

**Sharpless**

I need to turn the tape.

*Tape 1, side 1, ends; side 2 begins.*

Okay, you were talking about Fred Jaffe and Jean Rosoff.

**Dunlop**

Well, they were very, very upset, as was—I mean, the population establishment was furious with all of us, with us, I mean, Jerry Barney, Steve Salyer, Adrienne, and me. They thought that we were just a bunch of young people who didn’t know any better and were creating havoc. And then, with
the question of what happened next, which was another example of how difficult—this field was in a real sort of paradigm shift. There was a paradigm shift going on. And it was, in some ways, the field was bankrupt, not of money, but of ideas. And it was going to flounder, I felt, it was going to get stuck in tar on the road, because there was no vitality to it. And the very people who should've been involved in these programs, active in them and leading them, were women. And they were being, you know, repressed in these [areas], for all the reasons we now know.

I felt that there were—and I'd been around enormously dynamic program people in the foundation community, at Ford, under this man Paul Ylvisaker, who I worked for in the sixties, who was a great innovator and who did—Ford then, to digress slightly, was designing what became the War on Poverty. And I had been around a lot of creative people, including, too, in the Lindsay administration, where I worked for the budget director. I knew what first-rate programming was, and I knew that this wasn’t, that this was stale and atrophied and that they were on the defensive. And they had in there as critics the very people who they were trying to help. Now there were people from Latin America or people who were working in the villages, people who were on the ground in the field who were hampered by the values that were expressed by this family planning idea, which was in fact a very liberating idea. It was so perverse in many ways.

So, when we got back to New York, JDR said to me, “You know, we have to find a replacement for Barney. He’s quite ill.” And he said, “You’re not to tell anybody this. He’s not said anything. He’s had a series of strokes,
little mini-strokes, mini-heart attacks, and he could drop by the wayside any
day, but he doesn’t want to tell anybody. But we’ve got to start a search for
a successor.” Well that was a hopeless situation. Very difficult. And, um—

Sharpless

Now, what was Mr. Rockefeller’s official connection with the Pop Council?

Dunlop

He was the chair of the board, and he founded it with his money. (both
talking) By 1978, he wasn’t the major funder by a long shot, but he was chair
of the board and, in that sense, it was his organization. It was his baby. So
somehow or another [it] became publicly known that we were going to have
to do a search.

Sharpless

Against Barney’s wishes?

Dunlop

Well, I think Barney, by then must’ve come to terms with it in some way.
The first search committee was headed by Polly Bunting, who was on the
board. And they had a terrible time. They couldn’t find anybody. They
couldn’t find anybody who had the qualifications and the stature they
wanted who would take the job. And again, this is something to be looked at
by scholars, I think, but the staleness of the ideas was running up against the
vitality of the political opposition, and we just—we tried for one person who
was very prominent, whose name escapes me at the moment, and he said no.
And that was a huge shock. We thought, Oh my god, we’ve been turned
down? And JDR then decided, I’m going to take the search back into my
office and you, Joan, are going to do it. And, you know, I thought to myself,
okay. I felt that we needed somebody from the field. We needed somebody
who knew the reality of lives in villages, who knew—this wasn’t a job for an
academic. But the Pop Council strongly felt that they—and there was a real
division on the board about this. And I don’t really remember know how long we looked for, and it wasn’t my idea to find George Zeidenstein. It was actually Parker Mauldin’s idea, who was working for the Pop Council. He said to me, “I was looking at the Ford reps”—the people who were running the Ford offices overseas—“because I knew they had this kind of hands-on experience.”

Sharpless: People like Adrienne had had in Bangladesh?

Dunlop: Yes, indeed. She was later on. She had that same job, but she’d also done work in Bangladesh for George Zeidenstein. Well, then when it came to the board. There wasn’t a unanimous vote.

Sharpless: I’m sorry?

Dunlop: It was not a unanimous vote. During this whole period, JDR used to use an expression. He’d come into my office and he’d say, “I’ve had another cold shower”—means that someone else had just told him he was, you know, crazy or out to lunch or whatever they told him. That was his way of expressing opposition. He always used to find it very humorous, which I find an interesting fact, because I think he probably liked it (laughs).

Anyway, but finally, you know—and I think there are memoirs about this—[we were] going in to this board meeting, knowing that we were going to present George as a candidate and knowing that we were going to run into opposition. And Frank Notestein, who was a prominent demographer from Princeton, probably close to retirement, was furious, and felt that we were going to ruin the organization. He voted against it. A woman ethicist, whose name I’m not going to remember, [Sissela] Bok—she’s sister of the
president of Harvard, and she’d written a book on ethics—she was also against it, because she felt that George hadn’t published anything. But most of the board voted with JDR.

**Sharpless**

Um-hm. What were the objections to this?

**Dunlop**

Well, that he had had no published work. And that he was a nobody, basically. I thought there was anti-Semitism in it. I was very suspicious about that piece of it. Um—

**Sharpless**

And why did you think he was the person for the job?

**Dunlop**

Because he had the sense of what life was like for real people living in real villages, and it wasn’t just about fertility. There were issues of economic autonomy or economic opportunity, and that he also was very sensitive to the issue of women. His wife had already started to write about the lives of women and how their lives were curtailed, repressed, oppressed, and she published a couple of interesting essays on the topic. So he was very sensitive to that question, he was aware of it. He also had a lot of courage and he was tough, there was a toughness to him that I thought would help him. And, of course, within less than two years, JDR was dead. So it was tough business. So without going—I mean, I could say more about the work that I did for him—

**Sharpless**

I wish you would.

**Dunlop**

Well, on sex education, you know, he asked me to look at the sex education business. And I went and I talked with Masters and Johnson, talked to them, I talked to Mary Calderone, who was the first person who influenced me. I went to one of these sexuality sensitization sessions at the University of
[Minnesota], Minneapolis, where, you know, around the wall are all kinds of sexual activities going on trying to desensitize you, so you can be more relaxed about sexuality. I was sort of looking at people who knew how to break through. Again, [I was looking for] a paradigm [shift]. I was headhunting. I was searching for talent and for ideas. And I thought to myself, This is insane. And I came back to JDR, and I said, “I can’t find anything that I think is worth supporting. I think you may have to create it yourself. I think we’ll have to do it ourselves. Because I just can’t see anything that I think is going to break through in any way.”

And so we designed this project on sexual development. I picked that phrase very carefully: sexual development, not sexuality, not sex education, but that it was about a development process. And there were three pieces of this, as I remember. There was an academic piece, and I’ve got the books right there. Then there was a survey of parental attitudes to the sexuality of their children under the age of six, and we started in Cleveland. And the woman who did it, I’ve seen her in the last ten years, and she said, “Joan, you have no idea what effect this had. This was the most incredible piece of work.” We had no idea at the time that it would have such an effect. Turns out that there were huge gender differences between husbands and wives about their own children’s sexuality—surprise, surprise. And that in some cases, they didn’t even (laughs) know how many they had, boys or girls. I mean, the difference—the men knew nothing, and it was so striking.

That study was in Cleveland and was partly supported by the Cleveland Community Foundation, I think. I raised the money for it. It wasn’t just
JDR. Carnegie came into it, [and] Barbara Finberg was very supportive. And the Cleveland Community Foundation, I knew them pretty well. The people I knew from my past, I went around and said, “Come on, we’ve got to do this. This is really important. And JDR can’t do this all on his own. Otherwise it’s not going to be accepted.” And I found this woman, Elizabeth Roberts, and I can’t remember for the life of me where I found her. And then I found this professor, [Herant] Katchadourian, who’s now at Stanford who’s become quite prominent, who did a lot of the academic work. And then I found a guy called John Gagnon, who was a really interesting researcher. So it was a three part [project], it was A, the study, B, the academic papers, and then there was a third piece of it. The study produced two volumes. One was called *Childhood Sexual Learning: The Unwritten Curriculum*, which was a series of essays edited by Liz Roberts, Elizabeth Roberts. And the other was called *Human Sexuality: A Comparative and Developmental Perspective*, edited by Katchadourian, who’s become quite prominent at Stanford now, and it would be interesting to read these things in retrospect, because these were published in 1979.

**Sharpless**
So, twenty-five years now.

**Dunlop**
Um-hm. What’s frustrating about this [Dunlop is looking through books—ed.] is I don’t see the Cleveland study here, and I think it must have been another publication, and I don’t have the Cleveland study.

**Sharpless**
You were trying to, again, create a paradigm shift.

**Dunlop**
We were trying to break through a logjam of a conceptual framework that was heavily, as we might have known, embedded by values, and have people
understand that this was a natural process. I mean, it’s obvious that—
Michael Carrera’s in here. He’s become very prominent since then. But we were trying to make a paradigm shift. It was based at the Harvard School of Education under my former boss, Paul Ylvisaker, and Liz Roberts was working out of there.

And then the other piece of this was, we had a very prominent advisory committee, headed by Dr. Philip Lee, who had been assistant secretary of health under John Gardner, and under Johnson. And then we had Joan Cooney, and we had labor leaders. We had Ron Brown, who was in Clinton’s cabinet—who was in Bosnia. We had very prominent people, and I don’t know what’s happened with all those. They went and stuffed it in the Rockefeller archives.

They were the guiding force, basically. They gave this whole effort a Good Housekeeping seal of approval. They met every four or five months. Then we reported. They acted like a board. And it was a very interesting group. And I put that group together, I found the people. I mean, that’s basically what I was doing. I was doing his staff work and spending money. That’s the other thing that I did in this job, I was told that I was basically spending his pocket money, which would probably never be more than three hundred thousand dollars a year, and by the time he was killed in ’78, it was about a million dollars a year in different projects.

And that was the first time I met Aryeh Neier, who was then head of the ACLU, because he came to Mr. Rockefeller, asked for money for the reproductive rights project of the ACLU. And he had Janet Benshoof with
him in those days, and I remember saying to him, “Aryeh, this woman is much too young to do this job.” (Sharpless laughs) And he said, “Oh no, she'll be fine. Don’t worry.” And it was just this pivotal moment. But the Rockefellers had never supported the ACLU before. They thought it was, you know, to the extreme left and whatever. But JDR was very open to it.

And then the other thing he supported was a book called *The Word is Out*, and it’s a series of personal stories about people’s individual sexual lives, and it was put together by Peter Adair, who’s now dead. And this was a series of photographs and a series of narratives, and he made it also into a movie. And this book was published in 1978. And the film was put together by the Mariposa Film Group, and as I remember, it was one of the first times that there was ever any explicit conversation about people’s gay lives with regard to their sexuality. I don’t remember how these people found me, or I found them; I don’t have any memory. But I do remember Peter Adair was very compelling, and I thought he was right.

And I remember JDR saying to me, “You really want to support this, don’t you?” And that was what was so great about him, because he recognized people’s passion, and when people really cared about something, and he would respond to that. And he was, I think, very canny about those people who were trying to pull the wool over his eyes actually—going back to Mrs. Rockefeller’s words to me. For example, one of my favorite stories about him, and I’m diverting slightly, was when Imelda Marcos would come to see him, as she would occasionally, he would say to me, “Now, I want to make this absolutely clear.” He didn’t usually give directions like this, but, “I
want all her security people to be kept out at the reception desk, and they
don’t need to come in here.” Because at 5600 there was a reception desk,
where there’s basically a detective, and then there’s a sort of long walk back
through the offices before you get to a cluster, a little kind of living room
area, and then the offices are off that. He didn’t want the security people to
come down to the office place. And he said, “And I want you to be with me
in the room at all times. Do not leave me alone with her under any
circumstances.” It was so interesting. And she was a total piece of work.
And the thing I remember about that interview or the meeting, most
vividly, she says to him, “Mr. Rockefeller, can’t you please keep the
Japanese out of the Philippines?” (Sharpless laughs). And I thought to
myself, Oh my god. (laughs) And he would just, you know, smile and say
nothing. It was hilarious actually.

**Sharpless**

So, Mrs. Marcos wanted him to do foreign policy?

**Dunlop**

Oh, yes. I mean, she thought that he could do all kinds of things. I mean,
she behaved as though, you know—she had an attitude about power, as we
well know, and she assumed that because JDR knew Japan very well and had
a very prominent reputation there, she knew that, you know, she just
assumed that he could do that.

**Sharpless**

Um-hm. Interesting.

**Dunlop**

So, um, it was a very, very—it was a fabulous experience, because he was
such an amazing person.

**Sharpless**

I was going to ask you about that. Because when you hear the name
Rockefeller, you associate it with, you know, robber barons and—
Dunlop  Yes, right.

Sharpless  —and rapaciousness, and Mr. Rockefeller seems to have had none of that.

Dunlop  No, he didn’t. He didn’t.

Sharpless  What was he like?

Dunlop  Well, people think he was shy, very shy and soft spoken and understated. I mean, for example, going to Washington to lobby or anything like that with Mr. Rockefeller was—we would go on the train in economy class, you know, and we would split a sandwich for lunch. I mean, that was it. And, we never—only once did I ever go on a Rockefeller plane anywhere with him. He just didn’t like that kind of ostentatiousness. He was as different from Nelson as day is from night. They were a mirror image of one another. And in the end of their lives, they had this tremendous fight over the assets of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund and the future of Pocantico, the family estate, which was a deeply divided issue within the family, and JDR and Nelson were at loggerheads.

Sharpless  And he was committed to using his funds—

Dunlop  Well, his major interest was population. And he had decided in 1934 or something, 1933, he wrote a letter to his father saying, “I’m going to be interested in this.” But I do think that the biography that was written by Peter Johnson and Jack Harr has a really authentic voice. I mean that. They have captured it. They caught the whole Bucharest thing in that chapter very well. And the rest of it, I’m assuming, is equally authentic. It was never reviewed properly. I don’t think anyone’s ever written anything very interesting about these brothers, by the way. I think David’s recent book is...
very bland. It’s an autobiography. JDR himself never wrote anything about himself. He did keep a diary, and I know that Peter Johnson drew on that diary for this book that they wrote together.

But I would say [JDR was] modest, determined, persistent, tenacious, lonely, inhibited in many ways, but with a kernel of feeling for justice and feeling for humanity. And the reason that he was so responsive to this whole business of women and population—he used to say to me, “You know, I go to all these dinners around the world, heads of state, and I always sit next to the women, to the wives. And they always strike me as much more intelligent than their husbands. Much more interesting, much more intelligent.” I mean, he had much more time for the women than for the men.

And he used to carry a sort of notebook in his jacket, inside his jacket. And this notebook, he would bring it out, and the one phrase that he liked was something about women being less important to men than their cattle. And it was one of these things he’d heard somewhere. It was sort of obvious to us now, we kind of know all that. But in those days, this was pretty radical stuff, which is what I mean when I say that when he hired me, he knew what he was getting into.

Sharpless

Well, that’s my other question. When you came to work for him, you said you knew little or nothing about population. How did you educate yourself?

Dunlop

Well, I’d read some things and, you know, I talked to people. I was always interested in the public understanding of these public policy issues. And it’s been my hobby, if you like, and I carried it over into IWHC [International
Women’s Health Coalition] and so on. I was always trying to [find out], How
does a person in the street think about this? How do they understand it?
How do they engage in it? And the demographics didn’t do it for people. Big
numbers just turn people off. They don’t get it. So I was always looking for
the human voice, if you like, or the human dimension. And that’s why what
Adrienne was saying made such great sense to me, and to a great degree, she
educated me.

And then, you know, there was a bunch of other books that I [read]—I
met the Marxist, I think he’s an economist, Mahmoud Mamdani, whose
book was recently reviewed in the *New York Times*, a book about Iraq. But
he wrote a book called *The Myth of Population Control*, and I had seen him in a
series of panels, and I thought he was making sense. And he seemed to be
talking about reality, as I understood it to be. And then there was another
book called *Power and Choice*, which I have over there, which influenced me
and made me think, Okay, maybe this is the answer, maybe this is one way
of looking at it.

So, did I hole myself up and read? No. And also JDR didn’t learn by
reading, either, so I knew that I had to talk to him, or I had to introduce
him to people, or I had to engage him. I think David Hopper, who was on
the Population Council Board, and maybe even on the Rockefeller
Foundation board for a while, and who was in a senior position at the
World Bank, also influenced JDR quite a bit. I mean, there were other
people who were playing into this, not just me. So, I don’t know how much
more time you want to spend on this. I mean, [on] the abortion issue, he
was absolutely—

**Sharpless**
That was going to be my question.

**Dunlop**
I mean, he felt abortion should be legal, and he was making grants to a number of domestic organizations working—I’m trying to remember whether he ever made a grant to NARAL [National Abortion Rights Action League]. He must’ve done. You know, those are the things that can be found out. But, I mean, he was very clear that he was a strong supporter of *Roe*.

When I came to work for him, the decision [wasn’t] handed down until the next year. But what was interesting about that whole episode, that whole event, was that Carol Foreman had been policy director of the U.S. Population Commission, and Mr. Rockefeller had set up a small organization in Washington to continue to lobby the findings of the commission when it turned out that Nixon didn’t really adopt it in the ways that he hoped. And Carol headed that office, along with Steve Salyer. Carol was basically Mr. Rockefeller’s lobbyist, is another way of putting it, on this population issue. She wrote a historic memo to him right after *Roe* to say, This is going to be a real problem. It’s not worked through the country. It’s going to cause tremendous difficulty.

It was a prescient, extraordinary memo, which I still have somewhere in my papers. And she said to him, “You need to put money at the local level for the next ten of fifteen years to work this thing through at the local level. This cannot be by Supreme Court fiat.” And she was right on it.

Unfortunately he didn’t do it, and when I went to work for Faye Wattleton for Planned Parenthood later, I urged Faye Wattleton to think about this. I
showed her the memo. It’s only been in the last ten or fifteen years, and even more recently than that, that I think we’ve developed the political muscle along the lines that she was talking about.

**Sharpless**

This brings up [that] when funding the ACLU, Janet Benshoof was working in case law that would work its way up and be at a very high level before she got hold of it, I guess.

**Dunlop**

I don’t know how that—Aryeh Neier was at the ACLU, and then Janet eventually, you know, basically in the middle of the night, took her files out and set up the Center for Reproductive Rights. Then there was also Rhonda Copelon, who was working at the Center for Constitutional Rights, that was another fairly radical group that JDR supported. And Planned Parenthood—and he was putting money into a clinic directed by Judy Jones that was very prominent in terms of its voice, and I’m not going to remember that name of that.

**Sharpless**

Let me change tapes.

*Tape 1, side 2, ends; tape 2 begins.*

**Sharpless**

Okay, this is the second tape with the first interview of Joan Dunlop on April 14. Okay. Mr. Rockefeller got in an accident.

**Dunlop**

Right.

**Sharpless**

Tell me about what happened after, how you found out, and—

**Dunlop**

Okay, well, I was home. It was a July evening, and I was in the kitchen. The phone rang, and it was Elizabeth McCormack, who was a colleague of mine in the Rockefeller family office. And she says to me, “Are you sitting down?” And I said no. And she said, “Sit down.” And then she said—I cannot
remember what her words were—I think she said, “JDR has been killed.” And then she went on to explain what had happened, that he had been driving back from Pocantico to the train station with his secretary, and this young kid had had a row with his mother. I don’t think we knew he’d had a row with his mother then—we didn’t know. But there’d been a head-on collision, and he’d died instantly.

And I was having dinner that night with a man called John Cool and his wife, Catherine. John had been head of the Ford office in Pakistan, and I had visited with them in 1977 when Adrienne and I went on a long trip, which is probably worth talking about sometime—when JDR finally decided I needed to understand what population was all about. And so, I was on a long trip with Adrienne in Asia, but I went off to Pakistan on my own. And I went with John Cool through the Khyber Pass and into Rawalpindi and into all the places that we hear about now.

But, anyway, John was coming to dinner, and for some reason, I just decided I needed to go to Pocantico. So I don’t think we ever had any dinner. We got into my car and drove up. We didn’t get there until after dark, because I think Elizabeth must’ve called me about six in the evening. And I remember there was a mist swirling around, and the gates were closed. And I realized I couldn’t get in. And, so I just turned around and came back. You know, it was just the most shocking thing that had ever happened to me, and the most heartbreaking. I felt that I’d really lost a, sort of, a really close ally. That’s the feeling—not a father, not a lover, but a really intimate ally. And that I didn’t know what was going to happen to me,
basically, because—I just began to kind of spin out over as the days went by.

I began to realize that my future was problematic because I was this heretic in many ways. I think I must’ve gone into the office the next day—I’m sure I did—and his secretary, Joyce Tate, was there, who’s fabulous. And there was a great deal of anxiety about what had happened to his briefcase because he was in the middle of changing his will, and there was a great deal of agitation on that topic. And I never really knew what the issues were, except I’m pretty sure it had to do with how much money was going to the Asia Society. And I had been suspicious of the man who ran the Asia Society. I mean, not suspicious of him in any—I don’t think he was dishonest, or anything like that, but he was really on the make, I mean, he was one of those people who’s really manipulating JDR, I felt.

But, you know, we had to deal with the funeral, and they asked me to be an usher, which was unusual [for me] as a woman. And I realized that all of my colleagues and the Population Council people and George desperately needed help and needed support, so I remember throwing a party. I had a sort of reception at my house the day of the funeral, I think, or something. I mean, I was just, you know, running on automatic pilot, probably. I was heartbroken. And I knew that George Zeidenstein was in the job, but I knew the sexual development project was probably not going to go anywhere, because without him—I mean, on the sex education side, I think that had he lived, we could have done something really, really interesting and innovative that might have changed a lot of attitudes around sex
education. I’d like to think that. And I think it was a big, big loss.

But I had begun to think that I ought to get some academic training. I needed to get some credentials. So, I had talked to him about going to the Kennedy School, you know, on a sabbatical or something, and we never kind of got around to doing anything about that. I don’t think he was very keen on the idea. And in retrospect, I think he just didn’t want me to leave, you know. By then I was in the office right next to him, and he had been saying to me that he wanted me to be the chief of staff, basically, which was a really crazy idea. I mean, at the time I thought to myself, This is nuts. Porter McKeever, all these much older men, aren’t going to like this very much. And anyway, we’d had various conversations on that topic.

**Sharpless**

What do you think it was about you that Mr. Rockefeller liked?

**Dunlop**

(laughs) I don’t know. I think the frankness, and also, you know, I was very informal with him. I would just, you know, open the door and say something. I mean, I was very—and he would call me at all hours of the day and night. And he would always—you know, there would always be the same introduction. “Hello, do you have a crowd?” Meaning, Is anyone else there? Can I talk to you? And I think I was probably—I mean, I wasn’t married. I was very responsive to him. You know, I’d jump whenever he said, “Did you want to do this?” I said yes, for whatever it was. I think it was fun, probably. When I look back on it, I think probably it was kind of, you know, it was amusing, or it was, you know—I was talking pretty radical stuff. This sex education stuff was really, when I think back on it, was really radical. And I think it was about personality, to some degree.
He came to my fortieth birthday party, which was in my little apartment on East 73rd Street. And I have photographs of him talking to Steve Salyer and, you know, always looking very solemn. I think the English accent helped. The quasi-patrician (laughs) appearance, probably in style, maybe. He was lovely to my parents and, you know, invited them up to Pocantico for lunch and couldn’t have been more gracious or more hospitable, and so on. And they thought, Well finally, after this crazy daughter we’ve had, she must be doing something right. So, you know, after he [died]—I didn’t know really what to do.

Sharpless
And everyone else on his personal staff must’ve been in the same position.

Dunlop
Well, they were all scrambling for, you know—yeah, they were. And, I mean, this is where I needed an advisor, and I didn’t have anybody. And this was the worst part of it, really, in practical terms, but—I think I stayed in my office probably for six or seven months. And then one day, Donald O’Brien, who was the family lawyer, made an appointment to see me and came in and sat down and handed me an envelope. And he said, “Open it.” And it was a check for ten thousand dollars. And then he told me that I was going to have to leave, and this basically was my severance package.

Well, I should’ve—my other colleagues knew I had not been there long enough for my pension to be vested. I had been there about eight years, not ten, and in those days, pensions were vested at the ten-year point. So even though there had been a kind of another sort of savings program that was part of our compensation there, I left there with no pension. And that was a terrible mistake on my part, and very wrong of them. Somebody should
have been looking out for me. And they should've known better. Elizabeth McCormack should have known better. And I made sure that that never happened to any other colleague of mine that I—and I had numbers of other colleagues that had some of this happen to them, and boy, did I get that solved. But it was the biggest problem for me, as it turned out later, because that was the longest place I’d ever been working, actually. And when I think back on it, I can’t forgive those guys.

But I did feel that they felt that I was an outsider. By the way, Jay Rockefeller never did—Jay was terrific. But the people in the office, the people who ran the organization, even Bill Dietel, who ran the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, felt that I was a radical, I think. And it wasn’t until Cairo that they began to think maybe there’s something here. And Dietel said to me, “Dunlop, you were right.”

**Sharpless**

Twenty years later.

**Dunlop**

Um-hm. It was very interesting. Yeah. So—and then I got breast cancer. (laughs) That was the next thing that happened. I actually went, first of all, I went to Aspen to the Great Books program for a month or whatever it was. One of the most interesting things about that was that in my class was Prince Bandar, who was the Saudi ambassador to the—and I got to know him then a little bit, which was kind of interesting and revealing. But soon after that I realized I’d got breast cancer and—no actually, that’s not right.

I went to work for Planned Parenthood immediately. I went to work for Faye Wattleton. And within three months, I knew it was going to be a disaster. That she was an abusive manager, and it’s one thing I will not and
cannot tolerate. It’s that kind of way of running things. On the outside, she was all charm and all the rest of it—very effective in the public domain. But inside, she was a bully and unfair, unjust, uneven, and everything that I abhorred, and within six months, I resigned.

**Sharpless**

What were you supposed to be doing?

**Dunlop**

I was the vice president of public affairs. And that, actually, was a job for which I knew actually nothing. Neither of us—she shouldn’t have appointed me, and I shouldn’t have taken the job. I should’ve known better. But even then, the way the place was run was just appalling, as far I was concerned.

And it was at that point that I discovered—the reason I say that is because I had no health insurance. So I had no pension and no health insurance. I did have some savings, and I spent that, and I—anyway. So, at that point, I was then married to my second husband, Ed Deagle, and he was a terrific help through that whole siege. Adrienne thought I was going to die. And I remember her leaving my apartment on 72nd Street and standing at the door, and I said, “Adrienne, I’m going to be perfectly okay. I’m going to get over this. This is not going to be a problem.” And I’m looking, and I can see the disbelief in her face. She just didn’t believe me (laughs).

**Sharpless**

But you came through it okay?

**Dunlop**

Yeah, I did. And then I got it again ten years later, but never mind—that’s another story.

**Sharpless**

Now, before we leave the Rockefeller story completely, do tell me about the long trip that you and Adrienne took.

**Dunlop**

Well, I think the Adrienne piece of this—I mean, we became very close
allies. Judith Bruce, who was working for the international arm of Planned Parenthood, and Adrienne: the three of us became—we called ourselves “the coven” and we exchanged information. And we were trying to change this field from within. We were inside: Adrienne was in the Ford Foundation; I was, obviously, in the Rockefeller family; and Judith was in this big organization.

**Sharpless**

She was at IPPF [International Planned Parenthood Federation]?  

**Dunlop**

Yes. I think. Was she one of your people?  

**Sharpless**

Unh-uh. Not that I know of.  

**Dunlop**

Well, maybe she should be. She probably should be. It’s worth thinking—I don’t know how much money you have, but anyway, never mind, it’s worth thinking about. Adrienne was in an institution working for a man who, really, when I think back on it, was very limited in his imagination. And a decent human being, a very decent human being, but not an innovator. He was really doing Dave Bell’s business. Dave Bell was calling the shots. And Dave Bell was then the vice president for Ford and had been budget director under Johnson. Anyway, so Adrienne had developed this alliance, really, that began then.

This is what we thought: we’ve got to change this field. And JDR finally decided that I could go further than Newark, because he found trips—he thought of trips as junkets, basically. So I went on this—it was about five weeks, I think, to India, Bangladesh, Pakistan. And Adrienne must’ve been on a consulting assignment. Yes, because Lincoln Chen was head of the office, the Ford office, in Bangladesh, I’m pretty sure. She was still working
for Bud Harkavy. And maybe George Zeidenstein was head of the office. But anyway, she was doing some consulting work, so we basically did a lot—no, I’m sorry. Wrong again. Lincoln Chen was head of the Ford Foundation office at that point, and it must’ve been about ’77 or ’76.

We, with Marty Chen, Lincoln’s wife, you know, we went everywhere. We looked at villages, we wandered around the slums of Dhaka, we went and talked with women, and we had some adventures. We had a couple of adventures. One, we took a boat across—and I don’t remember where this was, except across a river, which there are many in Bangladesh. And we were going to visit a group of Catholic priests who were apparently doing some innovative work, and it was very late in the afternoon when we got there. And we had to climb up these steps. And if Adrienne remembers this, she may have told you, I don’t know, but I was cursing every step of the way: “Goddamn Catholic Church, they always have the best land in the best place.” Well, we finally got to the top of this and had an interesting conversation with these guys, as I remember. By then, it was dusk, so we had to retrace our way back, and through the village. Through the fireflies, and it was a very in a sense romantic world, so far from 5600.

What those conversations gave you was a sense of hope, a sense that something could be done, a sense that the women were so resilient and so strong and so humorous and full of life and laughter under these burdens. It gave you a very different view about poverty and development, I guess. But then we got in the boat, and the boat nearly capsized, and we got ourselves across the side of the river, found our driver. I think we were near
Chittagong—that’s where we were. We were close to Chittagong, because that’s when we went back to the hotel, this huge hotel with nobody in it and lots of air conditioning.

And then the next morning we went out and went down to breakfast and I looked around the room and the only other people in the hotel were five men, all of whom were sitting at different tables. And they were all, in one way [or another], there for the oil. And I remember I used to get very angry easily in those days. I said, “You know, what we’re doing is pointless. These are the guys who are calling the shots. These are the guys who are going to make the difference here. It’s not us—we’re not going to have any effect on this—it’s this industry that’s going to.” Anyway, that kind of stuff.

But Adrienne, you know, Adrienne is not only—she has a lawyer’s mind, but she has an anthropologist’s curiosity and a social science mindset. So we would be going to endless villages and I would say, “Adrienne, not another village”—because we were going to observe. “This is interesting,” she would say. “You see there this is the kind of bowls they use, and this is how they’re doing this with the wheat or the rice or”—you know, she absorbed the texture of everything, she was breathing it through her nostrils. I’m a quick study. I’m, you know, Okay, I get it. And that was fine. I got the general picture. But Adrienne had to get in to every single detail, and I thought that was fine, but I didn’t have the patience.

**Sharpless**

You mentioned the sense of hope that you could get from that trip. What else did you gain from it?

**Dunlop**

Well, what you gain from doing that kind of thing is authority. You’ve been
there, seen it. It’s almost like a degree, you know, you’ve been in those circumstances, you’ve spent enough time around it, you could convey it well. And it basically reaffirmed so much of what else I was saying and what I was concerned about. And I’m sure I wrote a diary. Again, I’ve got to find it somewhere. But I found that you did get a sense of high-density population, but it wasn’t a threat. That was what was so different. Masses of people on a road or in a circumstance didn’t feel threatening.

**Sharpless**  
It didn’t have a Malthusian feel to it?

**Dunlop**  
No. I didn’t feel that way.

**Sharpless**  
But that’s what the guys were saying?

**Dunlop**  
Yes, absolutely. Because for me, it was always about individuals and about how people related to one another. And the Bangladeshis are extremely attractive, very articulate, entirely intelligent. I mean, you can make sweeping generalizations. I liked the environment. But I felt that to be true in other villages, in Africa or in other places, that it’s not unique to South Asia. So again, the humanity—I think that you either like people—and it sounds crazy. You know, lots of people don’t scare you, it’s when they behave peculiarly, especially men, that’s then you begin to realize what the threat is. And I certainly felt far more threatened in Pakistan than I did in Bangladesh. When I went to Pakistan, driving across that flat plain as you go towards the Khyber, and I felt that there was a hardness to people’s eyes in Pakistan I didn’t feel in Bangladesh, for some reason. You could feel the male hostility in Pakistan.

**Sharpless**  
Um-hm. Yeah. Hardscrabble.
Dunlop: Yeah. So.

Sharpless: Interesting.

Dunlop: But it was an adventure. For me, I’d never—I mean, I’d been in Europe and all of that, but this was something completely different. And I found it very beautiful in many ways. In fact, we got ourselves into a lot of trouble later with the International Women’s Health Coalition, because the first thing we produced—again, they meant to try to convey these ideas to the person in the street. I think we did a series of stills with a narrative and music, and when we showed it Joe Speidel, who was then at the Population Crisis Committee in Washington, I remember him saying to me, “This is much too beautiful. You know, this is not what population is all about.”

And this is the perfect example of how we looked at it through different vectors. Because I felt that unless you could offer Americans a sense of possibilities and a sense of hope, then we would never get the money to do what we needed to do. If it was always going to be—this is why I think Bush’s whole attitude towards Iraq is so completely wrong for all kinds of reasons, but not the least of which is that if you frighten people, in the long run, it won’t work. Frightening isn’t going to do it.

Sharpless: Um-hm. And Joe wanted pictures of poverty—

Dunlop: Yes, and starving children, you know, miserable things and something dreadful. And at the time, I’m sure Joe—we could have a conversation now about this, and we could laugh about it, and he would see my point, but in those days, neither of us could see the other person’s point. I mean, I found Rei Ravenholt totally unacceptable, as an American, as somebody who was
representing the United States in the international arena. In villages, I mean, forget it. I mean, this was the Ugly American, as far as I was concerned. And to me, it seemed so defeating. I mean, here we were trying to help—we were trying to do something about development. And we had this man who was in such a powerful position who was such an embarrassment. It was just so embarrassing (laughs).

And one of the weird things about men in the population field in those days was they were either eunuchs—like Barney, who never wanted to have anything to do with sexuality, you know, in a sense—or it was in their head. Or they tended to be somewhat—they were flirts. They liked sex. Malcolm Potts was the perfect example, another ghastly persona, as far as I’m concerned—you know, don’t let him in, keep him away from other people (laughs). The image we were conveying was totally wrong, and that’s why I like George Zeidenstein, because George had a respect for people. These guys had no respect for women. None. At least that’s how I felt at the time. I’m sure that, in retrospect, I’m sure that wasn’t fair. But I was aghast that people in positions of power were conveying this sense of how women and men related to one another. There was something—not only was it not politically [appropriate]—not only were they sort of bullies, but there was an unsavory aspect to it. Judith Bruce is very good on this topic and, you know, she used to keep a tile of mash notes from people—it was a joke about the numbers of women Rei Ravenholt made passes at. It was a joke. We used to laugh at these guys when we weren’t crying, because of the way they were treating other women and the way they were dealing with the
Sharpless  
And the amount of money and resources they controlled.

Dunlop  
Yes, yes, sure. And power.

Sharpless  
Fascinating. Well, when we were talking off tape, we were talking about what happened in the field when Mr. Rockefeller died. Could you say a little bit more about that? About what the impact of his death was?

Dunlop  
If I had to bet, I would say it was sixty percent psychological. The field, people working in the field, felt they’d lost their most important ally, and the most important asset is a human asset. It wasn’t his money so much as it was who he was. He was the best kind of American to be working on this project and this kind of issue in the field. He was everything Ravenholt and Co. weren’t. You know, he had conveyed integrity. He conveyed a caring about people as individuals. His stature was unassailable. His motives were unassailable. He had to transcend the Rockefeller name. And his loyalty, his staying power. I mean, he stayed with this for a long, long time—unlike George Soros, who switches around a lot. Rockefeller stayed with it, and I think people felt supported, protected. He raised the level of the subject matter.

Charlie Westoff—he was a prominent social scientist at Princeton—talks about what it was like when he first did work in this field and how embarrassed he was. This was about sex, and he really had to hide in a small office and not tell anybody what he was doing because it was such an embarrassment to be looking at fertility rates, as I remember. And we’ve forgotten those times, and Rockefeller protected people from that. I mean,
he just elevated the subject out of academia and into a kind of public policy that had dignity and human dignity, as well as policy dignity to it.

Sharpless  

Turn the tape.

Tape 2, side 1, ends; side 2 begins.

Dunlop  

It was a terrible blow for George Zeidenstein, Rockefeller’s death, because he had to raise all this money for the Pop Council, and then he also had to make changes in this organization, just when it needed to be realigned, and then this was very difficult without some sort of mentor, really.

Sharpless  

Are you even standing? I mean Mr. Rockefeller’s backing—

Dunlop  

Yes, without his backing, without his presence. The money, yeah, but in those days, Mr. Rockefeller probably gave twenty-five thousand dollars to the Pop Council. It was a minimal amount of money. I may be wrong on that number, but it wasn’t a big percentage. So I think it was the fact that they’d really lost their standard bearer. And then the other prominent American was General Draper, who had a rather different view from Rockefeller about what population problems were and how they were to be solved.

Sharpless  

Now was he still living when you came into the field?

Dunlop  

Um-hm. Yes.

Sharpless  

What were your impressions of him?

Dunlop  

Well, with him as a perfect example—this was an American general who’d fought in the Second World War whose sensitivity to the topic was zero. You wondered why on earth he’d even got interested. I mean, JDR had real problems with him. I used to think to myself that part of the field—you
remember those cuckoo clocks, the woman would come out when it was wet, and the man when it was dry—that’s the way they used Rockefeller and Draper. They would use Rockefeller for something and Draper for something else, you know, speaking to a different audience, which is perfectly, in many ways, understandable. But Draper was boorish and arrogant and cavalier in some ways. And a certain—this is not fair about Draper, but it was true about others, certainly true about Ravenholt. They’d made jokes about sexuality. And those jokes, by definition, were also jokes about women, and I think it’s that that really got under our skin, as much as anything else.

Sharpless

Sort of a coarseness?

Dunlop

Salaciousness. Yes, a coarseness. Yeah, Draper was a coarse man, I thought. Yeah, that’s a good word. But not all of them. I mean, that wasn’t the way Barney Berelson was, and it wasn’t the way Bud Harkavy was. They were what I call the eunuchs.

Sharpless

Why do you call them eunuchs?

Dunlop

Because there was a sexless quality to them. And it was all very theoretical and intellectual. Which was fine, I mean, it’s okay.

Sharpless

It’s a style.

Dunlop

It’s a style, and it was a style that, you know, I think it was the Pop Council’s style that JDR wanted, I might say. JDR wanted a serious, professional organization that would take this topic seriously, that would look into it, that would have—it had three elements to it. There was a demographic part, there was a scientific research part, and there was a kind of family planning
experimental piece, which was [to] try different strategies. I think, again, the point—they didn’t have a high-level lobbyist when JDR died. They didn’t have somebody who even could get to the Pope or could get to the president of the United States or could get to the senators or whatever. They didn’t have that access anymore. So, again, that’s what I mean when I say it was psychological and [about] status, as much as it was about all the other things. Well, we can pause.

**Sharpless**

Well, okay. We can do that. (pause in recording). All right. We have just had a lovely cup of tea and we are going to circle back now, since we’ve talked about the Rockefeller years. Tell me about how you came to the United States.

**Dunlop**

Well, my mother was American and so there was always this consciousness that we were half American.

**Sharpless**

From where in England were you?

**Dunlop**

I was born in London, but I was brought up about twenty miles south of London, in a place called Kingswood, in Surrey, which my father always used to refer to as a dormitory area—commuting to London. And my parents bought the house in 1933 and died in it in 1991. So I was very much—you know, there was a lot of continuity in my childhood and so on. But my mother was one of five, and my grandmother lived in New York, and there was always the question about when was she going to bring her children to the States. We nearly came in ’41, when there was this whole effort to get British children out of England, and it was a natural to think that we might come to the States. I was the eldest of three, but my parents
changed their mind at the last minute. I've never really asked them why. I mean, they’d give me sort of bland answers. Oh, we thought we should keep the family together, or something. They should’ve thought about that before, I think. But anyway, so we came in 1946. I came first in 1946.

Sharpless

So you lived through the war in England?

Dunlop

Yes, yes. And it was a very, no question, a defining experience. For me, my best friends were Spitfire pilots. (laughter)

Sharpless

So you spent time around the servicemen?

Dunlop

Well, we lived near, not too far from a big Spitfire pilot base called Biggin Hill, and my parents were very friendly with somebody in the neighborhood whose son was a squadron leader. And he would bring all his friends, and my parents were very, very hospitable. My mother, you know, always was having—they’d have this big Christmas Eve party, and they got the cream, and they would have eggnog. They got the eggs—who knows where they got them from. But anyway, they were well known as being very hospitable. And so these young men would come to my parents’ house on their days off and, you know, I was six or whatever I was, eight or something. And there’s a photograph of me upstairs with one of them. But it was a lot of fun in many ways. And there was fear, but there was also, you know—we didn’t feel profoundly threatened.

My father was in the oil business, and he was a technical person, so they didn’t want him going into the army, so he was working in the research station for the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, which was very close to where we lived. So my family was intact, which was very lucky.
Sharpless

And you weren’t affected by the Blitz?

Dunlop

Well, we would hear the bombers go out every night. I mean, our whole world was suffused by war, and in a sense, that’s really what—we wore gas masks to work or to school, along with my satchel. We would help the milkmaid, Mary, deliver the milk, which means getting on the cart, which was pulled by a horse. And one day the doodlebugs came and landed on the golf course and it blew us off the cart. I jumped in and out of trenches—I mean, it was a world in which we were grappling with the sirens and the bombings and the reality of war, but it was just the way things were. I think children—you know, this is life, this is what it is all about, this is how we live. And I just thought these young men in uniform was just great. I just thought they were really exciting and fun, and that’s what I wanted to be when I grew up. [They were] my role models.

So very soon, 1946, my mother brought the three of us back to the States, and we came on a troop ship, actually. It was a GI war bride ship. And we stayed for three months, and I just fell in love—I was twelve—I just fell in love with the United States. I just thought this was the best place. There was a certain sense of freedom. People have asked me, What was it you really felt about it? Well, I think there was a sense of freedom that I hadn’t felt in England. But I also went to my cousins’ schools, and there was something about the teaching and the environment of schooling that I found really attractive and appealing.

So I just determined I wanted to come back here. Very early on, I got that in my head. And I don’t think it’s necessary to go into all of this, but I
wanted to come to college in the US, but my boarding school—I went to one of these conventional English boarding schools—didn’t think the American education system had anything to teach the English. And the snobbery was unbelievable. So they tolerated the idea that I would take Scholastic Aptitude Test. I had never seen a multiple choice question in my life. So I went to the English Speaking Union, this heavily curtained, dark Edwardian room with a beige baize tablecloth. You filled out all this stuff—and the only college I’d ever heard of was Vassar, because that’s where my cousins went. Nobody gave me any help, and I didn’t have the presence of mind to try to find out whether there might have been any other colleges. So Vassar wrote to me and said, Well, it’s very nice. Thank you. We’d like you come as a sophomore, but we’re sorry, we can’t give you a scholarship.

And my parents said, You can’t go. And I was very cross. And I basically said, “I’m going back to the States, one way or the other, as soon as I’m of legal age.” And my father said, “Okay, I’ll send you, but you’ve got to have a skill. You’ve got to be able to support yourself.” So, even though my school, who didn’t really know what to do with me—I’d been two summers in the United States [and] I was pretty unmanageable, I think, when I think back to it—even though I was a school prefect and all of that, I was breaking rules left and right. I wouldn’t play by the party line. As you sow, so shall ye reap. You know, it didn’t change much. But I took secretarial courses. I said, “Okay, it’s the fastest, it’s the quickest—I can get qualified very quickly, nine months.” And I was extremely good. I could do shorthand at 130 words a minute, which is quite fast—ridiculous. So I then
worked for the BBC for nine months, and then, two days after I was twenty-one, I got on the *Queen Mary* to come to the States.

My mother’s family was quite rich and quite powerful. The brothers had done very well, even though the mother was left destitute. The brothers had done very well. This was America in the forties and fifties, and my uncle was a founding partner of Morgan Stanley. He’d worked his way up, literally, from the bottom. And it was no accident that he was also on the *Queen Mary* on that same voyage. And then I came to work as a waitress on Cape Cod for the summer, which was the thing to do then. We’re now talking 1955. And I thought that was just terrific. I mean, I made money, and I’d never made money in my life before. And then I went back to New York, and I had to figure out what I was going to do.

And I stayed with my grandmother for a while, who had an apartment on Broadway and 54th Street. And I looked in the paper, and I found that McCann-Erickson was advertising for secretaries. And of course, I was very highly skilled. And I got a job right away in the TV/radio program of McCann-Erickson—which was, to me, like I’d fallen into a tub of butter. I mean, the people were such fun. The artistic people would do all kinds of crazy things, like jump on desks and, you know, act out. And there was so much vitality. This is 1955, and television was just beginning to blossom into itself, and advertising agencies had a tremendous amount of power. And one of the guys in the office right next to me was a man called Grant Tinker, who then became very famous. So, I just had a ball. But I didn’t want to live with my grandmother. So I ended up in the Salvation Army
hostel called the Evangeline, on West 13th Street, and I shared my room with the daughter of a chicken farmer from Mississippi who was reading Truman Capote, who I knew nothing about. Anyway, so it was a pretty fun time. And I had a boyfriend, who I’d met at the Inn at West Falmouth, who was getting an M.A. in English at Columbia and I—typical perversity—the three of us who met at the Evangeline took an apartment in Queens, and I would then travel by subway from Queens—there’s that tennis center in Queens—to Columbia at midnight. I mean, I thought nothing of traveling around in those days.

I got involved a number of inappropriate affairs, which we don’t need to go into all of that. We can, but I would [rather] not. And I—so crazy—I don’t know whether we want to spend the whole time talking about this, but, this guy—I was walking to work, I was walking to the bus, and a guy walking ahead of me dropped his keys. And I picked the keys up and said, “Hey, these are your keys.” And we had an exchange and he said, “Where are you going?” And I said, “I’m going to Rockefeller Center,” which was where my office was when I was working for McCann-Erickson. And he said, “Well, I’ll give you a lift.”

And I thought to myself, I said, “Oh, no, no. I don’t think that’s a good idea.” So I got on the cross-town bus on 79th Street, and he followed me in his white convertible. And when I changed buses at 5th Avenue, he’s there, and he said, “Come on, jump in. I’ll drive you down 5th Avenue.” So anyway, long story short, that started an affair which I didn’t really know how to handle to begin with. And I was guided by the senior secretary for
McCann-Erickson, who said, “Have lunch with him.” And basically they sort of managed this. However, he became quite a serious suitor and followed me back to England and asked my parents if he could marry me. And they were paralyzed with fear of the prospect. A, he was Jewish, and they were really anti-Semitic, and we got into a huge family fight, which was a defining moment in my life, no question. I got into a dog-eat-dog fight with my parents over that very issue. He kept pushing me, they kept pulling me, and I was caught in the middle, and I finally decided a plague on all their houses.

And I told him no, and I said to them, “I’m going back to the States and I’m not coming back here ever again.” I was very, very angry. And nothing was particularly resolved about our feelings about that or our understanding. It took me four years, I think, from ’56 to ’60—before I came back again to the States when I had resolved things with my family. And I was, by then, working in television. And I was working on schools programs. I was in Sicily in Taormina and had one of those moments. And it was so incredibly beautiful. It was April, and it was stunningly beautiful. I was at the very top of this Greek temple and looking at the coast of Italy to the north, and I thought to myself, I’m going back to the States. I’m not going to deal with this world any longer. I don’t want to be married to somebody from Lloyd’s of London and bring up my children and send them to this dreadful boarding school I went to, which I think is appalling. I hate this class system. Let me out of here. You know, I didn’t know anything about feminism or anything remotely like that.
Sharpless: But you went back to the States—

Dunlop: So I went back to the States and I went back on a Norwegian tanker, which had belonged to a friend of mine. Because, of course, I didn’t have any money. (telephone rings; pause in recording)

Sharpless: So you went back to the United States—

Dunlop: Okay, I came back on a tanker, and I had been working in television and Kennedy was running. And I had a job in television here doing interviews for British television. You know, I was the secretary or something. I wasn’t doing anything, I wasn’t doing the interview. And that job went on for about, I don’t know, maybe six months. And meanwhile, I was living with my uncle, my rich uncle in Gracie Square, and I somehow got the idea that I wanted to work at the Ford Foundation. I don’t know how—to this day I don’t understand where I got this idea from, except that I’d worked in television on documentaries that were dealing with people’s problems, and I was tired of constantly illuminating problems and no solutions. So I took the annual report home to my uncle, and I said to him, “Who do you know on the board?” And he said, “Everybody.” (laughs)

So, long story short, I got an interview with the head human resources guy, because of all this secretary—all this 130—Pitman’s shorthand, et cetera: they hired me right away. And they hired me into what was then the public affairs program, led by this man, Paul Ylvisaker, who was a legendary urban planner, really, I mean, a very extraordinary human being. And we’re now talking 1960. And I worked in that program for about seven years, and that was the defining moment that crafted what I was going to do
professionally for the rest of my life. Because it was about the public weal, it was about public policy, and in a sense—I can’t remember the term for it—you know, reorganizing public policy, changing the way issues are seen.

Again, it was a precursor. Everything I’d learned under Ylvisaker I applied when I went to work for John Rockefeller, because in the Ylvisaker period, we were designing programs that became the War on Poverty. So it was the initial design. There were only experiments in six cities. And then, from there, I went to the budget bureau, I went to work for the budget director under Lindsay. So then I saw government trying to deal with the same kinds of issues. So that was the background that I’d brought to JDR, and I have a feeling that’s partly what he saw.

But Ylvisaker was a charismatic leader who—I mean, he made the first grant to Vernon Jordan and the Voter Education Project in the South. That was the very, very early stages of social manipulation, I guess you could call it. But he was on the phone to the White House all the time. It was like being in a campaign. I started off as a junior secretary and ended up as his whatever they call it, executive assistant or something, which was basically answering the telephone. But I had an insight in all these jobs into how power is used, whether it’s money or ideas or access or whatever. But it was an extraordinary education. I was very close to Ylvisaker. We were lovers for a period of time. I learned so much from him. It was just extraordinary. It was more than a Ph.D. in many ways.

But it set the pattern, which I now reflect on at this age—this was when I was about twenty-six—where my professional life was always much more
interesting than my personal life. And the men I met in my professional life were far more interesting than any husband I was ever going to find or meet or anything. So the domestic life I had no interest in. Really, I didn’t ever want children. I wasn’t even faintly interested. Back to the Spitfire pilot business, you know, I really wanted to be, if you like, I suppose, in a male role, or at least I wanted more influence and more power, and I was very curious about the world. And that had begun when I worked in television in England. And it began then as I broke out of the class system. I came to this country as a way to get away from the class system. And, as a woman, of course I didn’t realize until much later, that was part of what was going on. But the Ford Foundation experience was really cataclysmic, almost, in terms of my understanding about what could happen—and again, what you could do, how you could make a difference. Don’t forget, those were the years when you really did think we could make a difference, pre-Vietnam.

**Sharpless** Yes. Yes. The whole idea of the War on Poverty is so audacious.

**Dunlop** Oh, absolutely. Well now, we kind of just, you know, dismiss it as being kind of naïve and almost stupid, but in fact, it was really biting down. We saw it bite down in various parts of the country and began to change people’s lives, but then, of course, one of its problems was it competed with the established political structures, and they weren’t having any of it. So that was part of the problem, along with the war and the money. They didn’t come into the poverty program because of Vietnam.

So when Ylvisaker finally broke with Mac Bundy, when Bundy took over Ford after Vietnam—Ylvisaker was dead against Vietnam from day
one. And they just couldn’t—there was no way they were ever going to get along. And Ylvisaker was on the trajectory to be vice president for all of Ford’s domestic programs. He was actually promised the job by the board, but Bundy took it away from him. It was a very nasty business. I saw very high-level corporate politics, if you like. Very raw. And Ylvisaker went to the state of New Jersey to be commissioner of community affairs.

And I was asked by Les Dunbar, of the Field Foundation, to go to work for Dr. Kenneth Clark, who had just started a new organization dealing with urban problems. And this was 1968, just before the cities blew up. And Dr. Clark had just begun this organization, and his offices were in two adjacent apartments. I think Les Dunbar thought that he needed somebody who had administrative ability, for whatever reason. Anyway, Dr. Clark hired me, and the first day I got on the job, he said, “I’ve just fired the vice president for finance and administration. Find the money.”

I said, “Oh, my god.” I didn’t know anything about how to do this except that I was then married to a guy who had a small business. He had a flower shop, and I knew something about payroll and the role that accountants play and all this kind of stuff. So I asked for the checkbook. And the way they were running the place was that they were handing around this mega-checkbook to everybody in the organization who was spending any money, and they were just writing checks. It was absolutely, I mean, it was just chaotic. And the community affairs people were giving parties and having liquor. It was out of control. I mean, Les Dunbar was not wrong. And I instituted all these controls. When I think back on it, here
I was, this English-speaking, young, white woman. There were only three whites in the organization—me and two others. And I would do things like label all the liquor. I would count the liquor. (laughs) I would label the bottles so I knew how many they’d drunk every night.

And then I was supposed to be running the intern program, which was mostly SNCC [Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee] volunteers. And they were these young people who were really, you know, very angry. That taught me a lot. And I listened to them pretty carefully. And then Dr. Clark calls me into his office and said, “Joan, don’t listen to all these people all the time.” He said, “You know, your opinion is just as good as theirs. Don’t think because they’re black that they know what they’re talking about. That’s racism.” That was the great lesson. It was a wonderful—I mean, he’s really extraordinary. And he didn’t like Black Power one bit, and that was the beginnings of Black Power. And I began to feel, you know, after Floyd McKissick asked me for a second date, I thought, This is hopeless, I can’t do anything here. As a white woman, there’s no way, I’m not going to make any dent. So I’ve got to get out of here.

So I knew, socially, I knew a man who was then deputy mayor under Lindsay. And I said, “I’ve got to”—Bob Sweet was his name, he’s now a judge—“I’ve got to find a job.” And Bob Sweet said, “Well, the budget director, Fred Hayes, desperately needs somebody. He can’t get to any meeting on time. It’s just impossible. So I think you ought to go to work for Hayes.” So I went down there to be interviewed by Fred, and Fred hired me right away. And then I spent whatever it was, two to three years, in the
Lindsay administration, working as aide to the budget director, which was—then again, I was right on the cusp of a highly creative process where they were trying to bring some sense. It’s just like the FBI, Bureau of Investigation, here now. What’s going on here with these hearings on the 9/11 Commission and the FBI and how the problems in the FBI—reminds me exactly of the budget bureau in 1968. When people were well-meaning, intelligent, doing what they thought was their job with a very narrow frame on it and not thinking smartly about what to do about these issues. It wasn’t even computerized in those days, either. It’s very interesting. The parallels are quite striking.

So, then I worked for Hayes for two and half years, and I met a lot of terrifically talented young people, including Peter Goldmark, who was executive assistant to the budget director and went on to be head of the Rockefeller Foundation. And by that time, I was getting tired being behind a typewriter, and I said to Hayes, “I’ve got to get out of here. I’ve just got to. I can’t do this any longer.” And he said, “Well, never sit in front of a typewriter again. That’s one thing.” And he made me head of—when Lindsay won for the second term, Hayes, who was very concerned about how the city was being run, decided to set up what he called “talent search,” which was a head-hunting operation out of the budget bureau that would compete with the political contracts that City Hall was seeking to place. Fred said, “Okay, you head that.”

Sharpless  
So, talent search?

Dunlop  
Talent search. And that was actually a real ride, because he didn’t do
anything. Because Hayes was actually a brilliant budget director. He was a fascinating, very interesting public servant. But he didn’t give me a raise, he didn’t give me any budget, he didn’t give me any office, he didn’t give me any equipment. I mean, I had to go beg, borrow and steal—

end Interview 1
Interview 2

Sharpless

All right, this is the fourteenth of April, 2004, and this is the second oral history interview with Joan Dunlop. My name is Rebecca Sharpless, and we are in Ms. Dunlop’s home in Lakeville, Connecticut. It’s part of the Population Pioneers project being sponsored by the Hewlett Foundation. Okay, when we broke for lunch, we actually ran out of tape as you were telling me about the talent search and how that—

Dunlop

Oh, that was about the Lindsay administration.

Sharpless

Um-hm.

Dunlop

Yes, well, that was my first time away from the typewriter, and I think that’s what was important about that. In other words, I was now getting out from—what was interesting about that was I was trapped by my skills.

Sharpless

Um-hm. You were too good as a secretary—

Dunlop

I was too good at this job, which was much more—as a good secretary is—it’s much more than the secretarial work. And also you get unexpected access, if you really get on well with your boss, as to how decisions are made. That was an invaluable learning experience, those jobs—the six years at the Ford Foundation and then the two and a half years at city government. But from the city government job, I went to be assistant director of a small foundation called the Fund for the City of New York, which was interesting because of its smallness. But also, during that period of time, I was getting divorced from my first husband, and I was preoccupied by that process, I think, in retrospect, because I wasn’t learning during that time much. I was really standing still, and it was from that job that I went to work for JDR [John D. Rockefeller 3rd].
So what I think about the International Women’s Health Coalition and what I brought to it—I learned crucial things from five people I worked for. Ylvisaker being first, where there was—I can only describe it as a lyrical, an audacious imagination in social engineering. It was truly breathtaking. Then Hayes, who was the budget director, came out of the War on Poverty. He was deputy director of a community action program under Sergeant Shriver. And Hayes was another brilliant innovator, but he was implementing in government, he was putting into place—what’s the word I want?—it was a complete regeneration of an agency, in this case, the budget bureau. So I watched how he did that.

So I learned from him how to deal with difficult issues. Because the personnel problems he had in order to get the change he wanted—and this is what I find interesting about these FBI hearings yesterday—in order to get the bureaucrats to change, he teamed them with very young, smart people and called them program planners. And that process took a lot of human relations skills and a lot of management. I learned from Hayes a lot about how to manage talent, really. And, most particularly, if you need to try to make—to chastise people, if that’s the right word, or direct them, take it on the issue. Go to the issue every time.

Then from there—I’d earlier had the experience with Dr. Clark, immediately before I went to work for the budget bureau—and then that’s where I learned a lot about racism and I really got the feel for racism in my gut. From those jobs, I went to Mr. Rockefeller, which was where I began to get the substance of an idea. The Planned Parenthood job was really a diversion. The job was not the right job for me. Faye Wattleton needed to have somebody who had political
experience, and I didn’t. My experience was innovation in both government and foundations.

So from Planned Parenthood, where I was for about six months, I then found I had breast cancer, and that took a year to deal with, and [let’s] put that on the back burner for later. By the time I came out of the breast cancer experience, I was looking for what I would describe as a nontoxic job. And I thought, Well, the New York Public Library is like, sort of, apple pie and motherhood. And I had been told by Bill Dietel, who ran the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, that there was this man running the New York Public Library who had a very strange name, and he certainly needed some kind of administrative assistance, as far as Bill was concerned, who was on the board and who had been involved in recruiting Vartan Gregorian. Bill said, “Call him up. He’s looking for an executive assistant. Call him up.” And I kept calling, and I wouldn’t get a proper answer. I mean, nobody could seem to be able to answer the phone. I thought to myself, God, I’m going to go down there and answer the phone myself!

Sharpless You can give yourself this job.

Dunlop Yes, right! So, I finally got to see him on a Friday afternoon when he was in a complete tizzy because the press had just gotten hold of the fact that he had been turned down for a co-op apartment in New York, and that was a big brouhaha. And he was really upset about this—upset about the press more than he was about the turn-down, I think. And I remember saying to him, “Oh, don’t worry about it. This is New York. They’ll have forgotten about it in two days.” And he said to me, “Will you come back tomorrow?” which was a Saturday morning. So I
did. And this was my experience with Vartan. It was one of the happiest periods of my professional life. We had a great conversation in the so-called interview. We really had wonderful conversation. I can’t remember what we talked about. I think we talked about all kinds of things about education, about which I knew nothing, of course. And finally he said to me, “I would walk into the desert without water to get you.” And I thought, Oh my god! Good heavens! (laughter) And then, much to his chagrin, I said, “I need a night to think on it. I need to think about this overnight.” And he looked quite crestfallen after this big pitch. But anyway, it was obviously a wonderful job. He was a wonderful human being, and it was an interesting—again, it was a turnaround. And I’d been involved in these turnarounds, lots of them—by then at least three. And so, it was trying to change a much-neglected institution that had been taken for granted, ignored by the city. The building was neglected, the collections were neglected, the people were neglected. It was—the Dowdy Lady of Forty-Second Street was how people referred to the New York Public Library.

I was the first person that Vartan hired from the outside. And by then I’d seen some institutional innovations, so I would say things to him like, “You’ve got one arbitrary fire. You’ve got to fire one person on this team quickly, you know, to assert your power.” This kind of talk went on, which of course he knew perfectly well, I’m quite sure. But there was one particular person who—it was a woman, actually—who was running the development office, who was a disaster and was stabbing him in the back at every turn. And I could not get him to get her out of there. And finally I picked a fight with her, so he had to choose. We got into a—I don’t remember what the topic was. I think she went away on
vacation and accused me of taking on some of her tasks when she came back. And she then blew it with him and accused him of being under the thumb of that English nanny. That did it for him. Bang! She was out of there right away. That was the first real breakthrough in terms of how to put a team together, but that’s what I did with him, which is hire—I mean he hired people—but I helped him search for the people who filled key positions, and it was a very exciting time.

I went with him to the editorial board of the New York Times—he went there for lunch—where he kept the entire editorial board on the edge of their seats as he talked about what the New York Public Library could be, every little detail about it, from the architectural history, from the history of the collections, from the person who worked in the archives—I mean, he knew everything. It was a virtuoso performance, and from that day on the Times ran a positive story on Gregorian in the New York Times almost every week.

I’d watched him deal with the city council. He went to every single subcommittee meeting and testified before every single subcommittee. He made an ally of Mayor Koch. I mean, it was a virtuoso performance par excellence. And to be close in to watch that gave me all kinds of confidence about what it would take to promote an issue and also to raise money, because he was raising money hand over fist at that point, and there were lots of hilarious moments, including the fact that he really scheduled himself horribly. You know, like, he’d have three breakfasts, three lunches, and four dinners scheduled, and we’d have to unscramble this time and time again. But he never lost his cool. He was an enthusiast. He had a tremendous sense of humanity and great warmth. But he
was also tough, and people misread him if they thought he wasn’t tough. His
geniality hid a toughness that was quite remarkable. I think he’s a very interesting
man—and it was a very satisfying—and I was very happily married during that
time. So it was a confluence. I’d beaten cancer, I thought, and, you know—it was
a very happy time.

But Reagan came in in ’84—and I worked for Gregorian from ’82, I think,
to ’84—and Reagan’s whole posture towards women was making me—I was
going madder than a wet hen every minute.

Sharpless

Actually, Reagan came in ’80.

Dunlop

Was it ’80? So, well by—was he elected to a second term? Must’ve been.

Well, that was it. At that point I got this call from the Hewlett Foundation, from
Anne Murray, who was then the population officer, saying that—she had been a
friend, and I had known her when I’d worked for JDR, and she’d actually done
some work for me and so on—and she said, “Joan, we’re very worried about
what’s coming out of the White House. There’s some kind of a white paper that’s
talking about abortion, that says that any of the traditional organizations that
receive USAID money, if they’re doing anything on abortion, they stand to lose
their USAID contracts.”

And that was, of course, the beginning of the Mexico City Policy, and Anne
at Hewlett and Amy Vance, Cy Vance’s daughter at the Ford Foundation, both
had the same thought at the same moment, which was, We’ve got to do
something about this. We can’t let this slide. So they started looking around for
an organization that had a track record on abortion but had never received any
government money, and they decided to try to find one and see if they could
build it up, strengthen it, so that this organization could operate in those, if you like, interstices.

Population—well, I guess I should back up here a little bit. The Hyde Amendment, I think, made it impossible for USAID to distribute what they used to call MR [menstrual regulation] kits. This was when Ravenholt used to have a swizzle stick in his outer breast pocket which was actually a cannula and swizzle his martini with a cannula—this was one of the things that used to annoy the women so much. Anyway, when that happened, the Population Crisis Committee, which was a population control lobby in Washington where Joe Speidel was then, I think, head of it—

**Sharpless**
That was General Draper’s old office—

**Dunlop**
Yes, that’s right. General Draper created the Pop Crisis Committee, and John Rockefeller created the Population Council. PCC found Merle Goldberg and what was then called the National Women’s Health Coalition. It was a 501(c)3 that she had created in New York State, and they decided to use this to really transfer what the USAID was doing with doctors—training doctors and putting together training manuals and promoting abortion and distributing MR kits—into this 501(c)3 that would be a wholly owned subsidiary of the Population Crisis Committee. Merle was running this effort. What they essentially were doing—well, they weren’t really—well, *training* is too much of a word, they were not training. They were giving doctors manuals, giving them a couple of lectures, and giving them these MR kits and letting them loose with the assumption that they would use these MR kits for early abortions by vacuum aspiration.

That was what we’re talking about—late seventies, I guess. Yeah, late
seventies. I don’t remember exactly when the height of MR was. Maybe it was 1980. But anyway, this had been going on, and by the time 1984 came, Merle Goldberg was having a lot of trouble raising money. The Population Crisis Committee, for some reason or other, didn’t want her to go to the foundations. I don’t know the reason for that. And along comes Anne Murray, very energetic and very innovative, and finds Merle and this organization and thinks, Aha! This is the structure. So she strengthened the structure by adding to the board Dick Gamble, Frances Kissling, Catholics for a Free Choice, and a management person Karl Mathiessen.

Then they decided that Merle couldn’t run it, and she didn’t have management skills—she didn’t have the feel for it. She was really a provider of services. And I thought doing under-the-table abortions herself for people, all during that period—the Jane Connection, which had to do with the underground provision of abortion services—that’s a whole other story. Domestically—I’m talking about U.S. So they set about looking for an executive director, and that’s when I got this call from Anne Murray and also from Frances Kissling, saying, Please apply for this job. And I was just about ready for it. I mean, I was ready to run something. I didn’t care what I ran as long as I ran something. Local garbage pick-up would’ve been okay. But I also saw that I was furious on the abortion subject. I was really angry. And I don’t think initially I really saw the opportunity for what the Coalition could be.

But I called up Adrienne, and I think she was—she was in Bangladesh then. My husband—my then-husband, Ed Deagle and I, persuaded Adrienne to take this job running the Ford office in Bangladesh—heavily, heavily lobbied her to
do this—and she finally agreed to, after some hesitancy. But I don’t remember how quite—she must’ve been there four years, because we went out to visit her. But I knew then, for some reason or other I don’t know how, that she was running into problems with the Ford management. I knew that they were not happy with her. She didn’t get along well with Carmichael, who was the vice president. She was much too opinionated and independent minded. But the trouble was she was so good at writing dockets, they couldn’t get her because her writing ability was too strong, so they couldn’t really do anything with her. They must’ve been maddened by it. (laughs)

Anyway, I said to her, “I think we should go back to the coven, take over this organization, and see what we can do with it.” And at first she was sort of reluctant, but as it went along, it seemed like a good idea. I knew that Susan Berresford wasn’t going to renew her contract. And Susan said that she was a very difficult woman to help and that they really kind of washed their hands of her. So, for reasons that I don’t fully understand—and at the time I was actually furious with Susan, and I think I remember having called up Susan and told her that she had a discrimination case on her hands if she didn’t watch it. I was fit to be tied. I had kind of threatened Susan, which was probably not very smart. And so Adrienne eventually—what was so funny about all of this was that the Ford Foundation was going to give her a year, post- her Dhaka job, as a kind of transition. They would pay her salary and she could be seconded anywhere, and I thought, Well great, she can be seconded to the International Women’s Health Coalition. Oh no, they didn’t want that. That wasn’t acceptable. They made her go work for the Pop Council, which was, of course, a much more conventional
organization. And I don’t know to this day why that was, except that they thought, These two women, it’s not a good idea, blah, blah, blah—who knows.

In the meantime, I was trying to figure out how to behave as an executive director, and when I think how naïve I was—it’s really breathtaking. But I persuaded the board that this was not about abortion, this was about women, and if they didn’t make it about women, I wasn’t interested. And it had to be about women’s reproductive health. About—our reproductive lives—I think I talked about reproductive life. Things happen to you over your lifespan that have to do with reproduction. An abortion of an unwanted pregnancy is one of those things that may happen. Unless we put the work of this organization in that framework, we would never be able to raise the money and we would never be able to get the constituency. It was not just about abortion, and I was not interested in just training doctors. We had to have a broader framework and a broader agenda. They bought it.

Pouru Bhiwandiwala, who was then the chair of the board, who’s really incredibly energetic, very eccentric, quite wonderful Indian physician who works out of North Carolina—I’m sure she’s still very active—apparently reported to the board, “She’s very good and she knows it.” (laughter) So they were stuck with me in that philosophy. And I also said we shouldn’t be in Washington. I don’t want to be in Washington under the thumb of the Reagan administration. We need to be in New York because this is where I live, and we need to be near the media because we’re going to have to deal with the media sooner or later.

And lots of anecdotes. I can remember moving the office, physically, myself and Judith Helzner, who’s now at the MacArthur Foundation, is the program director
of population, actually hauling the typewriters. I can see Judith putting a typewriter into her car. I mean, I don’t know what we thought we were doing. I think I started out in someone’s office. I rented one office from Grantmaker’s and Health, I think it was. We later moved to one floor at the Spanish Institute. It was very much a bootstrap operation. When I got into the office in Washington—Judith Bruce tells very funny stories about this, which is on a tape which is kind of fun to watch, which I have here.

Anyway, I didn’t want to be in Washington, I knew I didn’t want to be in Washington, and I was pretty sure that the three staff people—there were three people on the staff—two of them for sure I knew I didn’t want. One of them was a young woman I was actually quite interested in, very smart. She knew a lot about computers. So I thought to myself, I don’t know where I got this idea—one arbitrary fire. But the first thing I did when I got into the office, I asked to see the bank statement, because Frances Kissling had assured me that there was plenty of money. This was when Frances was on the board when they were negotiating my hiring. And I said, “How much money’s there?” She said, “Oh there’s plenty of money, don’t worry about it. Money’s not a problem.” I didn’t believe it for one minute.

And then [in] my explorations with the foundations before I took the job, I went to see Hewlett and Ford and, I don’t know, maybe a couple of others, and said, “This is what I’m thinking of doing. Will you support it?” Because I wanted to be sure the foundations were going to be there. They said, Oh yes, they would. And then I said, “And furthermore, if you’re going to appropriate or grant out, don’t make the grant until I get there, because I don’t know what I’m
going to find.” So, the first morning, I ask for the bank statements, and, sure
enough, all they had was seventeen thousand dollars. And I thought, Uh-huh.
And then the office manager, who I knew I wasn’t going to get along with at all,
for some reason, in the first week, lost the keys to the office. And, I thought,
This is it. I’m not having any more of this.

So that was my first arbitrary fire, and then, because I was moving to New
York, that solved the other one. And then Beth, her name was—this young
woman, ended up coming with me to New York. And then I made one or two
of my, what I call “spectacular hiring maneuvers,” which is that I hired a woman
out of the check line at D’Agastino’s [supermarket chain]. (Sharpless laughs) I
believe you should give young, bright people an opportunity, and this young
woman—I’d been going to D’Agastino’s for quite some time. She was Latina,
and she was very good at the cash register. (laughs) So I thought, Oh, she could
be trained easily. Well, that was a big mistake. She was wonderful, but she simply
didn’t have the social skills or the background or anything to really handle it. She
went into the military in the end. But it was quite time-consuming handling that.
And the other woman I hired, who was really wonderful, was Karen—blocking
on the name—she’s married to Hernan San Hueza and she’s working I think
now for—I can’t remember—the organization has changed its name. Used to be
a sterilization organization.

**Sharpless**
EngenderHealth?

**Dunlop**
EngenderHealth. That’s where she’s working now. But she was incredibly patient
with me in all kinds of ways—Karen was absolutely wonderful. She did all the
administrative work. We didn’t know how to—we had to start totally from
scratch. We had absolutely nothing. And we didn’t know anything about computers. We only barely knew how to put a budget together.

**Sharpless** To what extent did you have a mission statement when you first went on board?

**Dunlop** Well, we probably inherited something. I remember the by-laws were vague enough that we could use them. But, you know, Adrienne and I wrote, and I don’t remember which of us—but one of the things about Adrienne and me is we tend to finish one another’s sentences. She used to be happy if I started writing something and then she’d ended it. That seemed to work the best way. So I think we developed our first proposal. And actually, upstairs I have the letters that Adrienne wrote me from Bangladesh. There’s sixty-one of them from when she was in Bangladesh, and one of the letters—I was looking quickly through them—says, “The proposal is great. I like it a lot.” So we must’ve been working on that in 1984, and that’s where the mission statement—as it was originally developed, because it’s very different now—that’s where it began. We didn’t inherit the mission statement from the old International Women’s Health Coalition. I think we invented it all from scratch, basically.

**Sharpless** What became of Merle Goldberg?

**Dunlop** She’s no longer alive. She was never well. She was one of these people who neglected her health terribly. She was very overweight. It was a very difficult situation because the board didn’t want to fire her. They wanted to bring me in over her and help her stay around to do writing. I knew that was a mistake. I’d learned that from, of all people, a wonderful, wonderful man who used to be dean of the Harvard Medical School. He was on the board at the Pop Council, and he became chair of the Council after JDR died. Bob Ebert. But he handled the
transition between George Zeidenstein and Barney Berelson. And I learned then from him, you cannot keep the previous chief executive around. Absolutely not.

**Sharpless**

Did they try?

**Dunlop**

Yes, and I had to negotiate—by then I’d gotten smarter. I got Helene Kaplan, who’s a prominent lawyer, now chairman of the board of Carnegie Corporation and Gregorian’s boss, to be my lawyer and to negotiate for me. And it was a very tough negotiation. Dick Gamble told me later it almost got derailed because I absolutely insisted that Merle had to leave, and it was very hard. And it was very tough, also, on Sandra Kabir, who was running the Bangladesh Women’s Health Coalition, who was a very close friend of Merle’s and who Merle had helped, literally. Merle had gone out there for three months and lived in Dhaka and helped Sandra set up the Bangladesh Women’s Health Coalition. So there were very close alliances and deep cuts in that process. And then, I think, Merle did consulting work, but she had health problems from day one. And I didn’t keep in touch with her. I did a little bit to begin with, but after that we just kind of faded away. She went to Washington, lived in Washington. She was a writer, really, as well as being a practitioner.

**Sharpless**

I’m sorry. But you were talking about—we were talking about mission statements and redefining—

**Dunlop**

Well, the initial, first proposals—I’m sure I have them upstairs. We received a substantial amount of general support from Ford and Hewlett—

**Sharpless**

And those agreements were in place when you started?

**Dunlop**

Well, the understanding is—the handshake was in place before I took the job. And Ford went along with it. Once Adrienne had done her year of transition with
Pop Council, there’s nothing much they could do about whether or not she was going to join the International Women’s Health Coalition or not. But she was there—she didn’t actually come to work at the Coalition until I’d been there a year. But we were in close contact, and we knew that’s what was going to happen. So when she says that the two of us founded it together, she’s really right, even though—people have said to me, “Joan, why is she saying this? This is not true. You took it over. You got her to work with you.” But, in fact, there was this long alliance. And it had been brooding for a long—not brooding, germinating—for a long time.

**Sharpless**

You inherited work in Indonesia, the Philippines, Bangladesh, Senegal, and Brazil. You want to talk about those?

**Dunlop**

Well, all I can really say about it is the Bangladesh project was terrific. That was Sandra Kabir, and she was wonderful. That was a perfect example of what we wanted. That’s the ideal. We always knew that that clinic and how she ran it and was what we wanted. First of all, it was women oriented. When we asked Sandra Zeidenstein, George Zeidenstein’s wife, to do an evaluation on it for us because she knew Bangladesh, and she knew women, she came back and said, “This is a safe haven.” She used that expression because—the first time I’d really heard that for women, even anywhere, as a concept. But not only was it a place where they could go to be treated as human beings and to terminate a pregnancy if they wanted to, but they also—Sandra was providing legal advice for land rights or for divorce. They had other kinds of things going on in this clinic that were quote-unquote empowering for women. So that was part of what was innovative about it.
The work in Indonesia was highly problematic, as far as I was concerned. By that I mean it was almost entirely physicians, doctors, who had received grants from IWHC [International Women’s Health Coalition]. And they were doctors who were really earning a big amount of money because they were already doing illegal abortions, and they were—often they were prominent people in the community. I didn’t know anything about Indonesia.

_Tape 1, side 1, ends; side 2 begins._

**Sharpless**

I was absorbed and not paying attention to the tape. I’m sorry. Okay, so you went to Indonesia.

**Dunlop**

Well, I went to Indonesia. I met these various physicians. I tried to find out what it was they were doing. I mean, I could not get a straight answer for anything. Now, that’s typical Indonesia, so I should have known better. But one of them, I went to one of his classes. I tried to figure out what were they actually doing with the money. And it certainly wasn’t anything to do with women. I mean, it may have been something to do with abortion, but it wasn’t from the women’s perspective—they were using this money to promote their own careers, whatever they were doing. And I thought to myself, This is not on. I’m not doing this. So I basically told them right then and there, The grant’s cancelled. Now, that’s totally not at all Indonesian behavior. And Adrienne was slightly horrified when she’d heard that I’d done this somewhat arbitrarily. And later on I said, “You’ve got to go back there and fix this.” But anyway, basically we cut the grant—I cut it off in Indonesia.

In the Philippines, there was this husband-and-wife team who were running a clinic and who were providing services, and he was a lawyer, so there was also
contributing to the discourse about the need for family planning, all of them. They were playing in the policy level, and I’m blocking on their names. Adrienne probably will remember. But I went to the clinic, and I saw them perform abortions, and I was pretty horrified. And then they had a young woman working for them who was superb. I liked her a lot. I thought she was excellent. She had a real feel for women. And so we hung in there in the Philippines for quite some years, and the young woman, Reena Marcello, eventually came to work for Ford in New York. The older couple, moved on. I don’t remember having much impact on policy. It was very difficult. There was a lot of under-the-counter abortion going on, a lot of it. Some of it was safe, some of it wasn’t. And, you know, the Catholic Church was very present. The women’s movement was highly antagonistic to the West. We had a lot of, as I remember, a lot of political difficulties in some ways as we were going into Cairo, with the more radical parts of the women’s movement who were very against the idea of abortion—thought it was population control. And the intensity—a lot of it came from the Philippines, as I remember.

Senegal, the work was built around one flamboyant woman. Madame Mbai, I think her name was. And we weren’t still sure what we were going to do in Africa, so we hired a team of three people. One was Janice Jiggins, who knew a lot about Africa, a lot about agriculture, a lot about women. Another was a Belgian nurse-midwife who had had a great deal of hands-on experience in service delivery—and Liz Coit, who was a program person. And we said, Okay, take three months and tell us where we should work in Africa. Long story short, they said, West Africa, because you need to get away from colonial east Africa.
There’s too many British—the heritage of the British is too deeply entrenched here. It would be difficult to break through—there’s a lot of AID money. We want to stay away from colonialism, stay away from USAID. In West Africa—the tribal history was less destroyed. There were things about the tribal history that would be to our advantage. Nigeria was the largest country in Africa, tremendously powerful. Of course, there were very corrupt government[s] in those days. And then we picked, um—

Sharpless  
Cameroon.

Dunlop  
—Cameroon, because it was English and French and because it was—we’d picked for influence. Influence in the continent. Size, diversity—and we didn’t want just basket-case countries. We did not want countries that were terribly, terribly poor or terribly, terribly, in some way, torn apart for whatever reason. We were—I certainly was, and I’m sure Adrienne and I talked about this—we were going to play for success. We wanted to succeed and succeed as a women’s organization, and Adrienne had inherited these various alliances because of her international work. She had already a whole bunch of allies all over the world who knew about her work on economic development. What these allies did not know was the population control, reproductive rights business, nor did they know where the political opposition was coming from to reproductive rights and to reproductive health. And that was the big challenge that we faced at the UN Women’s Conference in Nairobi in ’85. Because that was our first big political push. And we did it by—well, we wanted to come into Nairobi with a program. We had a whole program on abortion set up—

Sharpless  
By *we*, you mean the IWHC?
Yes. The IWHC, on its own—we had a panel on abortion and we convinced the practitioners from these various countries to talk about their—I wanted them to talk about their experience. I didn’t want to hear numbers of procedures, I didn’t want to hear demographics. I wanted them to talk about themselves as providers. How do they feel about providing abortion services in a situation where it was illegal, or quasi-legal, at the very least. So that people would be engaged in the problem, the audience would be engaged in the issue. Dr. Feroza Begum, who was one of the grandes dames of Bangladesh, was one of the people who asked to talk about her early experiences.

I also wanted to know, Why did they get into this dangerous business? What made it possible? To try to humanize it. And that was quite successful. But when Adrienne and I got there—this is one of these moments when you remember—we were sitting in the sun, I remember, and we must’ve been outside the hotel where we were staying, having a cappuccino. I can remember holding the cappuccino. I opened the paper and there’s this panel talking about reproductive health, and, as I read the story, I thought to myself, This is Right to Life stuff. And I remember saying, “Oh, shit! They’re using our language.”

And that’s exactly what happened. It was then, for the first time in these international conferences, we began to see the Right to Life activity in opposition to our work. They were going after Planned Parenthood, big time, in that setting. They didn’t come after us because they didn’t really know what we were about. But by then we had—even then we had a pretty good team of people, and we’d only been in business maybe, almost two years. But we knew that this conference was being heavily politicized. And the incident that I think stays most vividly in
my mind is a conference—it wasn’t a conference. It was a gathering on a lawn at
the University of Nairobi, where the NGO conference was. And the debate was
about—in some way, it was about family planning, and I don’t remember why or
how, and it must’ve been broader than just family planning, because this was a
women’s conference.

But one of the people who was the most provocative and most outspoken
about the dangers of abortion was an Indian physician—I’d been watching
various panels. I’d been moving from panel to panel. And by sheer luck, I
discovered that she was allied to the Vatican. And I knew that this was agent-
provocateur stuff. I said to one of our closest allies, Mercedes Sayagues from
Uruguay, who was a political person—I got hold of her. I don’t know what I did.
I must’ve gotten up. We were all sitting on the floor, on the ground. And I
must’ve gotten up and went over to Mercedes, and I said to her, “Mercedes, this
is who this woman is.” So she said, “Okay, fine.” And she stepped into the
middle of the circle and pointed out at her and said, “I denounce you. I
denounce you. You are not what you say you are. Tell me what you really are.” It
was a very dramatic moment. It was really quite something. Mercedes had had a
lot of political experience in Latin America, so she was a very dynamic woman.
Small and very elegant—I remember her quite vividly. But it just—all of a
sudden, people began to see what was happening in this political environment
around these issues of reproductive rights. And, basically, the woman slunk off,
and I don’t know what happened.

But it was one of those moments when, for the first time, I began to see
how we could build a lobby, we could build an alliance, basically. My husband
was there, and he was working for the Rockefeller Foundation, so thanks to him
we had a room at the Norfolk Hotel. That was the room we used because we
were very close to the university there. We used that as our base. And we were
doing writing, we were churning out press releases. I don’t know what we
thought we were doing. My best description of this whole period—which was
very exciting, very anxiety provoking—is that I was just making it up as I was
going along. Literally making it up. We knew what our values were, but we didn’t
have any idea where we were really going in the long run. We just kept holding
tight to those values and to those alliances.

**Sharpless**

So, in the case of the Nairobi conference, you decided, Okay, we’re going to go to
Nairobi and we’re going to do—what?

**Dunlop**

We had to get visibility for the International Women’s Health Coalition. We
wanted to get name recognition and visibility for what we were doing. We
were working on abortion. We were working on other things as well—
Adrienne had not yet written “The Culture of Silence.” We hadn’t gotten on to
the reproductive health tract infection issue yet. We weren’t there yet. We were
still trying to get a women’s perspective on the abortion issue, and, at the same
time, have the world—well, world community is a little grandiose. But have
our colleagues know that the United States was not totally dominated by the
Reagan view, which became the Mexico City Policy—that there was diversity
in the U.S. And we wanted to be visible on that topic. We didn’t realize going
into it that there was such—latent political opposition was lurking in the
shadows. I’m not actually overdramatizing—it was quite intense.

So that was our first—it was like baby steps. It was like kindergarten. That
was ’85. It was ten years to—’94 and Cairo. In those ten years, we built the
capacity to operate at a very much higher level of sophistication and across a
broader array of issues as well. And by then, because of the grant making, we had
alliances all around the world. Adrienne was doing that alliance building. She was
traveling and doing the program work. I was essentially raising money and trying
to hold the staff together, because that was never easy.

We established—it was from the very beginning very difficult for two
reasons, initially. This was very interesting. Judith Helzner, who was the first
person I hired, when she first went out to—I think she must’ve been in Asia
somewhere—trying to talk to people about the work we were doing. If those
people worked for the U.S. government they didn’t want to talk to her in their
office. There was a huge—chill factor that was created by this Mexico City
Policy. And it affected our hiring capacity. Even Judith herself wasn’t sure that
she wanted to be allied with this organization that was really, in a sense, quite
radical, and she would get tarred with the brush of being associated with
abortion at a time when abortion was really taboo—everybody wanted to run
away. They wanted to drop it, you know.

You asked me earlier do I think family planning and abortion should go
together, and I said, “Absolutely, yes.” If you have a women’s perspective,
there’s absolutely no way that you can drop abortion and pretend it isn’t about
women’s control over fertility. But the family planning establishment in those
days was terrified of this stuff. I knew because of my work with JDR—and
because of my association with the civil liberties people—that the right was using
abortion as an organizing tool. They knew that they could get people on the
streets using abortion as the organizing tool. It wasn’t just about abortion. There was something else that was going on here, and we needed to recognize that this was a slippery slope. They weren’t going to stop with abortion. That was just one—that was just the organizing tool. They were going to go down all kinds of different issues that affected women’s autonomy, and we had to recognize what we were up against. This was a much more systemic opposition with, you know, heavy duty ideology.

I had gotten distinction in divinity studies at school in England. I had a feel for—maybe because I’m almost sort of in love with social history, I had a strong instinct about what we were dealing with. And it wasn’t just about abortion. So there was no point in being embarrassed by it or feel guilty about it or to feel ambivalent about it or—as many of the family planners did. Many didn’t, I might add. But their sense was, if we could just distance ourselves from this, we’d be all right on family planning. We could protect family planning.

I later told the vice president, Gore, that there was no hiding place. I was called into the White House under Clinton—this was going into Cairo—because Gore had decided that the U.S. needed to modify its strong position on abortion. He tried to pull back Tim Wirth and the U.S. delegation in terms of their position going into Cairo. So he called in the heads of the women’s—I’m jumping here, chronologically—but he called in a bunch of heads of women’s organizations. Adrienne wasn’t with me. But there were about twelve of us. And said, you know, basically, we need to modify our position.

**Sharpless** Gore did?

**Dunlop** Gore, yeah. And I said, “You can’t, because there’s no hiding place. There’s no
hiding place for a woman who has a pregnancy that she does not want and there’s no hiding place for a politician.” And he said, “Are you telling me I’m naïve?”

And I said, “Yes, I am.” And Judith Lichtman reported later, she said, “Oh, okay, that’s the end of this. We’re leaving now.” Actually, he was great about it. He was very good. He wasn’t great about what he did. What he said in Cairo was far too namby-pamby for our taste. But, anyway, to go back in time, we first saw this political opposition in Nairobi in 1985.

**Sharpless**
Well, this is going to sound like a naïve question, but what’s the deal with the right in women’s rights? Why does the right want to curtail the rights of women?

**Dunlop**
Because they want women, you know—what is it—pregnant in summer and barefoot in winter, or whatever. I think it’s about women. It’s about women’s—

**Sharpless**
Is it about patriarchy?

**Dunlop**
I’ve never really felt comfortable with that phrase. I think it’s because women’s autonomy—I like that word, autonomy, I prefer it to, actually, empowerment—women’s autonomy is a threat to the established way of doing things. It’s a threat to the so-called nuclear family. It’s a threat to economic issues because if women gain economic power, either individually or across the board, it’s a threat to the male of the species. And the right is male-dominated. The Catholic Church is male-dominated.

**Sharpless**
I was going to ask where the Catholic Church fit into this.

**Dunlop**
Well, the Catholic Church was driving this Right to Life movement, I was convinced, in Nairobi in those days. The right was lurking around because now we know. I believe that this current radical right movement we have in the United States began as soon as Martin Luther King said, “I have a dream.” They said,
No, you don’t. And they started working then—this publication I have here that’s been published by the Committee for Responsive Philanthropy about the radical right foundations. They began in 1971. And that’s what I mean when I say abortion was an organizing tool. It was the most convenient and effective organizing tool, but their agenda was far larger than that. And that’s what we knew. In answer to your question, I think it’s because women’s autonomy is very threatening, by definition.

**Sharpless**

Well, that makes sense. I’m going to come back to those things, but how did you all get involved with the Tietze Symposium?

**Dunlop**

Well, Christopher Tietze was this remarkable man—I think he must’ve been a—I don’t think he was a demographer, I’m not sure—at the Pop Council—who had done this fantastic data gathering on abortion. He was progressively and imaginatively way ahead of his time. I think he died just before we took over the Coalition, IWHC. But his wife was very anxious that his work be in some way memorialized. Sarah Tietze and a woman named Uta Landy, who had worked for Chris Tietze, had wanted to put on a Tietze Symposium, in Berlin in 1984. But they didn’t have the money, and they didn’t have the administrative capacity. So they came to me and asked if we would do it.

I think we saw an opportunity then to give, again, visibility and credibility to the abortion issue, and the need for safe services. Just because the U.S. government says something doesn’t mean everybody else is thinking that. This was the first time we tried to do an international meeting that had international participants and international presenters. And I don’t remember, quite honestly, who was on it, who was speaking. It was a two-day symposium, I believe. All I
can remember about it—it sounds so ridiculous—it was Berlin, and I saw Boris Becker. And I’m a big tennis fan, so that was a big thrill. But the other memory was our first encounter with the quote-unquote Right to Life movement, when Paul Marx of Human Life International—now a big organization—was making a lot of trouble at these family planning conferences. He was going into these meetings and disrupting them—I had been told about him. Ours was an invited meeting. He hadn’t been invited.

Sharpless But he showed up?

Dunlop He showed up. And Dick Gamble and I were standing by the registration desk, and here comes this guy. And very belligerent, into bullying. And there’s something, I don’t know, I think it’s because I’m very tall. I find bullies like this, they just get my goat. I can’t control myself. I just can’t stand bullies. I’m the eldest of three, and my sister was small, and, you know, when she would be bullied at school, on more than one occasion, I would take somebody by the scruff of the neck, literally, and throw them on the ground. Happened more than once when I was in school when I was much younger. I thought, “This guy is not gonna wreck this meeting.”

So we argued with him, and he was very belligerent and accused Dick Gamble of all kinds of dreadful things that his family had done—murdering babies and all this usual rhetoric. He had a photographer with him, was taking pictures of us all this time. And then he headed for the door. This is when I lost it. He pulled the door towards him—he was small. I reached over his shoulder and slammed the door shut over his shoulder, as he tried to open it. Then I reached down, and I pushed it really hard with all my strength, so it banged and
he couldn’t open it. And I thought, Well, I’m in for a fight now. But, you know, like all bullies, he just slunk away and said, “I’ll be back.” I said, “Okay, you come back. I’ll be here. I’ll be waiting for you.” (laughs)

Afterwards George Brown, who’s a lovely man who worked for the Population Council, said, “Joan, how could you be so rude?” I said, “Listen, I’m taking no prisoners on this. There’s nothing nice about this.” You know, he never showed up again. Again, it was always there. But it was interesting. It was instructive, given today. But that was the first international conference. The most critical one was the one in Rio.

Sharpless Let me check the tape. (pause in recording). You were saying that the Rio meeting was the most—

Dunlop The most important. That was our most ambitious, our most ambitious. And I can’t even remember the date. Do you have it there anywhere?

Sharpless 1986 or ’87. I wasn’t quite sure.

Dunlop That’s right. Well, this time, we had made some allies in senior positions. And he had made an ally of us—Mahmoud Fathalla, the Egyptian—a physician—who’s one of the most beautiful human beings. And I’m trying to remember—oh yes, he was at WHO in a key job there, and I’m sure Adrienne remembered exactly what the title was. But he had said to us he thought that we ought to think about doing the Tietze Symposium allied to FIGO, which is the International Federation of OB/GYNs, as a way of, again, lifting the status of the topic, and that we should do it in Rio, where that FIGO would be meeting, and that we should reach for as high as we could reach in the government.

Anibal Faundes, who later was on our board, who was an OB/GYN, a
Chilean émigré to Brazil, was an advisor to the—I’m going to block on the name. I know that he was governor of the state, but he was a very high-level Brazilian. He may have been a candidate for president, but I may be wrong about this. I happened to know him also because Peggy Dulany was John Rockefeller’s niece, David Rockefeller’s daughter, who JDR had told me was likely to be the one of his nieces or nephews that really inherited his values. And Peggy Dulany knew this man very well. So we were able to get to him and tell him that we were going to do this and ask him if he would open the conference. I think his name was Pino—[my memory is] so bad—this is why I need my papers. And he did, he agreed. So we got a lot of—we were reaching very high in terms of people we wanted to invite and the people we wanted to speak. And—

**Sharpless**  
And the Coalition was doing most of the logistical work?

**Dunlop**  
All of it. No one wanted to touch this topic, don’t forget. Nobody had any money because anybody else who had government money couldn’t work on abortion—USAID was all over the map. I mean, still they were funding everybody. So there wasn’t anybody else who could take on something like this institutionally and not run the risk of running into the Mexico City Policy. Planned Parenthood, IPPF [International Planned Parenthood Federation] London, were one of the few agencies, had taken a stand against it. But they didn’t really have, quite honestly, the imagination or the chutzpah. I mean, we had all the chutzpah, I think, to take on something like this on this particular topic, at that moment.

This Tietze Symposium in Rio was important because not only was it a high-level thing to do, but also there was this classic walk on the beach which Adrienne and I still remember very vividly, as do the two gentlemen who were
with us. One of them was Mahmoud Fathalla, and the other was José Barzelatto. We were walking on the beach in Rio, and of course it was hot as hell. We didn’t have bathing suits—we had proper clothes on. I was thinking how uncomfortable I was. But we had a very, very good conversation with these two gentlemen about the work that we were doing. And for the life of me I can’t remember what the issue was, but there was some issue that we wanted to get their support for, and they agreed. And Barzelatto later became the program director at the Ford Foundation for Population and was a strong supporter of our work for many, many years. But that was a breakthrough moment for us, that Tietze symposium. We published an extensive volume out of it. Again, it was making the issue credible and keeping the substantive issue alive.

**Sharpless**

Keeping it on the table.

**Dunlop**

Yeah. I used to say that the Reagan Administration wanted to deep-six the topic. They just wanted, you know, to put it into a briefcase and dump it in the river, the whole topic and all the women who went with it. And so part of what we were doing was also saying to our colleagues, Look, who cares about the subject? It may have been captured by USAID money. But we’re in alliance with you. We’re here. We were trying, and perhaps not well, to broker relationships. I didn’t want to divide ourselves from the family planning community, when I look back on this, because there was so much animosity as we went into Cairo. You look as if you’re falling asleep.

**Sharpless**

I’m going to stretch for a minute.

_Tape 1 ends; tape 2, side 1, begins._

**Sharpless**

Okay, this is the second tape of the second interview with Joan Dunlop on April
14th. Okay, you mentioned something a couple of minutes ago that we talked about off tape. And I was thinking back, for example—Family Health International, Malcolm Potts’s organization, just didn’t talk about abortion there for a long period of—well, maybe still doesn’t talk about abortion. Tell me again, on tape if you would, how you came to the conclusion that abortion and family planning were intertwined, that you could not talk about one without talking about the other. I mean, you mentioned it briefly a few minutes ago.

Dunlop: Well, if you are looking at this from a woman’s perspective, from a woman’s individual life, the problem is simply one of degree. “Controlling your own body” is too simple. It’s so much about the essence of being. And I don’t care whether you’re in a village in India or Bangladesh or you’re in London, it’s the essence—it is a fight for your life. And those choices are very stark if you face an unwanted pregnancy. I had an illegal abortion in London in 1958, and it was a frightening experience. And one of the reasons I got into the International Women’s Health Coalition was because I vowed to myself, “This should not happen to other women.” And I think the sense that this desire to control fertility or control one’s life—it’s not about controlling your body. It is about your body, but it’s really about your life.

Sharpless: About whether you will be a mother or not.

Dunlop: Well, whether you will be able to make choices. I’ve always thought choice was a weak word, politically—actually, because it sounds self-indulgent. But that’s why it’s a life force. Yes, being a mother is something that may matter enormously to you—

Sharpless: But that’s not the right phrase either, because being a mother is loaded with
It’s a make-or-break issue, as far as I’m concerned, for women’s lives. If you have to bear an unwanted child, and you don’t have the money, and you don’t have the family support, and you don’t have whatever else, it can break you. And I think that’s just as true for women who have very little money and for those who do. It also has psychological effects as well, I’m quite convinced. This kind of desperate trap in an unwanted pregnancy. There’s a desperation to that trap, and women should not be forced into those circumstances.

To me, it is the worst kind of oppression. That’s a strong saying. There are other very bad forms of oppression, but to me, it’s the worst oppression. To force women to bear children against their will and against their circumstances, and furthermore, to assume that you know better than the woman does. That’s the other thing about the population control business is that the presumption was, We know better. That’s a presumption that won’t work. It won’t work in reality, and it won’t work politically, either. So it’s self-defeating. Down that road, there’s no win down there. There’s only loss. So, family planning is a way to control fertility, to defend yourself against pregnancy. To say that abortion is not a method of fertility control, I mean, it’s fantasy.

So that’s one—there is a continuum, and there’s no getting away from it. And there’s no hiding place on that. The way that Right to Lifers tip this argument to be about the fetus is clever, and I think can be fought back by very deep conviction. That’s why Adrienne has been so successful, it’s the depth of her conviction. And I think as women working in these issues who are feminist we need to be sure that we articulate the depth of that conviction. Because you
can’t be—we can’t be wishy-washy on this one. There’s no wishy-washy place.

Now, the other reason I feel so strongly about it is I’m absolutely convinced, as I said earlier, the Right uses this as a tool. It could be HIV/AIDS.

**Sharpless**

It’s not really about babies.

**Dunlop**

No. It’s not about babies. It’s about getting people out. Mostly men, I might say.

It’s about getting people onto the street. It’s getting political activism for a much broader purpose. And the family planners who think that there isn’t a broad propose and that they won’t be swept up in this, are kidding themselves, big time.

All this nonsense that’s going on now about sex education—not sex education, sex workers versus prostitutes, or HIV language—I mean, it’s all the same baggage. I think the family planners actually know this now. I think it’s become quite apparent.

You know, Ellen Chesler says very rightly that you can blur the distinction between abortion and family planning by talking about emergency contraception—that emergency contraception blurs it. The Right’s going to take that on—that’s not going to do it. It is about conviction and about, as far as I’m concerned, reality. And to give the unborn child—I don’t care what stage of gestation they are—preference over the woman in whom parents, teachers, society, culture has deeply invested and say that that investment has less value than a bunch of cells is just to me an outrage. Don’t get me going on this one. It’s just astonishing.

**Sharpless**

What is it like to find yourself toe to toe—*Humanae Vitae*, the Roman Catholic Church, had come out in the late 1960s. What’s it like to find yourself standing toe to toe with a powerful geopolitical force like the Vatican or the U.S.
This is going to sound terrible. Fuck ’em all, is my attitude. You know, just buzz off. You have no business in my life. I don’t find them the least bit intimidating. I mean, I do find them intimidating in political terms, but personally, I don’t feel threatened. And I remember one of our most tense moments in the pre-runup to Cairo, when the Vatican went too far in their negotiations to Cairo on some language in the document—they wanted to object to the idea of condoms to prevent HIV/AIDS. And that was when Rachel Kyte, who was our chief whip, said, “Okay, everybody on the floor.” And Nick Biegman, who was running the meeting, had to call a recess. And I remember being so furious, I went up to Mr. Klink, and I said, “John, you’ve gone too far. You’ve just gone too far. Now, remember that.” I mean, I was so angry.

My view: fuck ’em all. That’s what I’d tell them. (laughs) They are wrong, dead wrong. And I have no time for the Catholic Church whatsoever—you know, I was raised in the Church of England, okay? And I kept saying to my colleagues, “Look, my favorite period was Tudor history. Let’s go back to sacking the monasteries. Let’s start there.” You know, that’s my view about the whole thing. Organized religion gives me hives. (laughs) And unfortunately, it seeps over into, for example, this lovely Congregational minister here, who I have a lot to do with, and I’m very fond of. But I know he’s very upset that I don’t come to church and listen to his sermons. But The Passion, this movie by Mel Gibson, has just, you know, just pushed me totally over the edge.
equality and justice? I don’t think so.

**Sharpless**  
No, it’s about power.

**Dunlop**  
It’s about power. Women’s power is in our collective force, and the depth of our conviction and the choices we make as a result of that. And the decision to have children or not to have children is deeply embedded in that—to quote a phrase, embedded.

**Sharpless**  
(laughs) Okay.

**Dunlop**  
Anyway, I don’t know how Adrienne felt, and I certainly—she was much closer in on these negotiations than I was, in the Cairo process. I wasn’t engaging with these people on a day-to-day basis.

**Sharpless**  
Well, one other thing. Is there anything else to say about the Nairobi conference?

**Dunlop**  
No.

**Sharpless**  
Okay. I have in my notes something: 1992 Women’s Declaration on Population Policies. What was that all about?

**Dunlop**  
Oh yeah. Well, that’s important because it’s the beginning of the movement towards Cairo. In 1992, in the summer of ’92, the UN Conference on Environment took place in Rio. We had been urged to go—we, IWHC, had been urged to send a delegation or presence. And at that moment, I was in heavy-duty focus mode. You know, hold focus, hold focus, hold focus. We’re not going to do everything. We can’t do everything. So I said no. But Adrienne went.

**Sharpless**  
What were you focused on at that—

**Dunlop**  
I was focused towards only the issues that had to do with population policy. There was an issue whereby the people who worked with us and our staff felt that Adrienne and I were in some close cabal, from which they were excluded. They’d
keep saying to me, Joan, what is this organization really doing? What we were not saying and what we really were doing or interested in doing was changing population policy. We were not just about abortion and reproductive rights. So to some degree, they had a legitimate point.

So, going back to why not Rio: because I didn’t think we could put the resources in, I mean, human as well as financial. However, Adrienne decided she would go anyway. That’s when we began to see the Right to Life [movement] organizing again.

Sharpless

At an environmental—

Dunlop

Yes, because the issue that was to be discussed was family planning, and it was in a panel that Bella Abzug’s organization had put on. And what we were further worried about is that the population establishment was being intimidated by this stuff. And it was coming from a radical Marxist-feminist perspective. And, uh-huh—you know, that figures, right? So what happened, Adrienne saw this—

Sharpless

Say a little bit more about that.

Dunlop

Well, it’s an overstatement, an oversimplification, to say that there’s a Marxist view about population control—that it’s an oppressive, capitalistic mechanism stuff. That language. Well, you can say the same thing about abortion, or you can say that women are being bamboozled through their support for abortion because it’s really about the capitalist plot.

Sharpless

Yes, and they’re in control of women and—

Dunlop

Yes, exactly. And that argument was put forward by young women. There was a group from Brazil and a group from Bangladesh, whom we knew who were on panels. And in the audience was Joe Speidel and other family planning people
who may not have been our closest allies, but were our allies, and they were being hoodwinked by this stuff. They were being taken in and feeling guilty or bad or whatever they were feeling. This was a problem for us. We didn't like that one bit. I got phone calls. I got calls from Jacqueline Pitanguy, who was the chair of the Commission on Women for Brazil, who was very worried when she saw this. I got another call from Bene Madunagu from Nigeria, who was also there, and they were saying the same thing: Joan, this is a problem.

**Sharpless**

And were these young women sincerely saying what they were thinking?

**Dunlop**

I think, you know, they honestly had an ideological perspective. Adrienne knew the one from Bangladesh well. In some ways—and this is harsh, but they were so—it's a bit unfair to say this—they were dissemblers. The other way of saying that is that they wanted a place in the sun, and I think that's very fair, you know. I understand that.

**Sharpless**

It is a perspective.

**Dunlop**

It is a perspective, but I'm not giving a place in the sun to you when my enemy's over here on the right. I can't afford to have you over here. I'm overstating the right-left thing. On the left, making all this noise. We need a joint population policy.

**Sharpless**

A united front.

**Dunlop**

A united front, right. So I was very concerned about that. Dissembling on the left was going to make the Right's job easier. My colleagues were basically saying that to me. And the Brazilians are superb politicians. They could see it. And so they said, We'd better get ready for Cairo. This is going to get much worse in Cairo. This is nothing by comparison. This is environmental, and this is a minor panel.
If this is going to happen, we have to figure out what to do about this. I do think this is one of our more inspired moments. This was August.

Sharpless  

Dunlop  
Yeah. And I said to Adrienne, “I’m going to call. I’m going to get on the phone, my favorite form of communication, and I’m going to call the ten people we think of who are points in networks around the world in as many countries as we can reach and ask them to come to London at once, within the next three weeks, to talk about how we’re going to deal with this.” And that’s what happened. We got on the phone and I remember trying to reach others, calling Africa—I was calling on the phone for a week. Sure enough, we got—I don’t remember, there must’ve been twenty of us who ended up in London. We had the money—that was the other thing about us. We had the money. We were being well supported by the foundations, and we had general support money. We could turn on a dime.

I used to say this all the time. We can turn on a dime. We can go tomorrow because we had that kind of freedom.

Sharpless  
You can pay those airfares and get those people there.

Dunlop  
Right. And so we said, We’ll pay your airfare. We’ll pay, but we need [you] to come. We’ve got a problem here. And by then, we’d built these relationships because we’d had program offices going to Africa. We’d had people in Latin America. We’d built these alliances—so when I got on the phone, they knew what I was talking about.

And they came. And I remember it was September, because that’s the day that George Soros bid against the pound and made, billions of dollars. For some reason I remember that. I don’t know why, but I do. It was at this meeting that
the Latinas—it was the Brazilians—said, We need to get away from oppositional politics. We are always in opposition. We’re saying what we don’t want, what we don’t want, what we don’t want. We need to say what we do want. And it was then, right then and there, that we started to draft this thing called the Women’s—whatever we called it—Women’s Statement on Population Policy, or something.

**Sharpless**  
Women’s Declaration on Population Policies.

**Dunlop**  
Declaration. Well, the idea was that we would draft that document in London. I can see Peggy Antrobus now, typing away at her—she was one of the first people to have a laptop computer—and Adrienne dictating it to her. There was about six people working on it. If we could agree—the twenty of us around the table—then all of us would take the declaration back to our countries and begin to work our networks, and we’d give ourselves three to six months to do it.

**Sharpless**  
To get people to sign on to it?

**Dunlop**  
Yeah, to know about it—to know that it was happening, to know what the idea was. And what we would then do was we would all come together in Rio in—I want to say April—I’m losing time, but I think it was ’93. I’m pretty sure it was six to nine months later, in a conference organized by Jacqueline Pitanguy, where we would reach for all sections of the women’s movement. We would reach into the left. It was going to be the biggest umbrella we could possibly marshal. I think there were about ninety-two people at this meeting.

**Sharpless**  
At the Rio meeting?

**Dunlop**  
The Rio meeting. And we would have by then worked this document. In that meeting Gita Sen, from India, chaired a—what do you call it?—plenary session
that went on from eight to nine hours, in which we edited the document as a
group.

**Sharpless**

That’s agonizing.

**Dunlop**

It was agonizing. It was absolutely agonizing. And there is the great story, which I
don’t know whether Adrienne told you. But there was a program committee that
was a kind of organizing committee. There were about, I think, between six and
ten of them. And they had to decide how they were going to manage this process.

There were all kinds of political problems et cetera. They threw the I Ching every
night. Did she tell you about this story?

**Sharpless**

Tell me about your side.

**Dunlop**

No, no, that’s all I know. I wasn’t in it. They used to joke about it. But it was very
effective. And I don’t know—the person who knows the detail about it is
Amparo Claro, from Chile. But, you know, what I like about this story—I think it
demonstrates one of the reasons why we were successful against the Vatican.

Because we were dealing with a belief system, just as they were, and the belief
system was feminism. But this I Ching thing was not a joke. I mean it was a joke,
but it also wasn’t a joke, because there was something spiritual about it. It had the
force of diversity of many countries. It was carrying a weight. Don’t ask me to
analyze it, but I’m convinced it had something to do with our success. Because
out of that meeting came what I call the Cairo lobby, which—I’m sure I’ve got a
photograph upstairs, and I’m sure Adrienne will show it to you. But, you know,
the twenty people who were really the hard-core of the people who did the work
work.

**Sharpless**

She didn’t put it in those terms. (telephone rings; pause in recording) Okay.
Thinking about the Women’s Declaration on Population Policies. So, ninety-two people editing in a group—(laughter)

Dunlop Right.

Sharpless What was the outcome?

Dunlop Well, the outcome was this declaration, and it was published—

Sharpless And were ninety-two people happy with it, as far as you could tell?

Dunlop Yes. I would think—I’m sure there were people who were caviling on the edges. But generally speaking, yes, because we all signed it.

Sharpless And how did you feel about it?

Dunlop I felt great. I felt it was a tour de force. I think this was almost our highest—Cairo was the high point. But without this as a jumping-off board, we never would have made it. It was, in a sense, the feminist prep com, was how I described it to myself and others. The document is really strong, and it stands today. We put a document out there, we had, you know, however many people signed it. This was part of what gave us all a legitimacy, and again, because of the three things we were talking about—the diversity, the numbers, and the conviction. We were on a roll at this point. We knew we were on a roll. I was exhausted. I’m sure I was extremely bad tempered. You know, Adrienne was doing most of the hard work. I was basically bullshitting in the corridors. I mean, that’s not quite true, but, you know, I was doing a lot of what I call shoring-up work. We know that Cairo cost us a million dollars.

Sharpless The Coalition?

Dunlop Yes, we needed a million dollars. We didn’t know going into it that we would need this much. What I can’t remember is whether we had raised the money at
this point (Rio) or were raising it after. But what we do know was that the donors were fabulous. I mean, they got themselves together, which they seldom do, and they basically divvied it up and said, Okay, we’re going to support this effort. Some of us are going to support the family planning people. We’re going to support the feminists. We’re going to blah, blah, blah—whatever they decide to do. And Susan Sechler, who was then at Pew, was a key actor in that, as was Carmen Barroso from MacArthur. It was a full-court press. But they were smart to do what they did because they had a product—in other words, they had a movement, if you like. And they knew that it was there, that it was solid.

**Sharpless** They could catch that wave if they wanted.

**Dunlop** We used to describe it as jumping on a wave. The wave was coming. We didn’t invent it. We just were able to get on top of it and balance on it. But I don’t think, at the time, we realized it. I certainly didn’t. I knew we were rolling, but did I have this broader vision—not vision—did I see to the very broad landscape? I’m not sure that I did.

**Sharpless** You just knew that things were moving down the road.

**Dunlop** I was blinkered. One of the things you learn when you’re in jobs where—you’ve got a lot of stuff coming at you from different places—okay, I’m going to hold focus on this and I’m not going to let go. It was during that time that I decided, I’m not responding to my inbox. If I’m constantly working on my inbox, I’m dead in the water because I’m going to be exhausted before I get to what I really need to do, which is the stuff that I’m going to initiate. And so I would stop being a good girl at that point, whatever that means.

**Sharpless** So you stopped being reactive and started, you know, working on your own
initiatives?

Dunlop

Well, when the Latinas said we needed to get out of oppositional politics, it was another paradigm shift. It was crucial, absolutely crucial. We never would’ve made it without that. Then we came back, and we realized that we needed to deal with the media, and I could not persuade Adrienne that this was something we needed to do. I mean, she may think now—it’s just so bizarre—I kept saying to her, “Adrienne, give it to me in nursery rhymes. I don’t want a long paragraph. We’ve got to, simply got to”—I hate this phrase—“dumb it down. We’ve got to get this message down tighter.”

And our first encounters with the media advisors, Doug Gould in particular, were disasters. You know, Doug and Adrienne disliked one another on sight. She mucked up several meetings. I don’t even remember now what it was. But Adrienne can beat anybody in a conversation if she wants to, and she was not going to have any of this. This was interesting because academics and lawyers—and she, in many ways, has those skills—don’t like people messing up their structure, you know, their construct. And that’s what media stuff is all about. It’s messing up the construct.

Sharpless

She wasn’t going to have any of it?

Dunlop

No, absolutely not. Some of it she went along, to tolerate me, kind of thing. And we went through this media training, which was of course absolutely hysterical. I think it was good because it desensitizes you. It’s like going to those sex things where you see all the sex on the walls. This was like getting used to cameras and getting used to talking. And it’s not magic, it’s not rocket science, it’s habit. And you do need to learn a bit of the habit of it. But, you know, I was beside myself
because here was Doug Gould, one of the best media strategists in the business, who had some really terrific ideas, and we totally alienated him.

**Sharpless** And what you were going for was getting the word out?

**Dunlop** Yeah, we had to deal with the press. We knew we needed to go to the editorial board of the *New York Times*, but we were very apprehensive about how to do it. And none of these women’s organizations had ever had this level of audacity. Not in the United States, anyway, or maybe they had if they were domestic, but not an international organization. Even our colleagues didn’t really know very much about how to do this kind of thing. Furthermore, the foundations weren’t paying for it. They hadn’t gotten on to it either.

So there I was, beside myself, with no Doug Gould, and then Doug produced Geoffrey Knox, and that was just genius. I mean it was—talk about the luck of the gods. Geoffrey got along very well with Adrienne, and he was, basically, virtually on our staff for that entire period of two to three years, all through Beijing, helping us, taking us by the hand. And not just us, but all of our colleagues. But, in the meantime, we’d hired another—a publicist, essentially, to get us to the press in the U.S. And we were getting better at it. We did get to the editor Mary Cantwell. We saw Mary Cantwell of the editorial board of the *New York Times* more than twice, I think, at least. They wrote a couple of editorials. We weren’t the only activist group—Nafis [Sadik] was doing her stuff, and so was Planned Parenthood. But we were the hard-line feminist organization, if you like. We had the international constituency. We had this lobby, what I would call a lobby.

**Sharpless** And how much had UNFPA been present in Rio?
Dunlop  I don’t remember. They must’ve been there. The other thing is, in those days, Nafis couldn’t stand the sight of us. I don’t think she could stand the sight of either Adrienne or me. She thought we were surrogates—she used that expression for women in the village—that we didn’t really represent anything. We were just a couple of American feminists, advocating our values.

Sharpless  How do you know she thought that?

Dunlop  Oh, she said that! She was pretty frank about it. In the beginning, she didn’t take to us one bit. She thought we were—I mean, this is my language—pimples on the ass of progress. You know, we were a nuisance because we were basically saying something different from family planning, right?

Sharpless  Right.

Dunlop  And who were we, these Americans, heading this international organization? We were as presumptuous—[I] remember Fred Sai’s saying this. We didn’t represent Mrs. X in the village.

Sharpless  Did Fred believe that, or was he quoting?

Dunlop  No, I think he believed it. I think they both did, in the prep coms. They said some really unpleasant things on the podium. But then, of course, gradually they began to catch on that there were these other people. We weren’t just us. I mean, we didn’t really have very constructive talks with Nafis at all. But somehow she figured it out, because then she switched her posture completely. And then, of course, she came in to the NGO forum in Cairo and got this standing ovation. She got a hell of a lot from it. But boy, was it heavy going to begin with, really heavy going. And I don’t know, to this day—it would be interesting to ask her, What made you change your mind? Knowing Nafis, she’d probably say, Oh, I
never thought those things—they’re quite wrong.

**Sharpless**  She is quite the diplomat, isn’t she?

**Dunlop**  Yes, oh sure, I’m sure she would. But we remember very well. And, oh, we had all kinds of tense meetings with her. And, you know, she would sort of not see us in the corridors—

_Tape 2, side 1, ends; side 2 begins._

**Sharpless**  —you were saying she called you surrogates—

**Dunlop**  She called us—her term for us was surrogate women.

**Sharpless**  You were surrogate for Mrs. X in the village?

**Dunlop**  Yeah, but we didn’t represent Mrs. X in the village because we didn’t really know what Mrs. X in the village wanted, and what she wanted was family planning! You know, never mind that what we were talking about was policy. Anyway, so it was a battle.

**Sharpless**  So, I’m trying to keep all the chrono—

**Dunlop**  The chronology.

**Sharpless**  The chronology. You got the document. You then hired the publicist, you hired the media consultant to get the message out. And because you knew Cairo was coming—how did you fix on Cairo as a goal, a target, a—

**Dunlop**  Well, we began to see it as an opportunity. (both talking) You know, I don’t think it—

**Sharpless**  How did you arrive at that? When did it first dawn on you—Cairo, 1994, we need to be there?

**Dunlop**  In the fall of ’92, when we realized that we had this opposition from the right and the left.
Sharpless: Okay. So it was really the environmental meeting that focused it?

Dunlop: Yeah, that was the click. That was the click. Now, Adrienne and I had both, don’t forget, been in all these conferences all through the years.

Sharpless: Did you go to Mexico City?

Dunlop: Um-hm. Yeah, we went to Mexico City in ’75.

Sharpless: Must’ve been mortifying in ’84?

Dunlop: No, it was ’75. No wait a minute, let’s get this right. Mexico City women’s conference was 1975. I was working for John Rockefeller.

Sharpless: But the United Nations—

Dunlop: That was the UN conference—first UN conference on women was ’75. The second one, ’85, was Nairobi, and ’95 was Beijing. On population, ’74 was Bucharest, ’84 was Mexico City again, and then it was Cairo in ’94.

Sharpless: Yeah, that was ’84 in Mexico City I was asking about.

Dunlop: That was a bust for us because we didn’t—I’d just been hired, literally two months before. I kind of tagged along to the Planned Parenthood delegation. There was very little NGO participation. The governments didn’t want it.

Sharpless: I would’ve thought it would’ve been very embarrassing to have been an American at that conference.

Dunlop: It was. It was very difficult.

Sharpless: Were you, I’m not American, I’m English?

Dunlop: Well, I don’t remember it very vividly. I remember thinking, This is useless. We first went to the Mexico City conference in ’75 on women, and we’d never been in one of these—except Bucharest, we’d never been in one of these conferences before. Is that right, ’75? Yeah, ’75. We’d been in Bucharest, but only with JDR.
So here we were, Adrienne and me, in ’75, both of us from different organizations. Adrienne gets the idea that we’re going to rewrite the entire document. I said, “Adrienne, we can’t even find our way to the women’s room. We can’t find our way around this goddamn city, let alone think we’re going to—we are not rewriting any document,” which was the kind of typical sort of conversation we would have. Oh, they’ve got it all wrong, you know, they’re not using the right language—she always knows better. The NGO conference was miles away from the delegation conference where the governments were. We couldn’t get around Mexico City. I said, “I’ve got JDR’s money. I’m hiring a taxi.” That was about my only contribution to the entire week. I’m going to have this taxi, he’s going to take us everywhere we need to go. We’re not going to get into any of this problem. Well, we didn’t, needless to say, rewrite the document, but it was a portent of things to come. (laughs)

Sharpless: So you say Adrienne always sees a better way?

Dunlop: Well, Adrienne always knows better. I mean, she knows better how to draft, she has a better idea—a lot of this is absolutely right. She thinks that it can be redone. It’s always about the written word because she only trusts the written word—whereas I’m a really oral person. So that’s how power gets expressed. And I don’t necessarily think that’s always the case. I mean, in my experience, it’s money that makes a difference, so follow the money. That’s just one of those incidents.

Sharpless: But, you were at—but you’d been going to the conferences—

Dunlop: Going back to your point about post- the Women’s Declaration on Population Policy, post- the Rio meeting, when we had what I call the feminist prep com. Then we went through these various prep coms—where the Vatican tried to edit
the document, endlessly. So we had to keep calling our colleagues back to New York where these prep coms were being held.

**Sharpless**
Now, explain to me who—and I’m sure Adrienne explained this to me before, but who comes to the prep coms?

**Dunlop**
Countries send delegations.

**Sharpless**
United Nations or—

**Dunlop**
Well, no. Well, it depends on—they send delegations, and they can be—they’re not UN employees.

**Sharpless**
But anybody can come as a representative—?

**Dunlop**
No.

**Sharpless**
I mean, any country can send representatives?

**Dunlop**
Yes. All the countries, 189 countries, that are a part of the UN. Everyone’s supposed to send a delegation.

**Sharpless**
Including the Vatican City?

**Dunlop**
Yes. The Holy See is seen as a country and therefore has a delegation, which is, of course, ten times more sophisticated than most other delegations.

**Sharpless**
Which makes Frances Kissling crazy?

**Dunlop**
Yes. Absolutely. Right. And they were. They are crazy-making, because they’re based in New York. They’re very sophisticated—you talk about the press. They know the UN—they knew the UN rules. They know the document backwards and forwards. And where we basically beat them was—we beat them for a whole bunch of reasons, mostly because we caught them off balance. But, essentially, we knew the document. So when they started to try and play games—you know, this is what I used to call lawyer’s heaven, you know, this endless maneuvering of
language, which is like a blood sport. It’s a fight to the death, and it’s interesting in itself. It’s an example of democracy, in some ways. We had to watch this like hawks. So we were watching—

**Sharpless**
Now, what is the document?

**Dunlop**
The document is the—

**Sharpless**
The declaration—

**Dunlop**
Well, the document is what the UN produces—out of all of this, [the] Cairo document comes up, which all countries sign. And it has no power actually, but it has political power, particularly in the countries—because, if you signed on to an international document, you’ve made a political statement, essentially. But it doesn’t carry money power with it.

**Sharpless**
I’m sorry I’m being slow on this, and it’s not like I haven’t heard it before, but I’m trying to remember. Where did the draft document come from?

**Dunlop**
It was initiated by UNFPA. It’s written by the agency that’s responsible, which is why the women’s document was so weak. Because the women’s commission wasn’t up to it. But UNFPA was very competent. Now they were being pushed by the women’s declaration to change this language. And what I don’t know, and maybe Adrienne does remember, is how that really happened. Because it went on over a period of almost two years, this process of pushing UNFPA as much as anything else to change the frame to be women centered and not demographically centered.

So, our critics accused us of hijacking the conference to say that it was not actually about population at all. My answer to that is, that’s what population is. We’re not dropping the population word, because people said, Oh, we need to
get rid of the word *population*. I said, “No, we need to transform what population policy is.” So the publications we put out, which Adrienne mostly wrote, were all directed towards that purpose. To try to change the idea of what population policy is. That was what you’re really talking about, which is what the title of it was—was balancing the scales, to give it equal voice, if you like, equal weight. It wasn’t hijacking, it was just, you know, old-time balancing act.

**Sharpless**  
So the four prep coms were people coming together to work on the document?

**Dunlop**  
Yeah. Nick Biegman chaired most of what they call the preparatory committee meetings that were about the editing of the documents. And the lobby, which was including anyone else—I mean, NGOs who got status, who got access, had the right accreditation, could get into the gallery. And they were lobbying their countries. And what we did was bring this Cairo lobby, as I call it—it was about twenty-five people, twenty countries. And every time we had another prep com, back they would come.

**Sharpless**  
And you were getting the money to bring them—

**Dunlop**  
That’s where the million dollars was.

**Sharpless**  
—from the foundations?

**Dunlop**  
Yes. And we had this process whereby we would meet at six a.m. every morning, and when we said, Well, we’re going to meet at six a.m. every morning, people said to me, Well, you’ll never get Africans to get up at six.. I said, “Come on.” They were always there first, before everybody else. So we met at six o’clock every morning. This was a technique that we used all the way through Beijing, all the way through, to decide how to deal with the day, and that was where that sort of geopolitical games were being played, you know. If India was going to do this,
who would support that, and how would we double-check it? It was a strategy, a political strategy—a legislative strategy, really. A lobbying legislative strategy.

**Sharpless**

The amount of maneuvering, as you say—it sounds exhausting. How do you keep focus on something like that?

**Dunlop**

Well, I was exhausted by the end. We were all exhausted.

**Sharpless**

Because you have to know where each ball is in play at each time.

**Dunlop**

Well, you’ve got a hard core of ten people. I mean these people—all of them—I actually have a photograph upstairs. We’ve got twenty people who really know the stuff. That’s all you need. You know, we didn’t need—we had two or three people who knew the document cold. Brigid Inder from New Zealand knew that document like the back of her hand. So, you know, she would be the point of reference, if you like. Gita Sen, who’s a brilliant tactician and strategist—I mean, there were certain key actors. Only Amparo Claro from Chile could go to the head of the delegation from Spain and say to her in her face, “Would you please shut up?” (laughs) That’s what she told her. Well, of course, this was in Beijing. In other words, we had a certain credibility. Then also, the other thing is, we threw parties. We threw at least—I had forgotten about this—at least one or two parties in the UN. And those were a lot of fun and, you know, people came. We wanted everyone to have a good time. And then at one point, we distributed these little pins—condoms. I mean, it was a condom, but it was a pin. And Adrienne and Amparo went around and gave them to everybody. We tried, when I think back on it—again, to my point about population control. You wanted people to feel that they were engaged and welcome, and this was a fun thing to do. This was a quest for building momentum. I don’t know why we decided to throw the
parties, I must say. I think we just decided it was a good idea because we had all these colleagues from overseas.

**Sharpless** Hospitality, collegiality—

**Dunlop** Um-hm. It’s all part of influencing legislation. I mean, it’s all part of the process. I think what we were audacious, probably.

**Sharpless** We, being the Coalition?

**Dunlop** Yeah. And also our colleagues. I mean there’s no doubt about it that we were ahead of the curve on raising money. I don’t remember what—this is what would be interesting to know: what was the logistic of those proposals? And when did we first get the idea that we were going to—I remember the moment, and this was much earlier. I’m trying to remember when. But the first grant from MacArthur was a million dollars—that was ’86—I remember thinking, We’ve got it now.

**Sharpless** We’ve got what?

**Dunlop** Well, that we had enough resources. This was a big deal, the fact that we could get a million-dollar grant. It seemed like an enormous amount of money. And we were still very small. We were still in the Spanish Institute. We must’ve been eight people. But I can remember when that was a whole deal because Dan Martin came to us and said, “Can you put together a proposal in a week?” We had to scramble, and we had another meeting of all kinds of people. We couldn’t be in the meetings. People were very cross with us because we weren’t in the meetings. Where were we? We were behind closed doors, blah, blah, blah, desperately trying to put together something, because we knew that timing is everything. And we knew that, if we didn’t get it now, going back on the wave, we needed to get it,
Sharpless: Well, I'm trying to decide which way—there's two sets of questions that I want to ask, and one is about the prep coms. But the other is just about this general role of foundations in shaping policy. Which one do you want to take off on?

Dunlop: Let's take the foundations and policy.

Sharpless: I'm fascinated by that, because you're articulating very clearly that the foundations themselves had ideas of where they wanted things to go.

Dunlop: First of all, I think, in the mid-seventies, or the early seventies, when we wrote the first proposals—we need to take the credit for the International Women’s Health Coalition who really put this term reproductive health on the map. We were determined because both of us knew foundations—we weren't afraid of the foundations.

Sharpless: Because you'd been in them.

Dunlop: We were familiar with them. Yes, we knew them. And what we set about doing was changing their minds. Often in foundations, especially Ford, people say, Oh, the Ford Foundation always knows what they want, you know, they tell everybody what to do. We, in those days, were on the same wavelength of José Barzelatto, in terms of our values. But, in terms of strategy and how to think about it and how to plan a program, we were leading them, I think it's fair to say. And we were out ahead of them. And they were just responding to us.

When it came to foundations coming together over Cairo, Susan Sechler was new to the foundation business on population and reproductive health, but she was highly activist and very experienced. So she came into Pew with a fair amount of money. And I'd known Susan from another incarnation, way back
when I worked for JDR. She worked for Carol Foreman in agriculture, and Carol was a good friend of mine, so I had met Susan before. So when Susan came into the job, she came to me and she said, “Tell me what on earth is going on in this field. I need to understand what’s happening here.” I think Susan, because she’s such a good political strategist, was one of the people who really persuaded the foundations to get together and to figure out what they needed to do about Cairo. She considers herself to be one of the architects, and I think she’s right about that.

But it’s rare for the foundations to work together. They’re often competitive, even though they may tacitly divvy up different pieces of the policy puzzle, whether it’s employment or housing or, you know, whatever. In this case, they acted in concert. And they had to persuade Nafis Sadik. It may have been that meeting that persuaded Nafis she needed to change her tune on the document. I don’t know that. It’s something to find out. Are you talking to Carmen Barroso? Do you know if she’s on your list?

Sharpless  
I don’t know if she’s on the list or not.

Dunlop  
You ought to if you can, because she’s a Brazilian, because she was in a key position at MacArthur, and because they were the host. It may have even been Carmen’s idea to pull these foundations together. I’m not sure. But—

Sharpless  
And that money was funneled through you?

Dunlop  
Not all of us. No, no, no, no, no. No, they just agreed that funding the NGO sector for Cairo was important. So they had funded other pieces of it. They funded, you know, EngenderHealth, Planned Parenthood, IPPF, probably the Pop Council. I actually don’t know who they had on the list or how they
strategized at that meeting. I don’t know. But it’s worth finding out.

**Sharpless**

But the foundations were convinced that Cairo was worth supporting?

**Dunlop**

Yes. Because they saw the policy change. Because, you see, by then, the things that JDR had talked to me about in the seventies were becoming starkly apparent.

**Sharpless**

The racism and the sexism?

**Dunlop**

Well, the field realized it needed to change, it needed to be revitalized. It was dying as a result of boredom. It sounds awful, but—it had a lot of money. It was all going in one particular way—family planning. The drop-off rates were becoming an issue in the academic community. Women, maybe they’d take Depo-Provera for three months, but then they wouldn’t come back, or they wouldn’t take the Pill any longer. Safe contraception, in other words, secure contraception, whatever that term they used. Highly technical contraception was proving to not be working. It wasn’t working. And so, on the field level, this was—plenty of danger about this—the drop-off rates were disturbing.

In the meantime, the women’s movement was coming up, and the feminists in Latin America were berating the scientists for doing studies on women and not treating them nicely and not telling them what was going on, and it was becoming a cause célèbre. Some of it was true. And then there was this—the word I was looking for yesterday to describe Ravenholt is salacious. And there was a lot of this. These doctors were—the way they behaved towards women was really outrageous, and you could hear endless stories about the behavior and attitudes of the male physicians in the clinics. Patting women on the behind—I mean, all kinds of stuff like this that makes you just aghast today—it was going on all the time. So the rumbling, the intensity, coming out of Latin America,
where many of these experiments had taken place, was really—the heat was on. So when the feminist movement decided to switch from criticism to positive, that was seen as a big advantage, in many ways.

**Sharpless** Instead of just being carping critics, coming up with an actual plan.

**Dunlop** Well, if you read that declaration today, the similarity with Cairo is really quite extraordinary. I haven’t read it in a while. That’s, again, why I must dig into my files. So that’s the answer on the foundation side. I don’t know what more I can tell you about that.

**Sharpless** That’s very illuminating. Anything else on—I think we ought to hold off on the actual Cairo conference until tomorrow. Is there anything else on the prep coms to talk about?

**Dunlop** Well, from my perspective, I’m trying to—what was challenging and interesting for me was, I got this call from the State Department asking me to be on the U.S. delegation to Cairo, and this was, like, eighteen months before the meeting. And I said to them—the woman who called me, Barbara somebody or other, I can’t remember her last name—I decided that it would be better if Adrienne was on it, not me. Because I knew this was going to be about drafting language.

**Sharpless** And that’s her gift?

**Dunlop** Yes and, I mean, she’s really very good at it, one of the best in the business. But I had to maneuver this because Adrienne is never the most popular person in the room. She’s much more now. She’s changed a lot. It’s really interesting. But in those days, you know, this was Attila the Hun. Nobody would feel good after she destroyed every argument within sight. I’m overstating it to make a point. But she was very shy, and she’s blind in one eye, which most people don’t know. So half
the time, she couldn’t see who she was talking to. She wouldn’t wear glasses
because she was too vain. And then, giving praise is not one of her great fortes.
So she was feared, and when she was in a bad mood, she could be really
poisonous.

And so they weren’t crazy about the idea of having her on the delegation. I
had to pull to get allies of mine in Washington to make this happen. But she was
invaluable. If she hadn’t been on that delegation, I really don’t think the language
would’ve been what it is today, because the Vatican would’ve won in the small
groups. Very difficult to stand up to that stuff. But because of all those villages in
Bangladesh, the conviction was deep within her. And there was no swaying,
there was no moving her on that. Other people didn’t have that conviction
because they hadn’t had the experience. So, by the time Beijing came, I couldn’t
get her on the U.S. delegation. She’d broken too many bodies along the way.

(laughs)

**Sharless**  
Well, maybe we should stop for the day and get it back together in the morning.

**Dunlop**  
All right, fine.

**Sharless**  
Is that good?

**Dunlop**  
Sure.

**Sharless**  
Okay.

*end Interview 2*
Interview 3

Sharpless Today is April 15th, 2004, and this is the third oral history interview with Joan Dunlop. My name is Rebecca Sharpless and we are at Ms. Dunlop’s home in—actually, Lime Rock, Connecticut. I’ve been saying Lakeville, but it’s Lime Rock. And this is part of the Population Pioneers project. Okay, we had a wonderful time, I thought, yesterday.

Dunlop Oh yeah, that was fun. It was great, it was interesting. I think that I’m aware of the fact that I have a political take on these things and that my memory is political, not substantive. I don’t think of the sequence of ideas, I think of how those ideas came into being. I thought to myself, Well, Joan, that’s sort of a whole bunch of anecdotes that don’t mean anything.

Sharpless Oh no, they were wonderful. (laughter) It was quite terrific stuff.

Dunlop Well, anyway. I think it probably mirrors, complements, what Adrienne talks about, and I think that’s one of the illustrations about the way we work together. I don’t know, but I’m guessing.

Sharpless Well, we spent a good bit of time yesterday talking about the beginnings of, the work of the International Women’s Health Coalition. And we left off yesterday talking about the meetings in Rio and getting together, and I think we’ve pretty much finished with the prep coms.

Dunlop I think we have. Yeah, I think the one thing I would say about the prep com is that I do think it made an enormous difference. I don’t remember at what point, but I always had an uneasy relationship with Bella Abzug, who was a crucial actor in this whole question of NGO capacity, because she, as she’d always did, learned the rules and figured out how to get into the UN system.
She sort of opened the doors for many of the NGOs who became accredited and then were active.

**Sharpless** Now, she had been in Congress?

**Dunlop** Yes, but she was running an organization called WEDO [Women’s Environment and Development Organization].

**Sharpless** Okay. That was my question—in what capacity she was working now.

**Dunlop** She was running this organization that was Women’s Environment and Development Organization. It was based very near the UN, and much of the focus of it was these UN conferences, particularly on environment. So, she was very active on the Rio conference in ’92, but she was also very active around all of the bureaucracy of getting access to these meetings and paving the way, in many ways, and spurring women on to participate and so on.

**Sharpless** Why was your relationship with her—

**Dunlop** Well, my relationship with her was awkward for two reasons. One is that I really have a great deal of difficulty with people who manage by bullying. It’s one thing I simply cannot tolerate. I’m incapable of being tolerant about it. I know many people do it, you know, and it can be very effective, but Bella’s a bullying manager—so that’s one thing. The second thing is that she over-claimed on her own behalf, did not give credit nearly sufficiently to other people that—and not me. I don’t care. That was not what I was looking for. But there were certain people who were very, very influential. Charlotte Bunch, for one, and Dorothy Thomas, for another. There were certain key—younger, much younger. And I thought it was—what’s the
word I want?—the sense of egotistical selfishness is something I really find very, very difficult to handle. So even though—Bella could be generous, but not until she was pushed. So, we had a number of tense moments.

Sharpless

In the prep coms?

Dunlop

In the lead-up, in the meetings on the side having to do with the prep coms and having to do with some of these. And I remember vividly only one where I really lost it in public with her.

Sharpless

What happened?

Dunlop

The trouble is, I can’t remember the issue. But it was along these lines and it was over Charlotte. Charlotte had—I don’t remember what it was, but Charlotte had done something that was really amazingly good and I don’t remember what that was. And Bella was being very obnoxious. And she was in the International Women’s Health Coalition office. I don’t remember what I did except I remember saying that, You’re in my offices and I don’t want this behavior here—or something to that effect. I was really, really angry. And Bella, to give her her credit, the next time we met, apologized. Not to me but to Charlotte, which I thought was—that’s what I mean about the generosity. So it was a tense relationship and it took her—she got what our issues were pretty quickly, and that was good. Then she and Adrienne were both on the U.S. delegation which—I think Adrienne can speak about how that went or how it worked. But the lead-up to all of this is to say that this lobby we had worked two tracks. One inside track where we had our colleagues on the delegation—and this was true in Cairo and even more true in Beijing. We
had an outside track, which was a media track, essentially a lobbying track, if you like. And I was doing the outside track and Adrienne was doing the inside track. Now the outside track, this group of this twenty-five people—twenty-five people, twenty-two countries, something like that—didn’t really have knowledgeable know-how. And there was a woman working for Bella called Rachel Kyte who I met and I saw hanging around Bella. And I didn’t know who she was, except that this woman looked to me as if she was being badly treated.

And when Adrienne and I met with Bella and Rachel to talk about what the substance was of our agenda, I began to understand who Rachel Kyte was. She was a Brit—she was probably, at that point, in her very early thirties. And she was clearly very, very smart, and not happy working under Bella’s thumb. I remember at that lunch we were—the restaurant was quite dark and we had a pretty good conversation. But as we left—and Rachel reminded me of this later—I said to her, “If you ever feel like leaving, call me. Make me the first call you make.” Because I could see that she knew the UN system cold, she knew the rules. She had an international grasp that was absolutely remarkable. All the friends of mine have said since they’ve gotten to know her, the woman’s a genius. I agree with that. Her ability matched Adrienne’s in every sense, but it was a political ability. I was absolutely convinced that this lobby needed that, and I wasn’t going to let—no, that’s too strong—make somebody else unhappy who I thought was a true talent and needed.

So anyway, Rachel did eventually call me. But she knew that Bella
would be so angry if she came to work for us that she negotiated some kind of consulting thing. But she, essentially in the long run, did come on the staff of the International Women’s Health Coalition and was what I call the chief whip for both Cairo and Beijing. And her contribution—in many ways it’s too bad this project doesn’t talk to her, because this woman is extremely talented and she’s now in a very senior position in the World Bank. She was also something of a stormy petrel and very unorthodox in the way she operated in many ways, but with extraordinary humor and wit and a brilliance that kept us all together in many, many ways. (pause in recording)

**Sharpless**
Okay, so, Rachel Kyte.

**Dunlop**
Yeah, Rachel Kyte. Okay, so, this is again where I need to look at my calendar. I don’t remember when we started to hire her, but it was a team that was very, very effective.

**Sharpless**
Now when you say she served as the whip, what do you mean?

**Dunlop**
Well, the person who basically—she got accreditation to be on the floor, so she was walking around among the delegates. She gathered information, in a broader sense, than any of our individuals from individual countries. She knew the UN, she knew all about the UN bureaucracy, she knew the people, she knew everybody, like the [security] guards. I mean, she knew—it was almost as if she knew the landscape intimately. So when we had these six a.m. meetings, she would brief and she would say, “Okay, this is what we think is going to happen. This is what X or Y’s country is going to do.” She complemented the information that was coming from the countries themselves. And she had an acute sense of strategic purpose.
She wasn’t a writer, although actually she’s very eloquent, but—and I wasn’t asking her to draft anything. I wanted political advice. Chief whip is a parliamentary term. And because we came from the same country, we sort of recognized one another as certain types. We both fell into certain characteristics, characters, almost. We were a little bit out of—not out of a novel exactly, but we both came from a certain part of society, and we were aware of that and we sort of enjoyed it. We would never have been successful without her. She was a crucial, absolutely vital element in this whole process.

In terms of Cairo—I mean, now I think we were, by then, ready to get into Cairo. What I learned in this process of working two tracks, the inside track and the outside track, was that we really had to get our message organized. And we were the first women’s organization, I think, to put out a really sophisticated press kit that was not only sophisticated in its content but was very vibrant in terms of its colors and its message. And that was seen as quite, you know, this little pissant women’s organization, which was the way I used to describe it, was capable of doing this kind of thing. We, by then, had Geoffrey Knox on the staff—so we developed message points, talking points.

I don’t—I have this somewhere, it’s buried, but for me, the thing that I remember most vividly, I remember the moment when I had just a sort of flash that says, What are we gonna call this press kit? And we called it Women’s Reality, Women’s Power, and I remember saying, “Okay, if we lose, we can talk about women’s reality, but if we win, we can talk about
women’s power.” Because we had absolutely no idea what was going to happen.

**Sharpless**

As you went into Cairo, what did you perceive the stakes to be?

**Dunlop**

Well, at one point, we wanted the U.S. to be a true leader in the best sense of that word. We had very good people on the delegation. We knew that Tim Wirth had the right instincts, but he veered towards a—what do you call it?—*controlista* view of the world very easily. He came to the issue from the environment and his frame on the issue was population control to save the environment. He was aware of the civil liberties/women’s rights dimension of this—he was enough of a politician to know that. And Adrienne, who was on this delegation, and Susan Sechler, who knew Tim Wirth very well, I think at one point never left his side—to make sure that he was on message constantly, because he could veer off message.

Beijing was a different matter and that’s a different question, but in Cairo he made a major speech in the UN, on the floor of the UN. The very early days of the prep—this was a prep com, not at Cairo itself. And he got a standing ovation. From my point of view, that was the highest point of U.S. behavior in the UN. And ever since then, it’s been downhill all the way. That speech in itself was an interesting speech and I think it’s fair to say Adrienne wrote a lot of it.

So on the one hand, I wanted us to really be a good citizen of the world. I think what was at stake was the language of the document, which we knew wasn’t going to be changed very much. But we didn’t know how the whole event was going to be played in the press. And the Vatican was
still holding out on some of the key language, and that was a long and bitter
and sustained struggle in the small groups in the small rooms of negotiation,
where Adrienne was in that role basically for the U.S. and for the women’s
movement. We’ve never really gone into this in endless detail in terms of
every move they tried to make, but I’m sure when you talked to her she told
you about that.

**Sharpless**
She did say, yes.

**Dunlop**
Well, she was incredibly tenacious and relentless, and this is one of her great
strengths. We got that language, in major part, due to her. Now, one other
piece about all of this, Fred Sai was the secretary general of the conference.
It was a very senior position. I may have that title wrong—I can’t remember
exactly. But he was in a crucial role, always on the dais with Nafis Sadik.
And at one point, he asked me to come have a drink with him. Now, this
was before we went to Cairo. And we went to that hotel that is just north of
the UN, and we were up at the top of the hotel looking over the city.

**Sharpless**
Is it the Millennium?

**Dunlop**
No, it’s an old hotel. It’s on the northeast corner of 48th Street—oh not
48th, 44th Street or something. And we were both drinking scotch, and I
remember I’m saying to myself, Why does he want to see me? Because we
weren’t necessarily—we’d be cordial in the corridors, but we weren’t
friends, and I think we never really had a long conversation. And he
basically said to me, Joan, on abortion, don’t go for the right to abortion.
Go for abortion as a public health problem. I think we’ll get that through
without much problem, but if you go for the rights, we’ll lose it.
I thought that made enormous sense. And I said, okay, fine. So that when we came back and we were discussing what to do about the abortion language—I told Adrienne this, I’m sure. Well I’m not—I thought I did. But anyway, it was with that in mind that I knew we basically, by then, had an ally in UNFPA [United Nations Population Fund], going back to when Nafis changed her mind. But it was a crucial, a crucial moment, because the language on abortion was the major breakthrough. Apart from the whole concern about women’s entire lives it was the abortion language that I really cared about, and it came out, from my point of view, really very well.

**Sharpless** What are the nuances between those two arguments?

**Dunlop** Well, going back to our point about why is the patriarchy so opposed to women’s right to choose. I think you’re talking about the whole notion of rights [it] carries with it—it’s a threat, especially to the male of the species, whereas public health emphasizes the consequences of unsafe abortion.

**Sharpless** But you believe in it as a right?

**Dunlop** I do believe it’s a right.

**Sharpless** So, why were you willing to give them—

**Dunlop** Because I didn’t want to lose. I was willing to compromise. I knew we weren’t going—I knew the rights issue was still highly problematic, and the sexual rights’ issue became one of the fulcrums in Beijing. And that turned out to be—that’s another whole conversation. But first of all I—don’t forget, in no UN document had this issue ever been addressed at all—in the previous documents that were from Mexico City and from Bucharest, not at all. So it seemed to me that I was a fool not to compromise, a complete
Okay, you were saying that when Fred Sai offered this compromise language that you thought it was something that you needed to accept.

Yes, definitely. I don’t remember demurring. I was just glad to hear he was willing to go that far, frankly, because the family planners were still afraid of abortion for all the political reasons we know of. And I don’t remember—Adrienne may remember—at what point the debate on the language—where were we?—because we were still in New York at that point, so it must’ve been at one of the final prep coms. So—

But here is the chair of the conference calling you for a meeting—

And the other thing he’d indicated was that he recognized that this lobby had power, and that was important to know about.

You knew the strength of your hand going in.

Yes we did. We’re going back on the stakes. I think the level of intensity and the speed, in some ways, at which this whole process was moving—we were working morning, noon and night. And it almost was—I mean, in those situations, you’re operating by instinct. You don’t sit down and think—you don’t draw on nonexistent intellectual capital. You don’t draw on nonexistent or nondeveloped political capital. You’re spending what you know. It’s like being in government—you’re spending out what you know at that point. And there’s no time to amass, in a sense, new thoughts or whatever.

I think probably what (laughs)—I’m sure many times I would say to myself, Just get me through this day. And the days were so intense and so
varied that I couldn’t even remember at the end of the day what I’d done all that day. And that was week after week after week. But I think my job was, to a great extent, to—oh, I hate this word—be a leader, to keep people feeling enthusiastic and engaged and hopeful and focused. So my whole being was totally focused on this effort. But do I remember particular things thinking, I have this at stake? I’m sure if I look back at my notes I would, but I don’t remember now without referring to the calendar at the very least—that would tell me a lot.

But, you know, the other deal that was offered to me was by the Vatican and John Klink, who was what I call the Vatican operative. He was in a sense in Rachel’s job. He was a chief whip. He didn’t have a dog collar on. He was our major nemesis, actually. Curiously enough—from a totally different set of connections—I had been in his home for a Christmas party the Christmas before Cairo. That’s nine months before Cairo. Now, I’m pretty sure that he asked this mutual friend of ours to bring me because he wanted to meet me. I’m thinking back on that now. I think probably that was the case—and have a sort of relationship with me of some kind. And I do remember in the last prep com or in the second to last—it was in New York and I was in the corridor and he came up to me and he wanted to make some kind of compromise, and of course I can’t remember what it was on. It probably wasn’t even on the abortion language because that was non-negotiable. And I remember saying, Forget it—or whatever, I mean, I blew him off.

*Sharpless* But he was trying to cut a deal with you?
Dunlop  
He was trying to cut a deal. And, you know, it was interesting in itself that they would even do that.

Sharpless  
For a little pissant organization, that’s pretty good. (laughter)

Dunlop  
Well, no, I wasn’t—our strength lay in the diversity and in the numbers. It was the fact that we had these colleagues and these, by now, close friends and allies. I mean, there was nothing like the tightness of those alliances among women when you’re going for something like this. It’s enormously energizing and empowering. There isn’t anything better. We had a focus, we knew what we wanted, we had a goal. We had great respect for one another’s strengths. We were beginning to see the Right to Life presence in the corridors. But they didn’t get it to begin with, so we had it all over them in the year, in the run-up to Cairo. By the time we go into Cairo, the maneuvering in the corridors became much more intense and there was more visibility of Right to Life types. Some of them were nuns, but not all of them, by a long shot. There was an organization called Concerned Women of Canada, or something, and they were quite aggressive.

But we used to deploy our lobby in certain tactical ways. For example, the Right to Lifers from North America were intimidated by the Nigerians, quite intimidated by the Nigerians. Peju Olukoya from Nigeria was a very large woman and she wore wonderful clothes, so she was very impressive looking. And when they were particularly pushy at the door of the entrance to the UN floor, I remember saying to Peju, “Peju, could you go over and just intimidate the hell out of those people, you know, and just get them out of there.” And so, she was great. We deployed our ethnic—that was one of
the interesting—our power was both national, ethnic, color, class, and in the long run collegiality. And we were very aware of the fact that this was the nature of our power.

So it wasn’t just about one organization. And we wouldn’t have been anything without them. Theirs was the strength and it was their voice. And having produced this press kit and done this press work, Geoffrey Knox’s goal was to get as many people from our lobby to speak to the press as we could. So Frances Kissling pulled my leg one time. She came up to me—and it was the end, the very end of Cairo—and said to me, “Somebody from the press has just said to me will I please introduce them to somebody who is not connected to the International Women’s Health Coalition.”

(laughs) So I thought, Okay, fine, I guess we’re—some of it was a deliberate smoke-and-mirrors operation, but some of it was just we had the numbers and we also had the know-how. I think we were the first organization that really developed this kind of press confidence. It was more about confidence and learning a bit of how to—some sound-bite kind of things which we didn’t—I don’t think we sat down and tried to make up phrases. I never remember doing that. But I do remember trying to think, How can I express this graphically or with a sense of authenticity? But we became much more confident as time went on.

**Sharpless**

So you got on the plane and went to Cairo?

**Dunlop**

Right.

**Sharpless**

And what happened?

**Dunlop**

All kinds of things. What happened was that we were staying in this
wonderful hotel, [Shepherd's], which is a famous hotel in Cairo. In all of my international travels, I liked Cairo better than almost anywhere I'd ever been. I mean, Rio was very striking, but there's something about the Cairenes that is really very appealing. And it was a false sense of what the city is like, because the government cleared out the streets. I mean, they changed the traffic patterns and all kinds of things for this conference. It was, in a sense, an idyllic time.

But the lobby was working extremely well. These morning meetings were really paying off. And Adrienne was making great progress. There were others—I'm trying to remember whether Gita Sen was on the Indian delegation, but I don't remember. But I know others of our colleagues were. I think Amparo Claro was on the Chilean delegation, and I'm pretty sure Sonia Correa might have been on the Brazilian, but I'm not certain. But they certainly were very close in to the people who were on these delegations.

The word was coming backwards and forwards with great frequency and great intensity. And Adrienne managed to get most of us tickets to some big bash the U.S. was throwing. So there was all of the extra kind of social activity that goes on around these conferences, which is very important. When I made speeches, afterwards I used to say that I think what's important about the UN is that it's the corridors of civilized conversation in a global setting, which you don't have anywhere else in the world. And it's very difficult for Americans to understand why that's important. The fact of the matter is that so many of our colleagues from
around the world—this was the only chance they would ever get to see their minister. They wouldn’t ever be able to get to the high officials of their government, under other circumstances. I mean, this was a very, very unusual pattern. A very important tool for them—for their own power and their own influence in their own country when they returned. A lot of what happens in the UN is asset building for purposes of country activity when you get home.

And, you know, Bene Madunagu, for example, who wanted to put together this program that became known as Girl’s Power, was one of our closest allies. When she was challenged in her hometown, when she went home for the work that she was doing on sex education, she would simply say, “Our government has signed on to this document. Here it is. Here’s the document and here’s the paragraph and this is what I’m doing, so you can’t stop me.” So it’s a huge—these documents are a tremendous asset to people who are change agents in their own countries—and especially if it’s a progressive document, as this one was.

So that was—but, you know, I think of all the kind of—not irrelevant, but sidebar issues. For example, Adrienne suffers from migraines very badly. I mean, it was a major, major problem all her life. And I’ve been in several hospitals with Adrienne when she really was so sick she had to get injections and drugs to stop this. She forgot her medication. Talk about approach avoidance. And I had to move heaven and earth to try to get this medication. I could not get it in Cairo, anywhere.

*Tape 1, side 1, ends; side 2 begins.*
I was horrified to learn—I couldn’t believe it when somebody—“I’m sorry,” Rachel said, “Adrienne doesn’t have the medication for the migraines.” I thought, Oh, fucking shit! What are we going do about—this is really, really crucial. And Jane Ordway, who was working for the Coalition, was my closest ally and aide in those days. Her husband was about to come—sort of as an add-on holiday. [I asked Jane if Dexter could get the medication and bring it here.] And he was, you know, game enough—wonderful guy. He knew what that meant and, boy, he went, he did it. I had to get authorization from a doctor who was a friend, who was very angry with me for doing this to him. He was actually Elizabeth McCormack’s brother. Elizabeth had been a colleague of mine at the Rockefeller Family office. And later he wrote me a letter and said, “Joan, please don’t do this anymore. I really can’t help you out.” And I was just—it was an example that we did have money that I was able to send Dexter back and bring him back. And it was probably one of the most audacious things I ever did. I mean, I just knew that if we didn’t have that medication, we were in deep-six trouble.

Sharpless

To have a healthy Adrienne was worth it—

Dunlop

Yeah, right. (laughs) Oh, god. Anyway, so that was very vivid in my mind. The press, Barbara Crossette, who was writing for the New York Times, was the pivotal journalist because her stories got on the front page, and how she framed it and crafted it influenced everybody else. Media, electronic media, follows print. And there was an enormous amount of work being done by the U.S. delegation, by all kinds of other people on the press, there’s no
question. But Barbara knew—she had our message very clearly in mind and she knew that this was fairly unusual. So she was really almost our closest and most important ally.

So, I don’t remember—the trouble is, it’s a blur. It’s pathetic. Because the exhaustion factor sets in and you don’t have time to write notes. And I’m so badly disciplined about this kind thing. It’s one of my worst faults. I’m no good sitting down at the end of the day and saying all the things I did. All I want is a scotch and put my feet up, you know. Or talk to people or whatever—I mean, the days weren’t long enough. So all I remember is the final day of the meeting when the document was finally approved. And coming out into that soft twilight of Egypt and looking at the sky and thinking, It will never get this good again. You know, this will be the highest point of my entire career. It will never be this good. The stars, the moon came together at one moment in time—and also, no matter what happens in the future, no one can take that away from you. I don’t care what the right wing tries to do to change the stuff in the future. It was that experience, and enough people had that that it was a real sea change.

The rest is, sort of—what’s the word I want—all of the caviling, and even though this fight gets very—I mean, there’s no question that the Vatican and the right-wing forces have taken the UN very seriously, using it as their battering ram ground in ways that I think are despicable now. But that moment—and then we had this party that night on this boat on the river, and it was a big high except for we didn’t need any alcohol or anything else to make us feel sure that this was a big, big win. I remember—
going on, I thought to myself, Why are these people—in all of the places I had been in my career and on this job, I was absolutely incapable of doing any sightseeing. I just couldn’t bring myself—I couldn’t jump the tracks. I was incapable of it. So we went—one day I think Jane Ordway and Mia MacDonald finally persuaded me I needed to go and see the pyramids. So we took one morning off or something, one half a day off, and we—it was wonderful. I have great pictures of it and it was a great day. But I never went to any of the other parts of Egypt, which I wish I’d now gone to.

Sharpless: But this was work.

Dunlop: Well, this was work. And almost, there was always what had to happen tomorrow, so I had to get back to the office. I couldn’t afford to just, you know, take off a couple weeks, or even a few days. Or I didn’t feel that I—I wasn’t willing to give myself permission, maybe that’s the way to describe it.

Sharpless: So you came directly back to New York.

Dunlop: Back to New York, yeah.

Sharpless: Now, how do you regroup after this mountaintop experience? How do you go forward?

Dunlop: Well, first of all, we knew we faced Beijing a week—it felt like a week—a year later. And I basically said, I’ve had it, I’m too old for this stuff. We’re gonna have to let the younger generation do this. And I was really serious about that for several months, until it became apparent that that wasn’t going to be a smart thing to do, that we were facing increasing opposition from those who didn’t want us to succeed and who wanted to roll back the agreements of Cairo. And that, in fact, it was likely to be even tougher,
which indeed it was for all kinds of reasons, due partly to the Chinese. But also, partly with the setting and the building, it was much less easy to work in Beijing than it was in Cairo. The setting, the way the whole place operates—I know I can’t remember all the frustrations, which were myriad. But in Beijing we had terrible difficulty getting the right credentials to get our colleagues on the floor, the ones who weren’t in the delegations. We needed to get them on the—

**Sharpless**

And Adrienne was not in the delegation?

**Dunlop**

Adrienne was not on the delegation. I'm blocking totally on who was. Donna Shalala was the titular head of the delegation. Had a frightful fight with Tim Wirth. I don’t even know about what, but there was a real donnybrook of a fight. It probably was who was going to be the public spokesperson, because both liked the media. And we were very cut off from the NGO conference, which was way out in the suburbs. And there—you talk about difficult circumstances, they were terrible circumstances. We made the decision, which at the time, seemed very—well, I made it, I guess—what’s the word I want?—almost cavalier. I mean, we did not work the nongovernmental conference.

So, I think many of our colleagues felt that we were, yet again, a snobbish organization—that, you know, it was a very elite operation that didn’t demonstrate solidarity with our sisters we were weak on, that we weren’t collaborative in the way that we should be. Charlotte Bunch, who had a really terrific program and a wonderful team of people, did work the nongovernmental conference, and they all got sick because they were
exhausted. And I said, “No, we have one purpose—it’s that document. We are not going to let that document be changed in this process. We have to keep focus on the governmental conference, that’s all.” And if people wanted to go out to Wairon on their own, that was fine.

But—thank god—I’m glad I made that decision. Because it was very hard. It was a much harder building. As I said, I couldn’t—I tell you, it was a damnable time getting credentials. And finally I had to go on bended knee to an Egyptian woman who was very high up in the WHO—and she’s well known there now—I can remember her name later—who was sick. She was in bed. And I knew that she was a very close friend of Amparo Claro’s from Chile. So I said, “Amparo, you have got to help me. We’ve got to get at least seven badges”—seven credentials. That’s the credentials to get the people on the floor. “And they have them. I know they have them and they’re not using them.”

So, I remember going to see this woman, who actually became a good friend later, but who was fighting with Adrienne all the time. She and Adrienne did not get along. I knew that she had power over us. And, you know, she could easily say no just out of bloody-mindedness, but she was very generous and very good about it, and Amparo was fabulous. So we got them. And I remember thinking that, in the first week of Beijing, that’s all I did, was try to get those goddamn credentials, because without them, we were just—we didn’t have the power.

**Sharpless**  
You couldn’t be out there moving around where you needed to be.

**Dunlop**  
No. Adrienne and Rachel were beginning to have a lot of tension. I don’t
even remember what about. I think it was more about style than anything else, actually, not substance. And I can’t remember, but Rachel would come to me and she’d say, “I just can’t. Adrienne and I, just—she’s alienating people left, right and center. I mean, we’re not getting anywhere.” She was beside herself, and I thought, Well, Adrienne's very anxious. I mean, she’s nervous and she’s feeling a lack of self-confidence. So let me try and go and buoy her up a bit and just try to get her to feel more at ease. But she was so—the desire for perfection, which is very much part of her character, was just driving her. And we were going to have to finesse this, maneuver around or whatever. I mean, I wish I could remember what the substantive issues were. I can’t.

But it was a very difficult—we were beginning to have the kind of fissures between us that became very serious later. And this is the part that I want sealed, because it’s important to understand how organizations emerge and change and that’s—I’ll say something about that later. But Beijing was a very, very tough business, and it was not the same happy time that Cairo was.

Then we had the sexual rights question. And this, in terms of a—it’s like something out of theater. In terms of a dramatic, deeply felt, deeply wounding experience, this was it. By that I mean that one of our challenges after Cairo was, How are we going to push the envelope further? We know we have to have an affirmative—we have to go further than Cairo, because we know we’re going to have to drop back, and if we don’t stake it out further ahead—I could not get the family planning people to understand
this. You know, you just don’t protect what you’ve got. In order to protect what you’ve got, you’ve got to go further, and the issue was sexual rights.

We were going to go further on sexual rights. But the family planners were having a fit. They didn’t want us to push for sexual rights, blah, blah. They were really afraid of it, and understandably.

I remember Rachel talking me into making this speech which I—now don’t remember what it was about. But it was a pretty good speech—it wasn’t bad, and I don’t even remember who I was talking to—but I’ve got it somewhere in my files, I’m sure—on what sexual rights really was. But it wasn’t just sleeping with whom who wanted to sleep with. That’s not the issue.

THE FOLLOWING PAGE IS RESTRICTED UNTIL APRIL 15, 2014
Dunlop

There was a strong lesbian element in the lobby, and I had, you know, just so much respect and affection for them because they would outlast the Right to Life people—individual gay women I have so much confidence in and admiration for, because they are tenacious. They will not let go. I knew that we could rely on them. And Rachel was not out of the closet really at that point, only half out. And I didn’t want her to be jeopardized. In Beijing, the Right to Life were tearing at her clothes as she walked down the corridor. I mean, this was nasty stuff, really nasty. And she was—you know, she needed to be protected.
Dunlop

I felt as though I was in this kind of protective role, in some fashion—protecting ideas, protecting people, protecting the lobby, protecting the money, whatever. So the language on sexual rights, and I’m sure you’ll remember this—I mean, this was being negotiated in a fairly small group, and the negotiation went on all night. And during that time, some of the male delegate members from countries got up and said some of the most horrible things. I was dismayed, but it was an education—it was like learning about racism from Dr. Clark.

I was surprised that my friends who were gay took it so personally. I thought, you know, these guys are just obnoxious. But it was a deeply personal, wounding experience for the members of our lobby who were gay and who, I think, had so much of their courage and their imagination and their idealism focused on this language. To be defeated in such a humiliating way, it was personally humiliating.

But there were some wonderful moments. The two I remember most vividly are Amparo Claro from Chile—I think I mentioned this before—going to the head of the Spanish delegation and saying, “Shut up! Do not say anything else, at all.” And the woman—I think she was in a lead role of some kind—she was not a malevolent person, she was just ignorant. So, that was really funny.

Then of course it was the South Africans who just saved the day. And they said, This is about discrimination and we will not tolerate it. And that shifted the—I don’t remember the exact language, how it came out now,
but that was a real strike for freedom, because the fact that the South African delegation was in Beijing but not in Cairo, I think, was a very, very important tipping factor. It was a significant difference and a significant presence. And Barbara Klugman, who was on the South African delegation, who was in our lobby and had been in Cairo with us as part of an NGO delegation, was by then on the South African government delegation, and later wrote the South African population policy, which was a perfect example of what a population policy should be. That was what we wanted—that kind of a population policy is what we were talking about. It’s called the Green Book, and it’s around somewhere, and Barbara’s now working for the Ford Foundation in New York. So, world comes full circle. So, you know, and that’s about all I remember.

Then, I should think we should add on—I hope Adrienne maybe mentioned this—I don’t know where these tapes are, but at one point, maybe post-Cairo, you asked me, how do we recover—or post-Beijing, and I do not remember which—we went to visit Adrienne’s close ally and friend and colleague Ruth Dixon in Costa Rica where she was living. And we taped our recollections of these meetings in some detail.

Sharpless
No, Adrienne didn’t mention that. That’s interesting.

Dunlop
I have this horrible feeling we’ve lost these tapes. This is what I worry about. We reorganized the office after I left. A lot of stuff got thrown out. I know I don’t have them, and it could be that they’re in the archives in some factory building somewhere and I have promised myself that there’s—as soon as I get a block of time, maybe in the fall when it’s not hot, I’ll take
Ken Berg from the office, who knows something about this, and see if I
can’t find some of this stuff.

But that was my problem. To give you a sense about what it was like, I
couldn’t keep track of anything, you know what I mean? I just couldn’t
keep—my papers were always disorganized. Adrienne would say to me,
“Joan, don’t mention a single number, you’ll get it wrong, you know? Don’t
say anything.” (laughs) You know, don’t try—because the cacophony was—
I felt as though I was in a constant state of disorganization. Not being able
to find my books is a minor example. And so—

Sharpless
You’ve got input coming from a dozen different directions at one time, and
emotions are high.

Dunlop
Yeah, right. So, for whatever reason, I just wasn’t good at putting any
energy into that kind of thing. So we’ve lost the tapes. I can’t believe that
we spent all the effort doing this—we knew we needed to do it. We knew it
was archival and important.

Sharpless
So you debriefed yourselves?

Dunlop
Um-hm.

Sharpless
Interesting.

Dunlop
Um-hm, yes. I think Wirth was with us—actually he even asked us
questions. I don’t remember how we did it, yeah. But—all the texture.

Sharpless
Interesting. Well, I hope they turn up.

Dunlop
Well, I hope so too, but I’m not feeling very optimistic.

Sharpless
So how were you feeling when you left Beijing, besides exhausted?

Dunlop
Thank god it’s over. (laughs) That was my major—
Sharpless: You had protected the language?

Dunlop: Yeah, we protected the language. We got away relatively unscathed.

Sharpless: And were you able to make those advances?

Dunlop: We hadn’t set—we’d breached—the word I want to say is we’d broken through the barrier on sexual rights, even though the language wasn’t what we wanted. We’d broken through that barrier and it changed the way IWHC thought about its priorities, and you see it in its mission statement now. I should add, by the way, that when we first said to the board of the International Women’s Health Coalition that we thought the issue of sexual rights ought to be a policy priority for us, they balked, and that was very revealing. They basically said no, they didn’t want the organization coming out in favor of sexual rights. That sounded much too much like self-indulgence or, you know, promiscuous behavior or—they were nervous of it. And to me that was extremely interesting, because it was like an indicator.

Sharpless: Um-hm—of how edgy it was?

Dunlop: How edgy it was and how, frankly, how un-understood it was. HIV/AIDS changed all of that in the years to come.

Sharpless: I was going ask you, you want to get a drink?

Dunlop: Yeah. (pause in recording)

Sharpless: Okay, so let’s see. You were beginning to talk about HIV/AIDS and the impact that it had on sexual rights.

Dunlop: Well, that does change everything. It became a non-issue. But (laughs) what’s so interesting, the squeamishness, sexual squeamishness, that was endemic in the opposition—among our liberal colleagues, I’m talking about,
never mind the right—was now no longer fashionable. It wasn’t appropriate
to deny the reality of sexual activity. It was one of the jokes about family
planning. I mean, family planning, right? I mean that phrase is really antique in
the extreme. It’s one of the problems.

And the other thing is, what I find interesting about the population
movement—I’m digressing slightly—is they call themselves a movement. I
used to say, Listen, family planning is not the Holy Grail. It’s a tool, like a
fork. You pick up a fork to eat. It’s a method. It’s not the Holy Grail—
please. Women’s movement, I’m happy with: it is about a political
movement and it’s very broadly based and all the rest of it. But reproductive
health was a much better phrase. I thought this family planning term was
antique, and if we needed to change anything, it was that. We’re told birth
control was a better phrase, in some ways. So there’s a lot of politics around
that kind of thing that we don’t need to go into. What was I saying—

Sharpless  
It’s the sexual rights language.

Dunlop  
We didn’t have, at that point—and I’m saying it must’ve been four years
from the time we first raised the issue of sexual rights—and by the way, I’ve
dodged the whole issue of reproductive tract infections, which Adrienne
had a lot to do with. I haven’t dodged it, I just left it out. We didn’t have
any opposition from our board on that point. But when I got back from
Cairo—from Beijing—it’s ’95. I was really running out of gas. But with the
question about what we were going to do with the organization and how we
were going to shape it in the future was a real dilemma.
Dunlop

The tension between Adrienne and me about how we dealt with people on our staff, how we managed, was by then palpable. We were really—our styles were so different that what was a strength initially was becoming a liability. And the organization was getting divided, badly, between people—I mean, I was having to mediate. Staff were coming to me saying, you know, Can’t deal with Adrienne—she’s holding up everything, she has to reedit every single document we put together.

It was dysfunctional. People were getting demoralized. She was undercutting people’s self-confidence, whether she meant to or not, because she wanted to win every paragraph and every sentence. There was real—the tension, which had always been there, which I always felt all along, even though I had pleaded with Adrienne over the years to try to change this behavior in terms of how she dealt with other people, it was very difficult for her. And there’s a whole bunch of letters and stuff between the two of us about this problem. I always felt that her talent and her mind—she has an absolutely first-rate intellect. I had been told this in the seventies by Lincoln Chen, and he said, “She has the best intellect there is, as good as Paul Demeny,” who was one of the prominent demographers.

And I agree with her—I knew that she was. She had this ability which was extraordinary. But with it came this—almost dysfunctional people skills. But up to the point post-Beijing, I felt that it was worth it. We were turning over staff—we couldn’t hold people. We couldn’t attract people initially because the subject was so controversial, and the quality of the people that
we were looking to get on the staff wouldn’t apply for the job anyway, because they didn’t want to be tarred with the abortion brush. As our success in Cairo began to be known then we began to attract higher-level people, but Adrienne wouldn’t give them any autonomy, from their perspective. So they were cycling out of the organization. And it was bad. The reputation of the organization was problematic. So what had been a healthy tension earlier on now began to be, I thought, a huge liability.

And I became very demoralized and convinced that this was not healthy, that what had been a double-headed sword, if you like, and had great strength, was beginning to be dysfunctional. The organization was getting divided. We were not going to be able to rethink ourselves unless we could break out of the paradigm. Rachel was on the staff and she was frustrated. She was, I think, intellectually visionary and looking for more autonomy. Adrienne wasn’t about to give it to her. Adrienne was very jealous of my friendship and alliance with Rachel, and it became, you know, personally painful, I think, for everybody. And I was, I have to admit, bored out of my mind with the topic. I didn’t want to hear reproductive health again in my life as long as I lived. (laughs)
Dunlop  
I don’t have Adrienne’s discipline about and passion for this particular area. And it is her life. I remember in one of our earlier meetings—it was in a meeting in Barbados. Actually, it was on reproductive tract infections. I think we had a lot of colleagues around the table. It was many years before, maybe seven years before. We all went around the table after the meeting and said what we were going do, and Adrienne said, “This is my life.” And I thought, Oh God. That’s true—it is. It’s not my life. I like a lot of diversity and I’m really a social historian in my heart. And I was interested in the degree to which we had a moment in time—jumping on the wave, we’ve used that image. But anyway, I thought to myself, I’ve got to get out. It took me two years to persuade the board that I really did want to leave.

Sharpless  
Let me change the tapes and then we can talk about that.

*Tape 1, side 2, ends; tape 2 begins.*

Sharpless  
This is the second tape with Joan Dunlop on April 15th. Okay, so persuading the board that you really wanted to leave?

Dunlop  
Yeah, and it took me—Judy Lichtman, who was chair of the board, was not willing. I mean, they’d known I was tired, you know—which was true, I was. And I was very reluctant to be very frank about my problems with Adrienne. I was completely convinced that she was the right person to take over for me. But she was also getting very restless, she was anxious.
Dunlop  

She wanted to work for the Ford Foundation. Actually, Ford was advertising for a particular job that she desperately wanted. I knew, from my inside contacts at Ford, they’d never hire her. I knew she had this reputation for being very difficult, and very difficult to help—those are Susan Berresford’s words. So I knew—there was no place she could go.
So there was never any question of your staying and her going?

It’s been suggested to me by colleagues whose advice I sought when I was getting really desperate that if I had any—they didn’t say this—but if I had any balls, I should fire her. But that made no sense, because the fact of the matter is, I knew she had the substance. There’s thirteen years difference in our age—you bet I was running out of gas. I was, by then—I was fifty when I took it over—I was coming up to sixty-five. I wasn’t going to have the energy. I’d had two bouts of cancer, one in 1990 and one in 1980. I needed to be sensible.

What I didn’t know is whether Adrienne really could run it, whether she had the confidence, whether she had—well, the people problem was never—I was convinced the people problem was never going to be solved. It was so deep in her soul that it was going to be very difficult to modify. I wasn’t sure about the money raising and I wasn’t sure about how she was going to position the organization. Many people were hurt by her and were cycling out of the organization and gossiping on the outside. It was destructive. And in the end I basically had to say to Judy, This is not going to work. And she said, “Are you sure Adrienne will take over—are you certain about that?” And I said yes, and the reason I said that was because I didn’t have any other alternatives. I didn’t see anybody on the horizon that I thought had the conviction, never mind the intellect.

And, of course, what’s happened is that it’s been the most amazing transformation. I also felt that there was this tight personal, intellectual and
political alliance needed—I mean, it was over, at a certain level. It needed to
grow into something else, and the umbilical cord between the two of us
needed to be broken. She was never going to be able to grow if I didn’t get
out of the way. She was never going to be able to grow into her potential.
And I’d always thought of myself—certainly in this job, and with Adrienne
particularly, but also with many other people—that I saw myself as a horse
trainer. I train racehorses. And I had my image of myself as this small
person—which of course is ridiculous, I mean, after all, I am [very tall]—
small person running around trying to get this bucking, kicking, beautiful,
strong animal into the starting gate. If I could just get [her] into the starting
gate, then maybe—I knew she could run faster than anybody else. And my
interest in how people develop—Adrienne has absolutely no interest in
helping other people develop. And now she says so, which is great. You
know, she doesn’t want to do it. She doesn’t even want to be asked to do it,
and that’s actually a real breakthrough.

Sharpless  Mentoring is not her thing.

Dunlop  No. Now a lot of people—one of the other things, people adored her. You
know, they just—she attracted people like flies to flypaper. Also, I might
say, that’s the other side of the coin. She could be very flirtatious and very
funny, and I had lots of people, sort of in a sense, falling in love with her,
and I thought, Oh God, not another one. And the sexual politics of this was
something that had to be handled. At one point, I had a chair of my board
during a meeting call me out of the meeting and say, “Adrienne’s behaving
very strangely with this person. What’s going on here?”
But that gives you a sense of how politically sensitive this problem was. It’s just so interesting. And I don’t know how many other organizations face these kinds of politics. I suspect that they do, but I’ve never talked to anybody else about it. But I think it’s very important because it is the unspoken undertow, and if it doesn’t work well then it—dissipates energy and productivity and accomplishment.

Sharpless
And it’s so much of, you know—are there different women’s ways of doing, knowing, thinking, working? That’s always a question.

Dunlop
I have worked for these wonderful five people, all of whom happen to be men. I learned a lot of my management style from them. And they certainly were highly intuitive, all of them, in different ways. None of them were authoritarian. Not Ylvisaker, not Ken Clark—although he could shout and stuff, but—not Fred Hayes, not John Rockefeller, not Vartan Gregorian. None of them behaved in that conventionally male way, quote-unquote. I do think women are not so willing to put up with unpleasantness in the workplace. We all have to agree together and we all have to support one an[other]—that collegiality thing is the only significant difference I can really identify. And so, if you don’t get along with people, I mean, they’re not willing to tolerate—they’re not willing to have a disagreement and then go out and have a beer later, quote-unquote.

Sharpless
There has to be harmony.

Dunlop
Um-hm. And that is very time-consuming, often. But, as we saw, it can be extremely productive. So I’m not sure how I’d come down on this. I just don’t know.
So you persuaded the board that it was time for you to leave.

Yes. It was very hard. It seemed as though, when I think back on it now, I realize how tired I was. I was beat.

What did Adrienne say when you told her you were going to leave?

Well, she was ambivalent. (laughs) We didn’t have a grown-up conversation on the topic. When I think about it, it’s ridiculous. We should’ve sat down and said—I mean friends of ours would say, Judith Bruce would say, “Why can’t the two of you go to a shrink together and get this sorted out?” And both of us, I think, were too pig-headed, or too whatever—ourselves. We refused to, so we—I felt there were two things going on at the same time. On the one hand, she desperately wanted to run the organization. She wanted to be the leader; she wanted her name in the newspaper. Fine, I understand that. That’s A. B, she didn’t really want me to abandon her. So there was a duality there that was hard to, kind of, integrate or come to terms with. And I’m sure she thought I was abandoning her. On the other hand, she used to say to me—I said, “Adrienne, I have to get out of here.” She said, “Well, whenever you’re ready, Joan,” or words to that effect. I would write something and she would never respond to me. She would come back to me and she’d comment on my appearance and I felt like saying, “Adrienne, that’s not the point,” you know. She didn’t want to engage, didn’t really want to engage with it. So we didn’t really—we kind of limped—I felt we managed it fine.

There was understanding, I mean, in the public domain—the party that they gave for me at the university club, which is on tape, Adrienne couldn’t
have said anything more beautiful. She said—you know, it was fabulous. It was a wonderful evening.
And even though we were kind of—I was angry. At some level I was angry. I was angry with her behavior concerning other people, and that was very difficult for me to come to terms with. Now I’ve come to terms with it.
I mean, first of all I’m not as tired, by a long shot in any sense, either intellectually or emotionally or physically or whatever. I’m really totally recovered. I should jolly well hope so—it’s been five years, or however long it’s been. But I can remember well enough about how I felt at the time to realize that that was what’s known as burn-out, and only time can take care of that. Adrienne and I are on much better terms, and we can have real conversations at this point. I think we both acknowledge that this was a unique partnership. You know, like from 1974 to 1995 really, so that’s twenty years—that’s pretty unusual. And it’s revealed in those letters I have upstairs in very interesting ways, and I don’t know what she ever did with my letters. I’m a big letter keeper. I just think it goes back to the social historian in me. I find it very interesting to see how it reflected in the time, in the moment.

So, I think the wheel’s come full circle, and she’s done a phenomenal job. And hopefully—I mean, she’s kept the organization more than alive. All of the public promotion things that I thought we needed to do have been done better than I ever thought would happen. I mean, that big event that they now do every year is really a huge accomplishment. But the problem is that you can never really thank people enough. I think certain board members—Ellen Chesler, Jacqueline de Chollet—feel that they’ve been sort of cast aside, which is so sad. I’d like to do something—so there’s lots of diplomacy stuff that still needs attention.

So, when you left the IWHC, did you just walk away?
Dunlop

Well no, because I—this is another, I think, part of my conflicts with Adrienne, really, International Women Health Coalition. My vision for the organization is that I wanted it to emerge not only as a think tank, a developer of ideas, and a translator of those ideas into public policy and into governmental behavior—or appropriations, if you like. I wanted it to be a membership organization. I wanted us to have the Coalition be real and have a constituency of Americans.

And I created this idea which I call the Women’s Lens on Global Issues—as a test, in a sense, to see if there was, in fact, the potential for such a process, such a constituency in the United States. And in the end I took that project into the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, where they offered me a distinguished fellowship, which meant an office and a title. And I raised some money and we did a certain amount of work, which I won’t go into now, which turned out to be in many ways very revealing and very optimistic. There is a constituency.

However, Bush and Iraq have certainly distorted that environment, even though in the process I became quite closely allied to Chris Grumm, who runs the Women’s Funding Network. As of this very week she’s got her first grant to do this project, to have her organization take this on as a means to educate and develop a constituency, a women’s constituency concerned about foreign policy. So that’s essentially what happened. And the IWHC will never go that route because Adrienne doesn’t—that’s not her thing.

Sharpless

Foreign policy is not—
Dunlop: No, the constituency [challenge].

Sharpless: Oh I see, yes.

Dunlop: Donors, yes. But political—it’s a different organization. I mean, it takes enormous amount of time and effort and money. It’s a whole different idea. But I think IWHC will always be the Alan Guttmacher Institute of the international arena—that’s where it’s going. The Population Council has—the woman who’s been appointed head of it is a mistake, in my judgment. Pop Council’s cutting edge that JDR [John D. Rockefeller III] envisaged and George Zeidenstein manifested has diminished greatly in the last, I don’t know, ten or twenty years, I think. I think it’s really become a somewhat conservative research organization.

So IWHC has a unique niche, actually, under Adrienne, in the vision that she has for it and how she herself operates. So there’s an absolutely legitimate role here. But I still think that our problem on international affairs and on global interdependence, or whatever you want to call it, is educating Americans. And I think women have different values from men on these topics—significantly different—so that if they could be really educated and mobilized, it would make an even bigger difference. The right knows that. (laughter)

Sharpless: So, how did you decide to move up here full time, to leave the city?

Dunlop: Oh, well, first of all, I always had this—I always am torn between the country and the city. I was brought up in the country, I suppose, and it was—my father used to call a dormitory area, a suburb, you know, like Scarsdale in London. But I wanted to live in one place and I’d had houses in
the country all my life in different interludes. I couldn’t afford both, and also I was nauseated by the fact that this one single person was living in this level which was inappropriate. I mean, it was not a good way to spend money—I should be giving this money away. It was ridiculous. So I had planned to come here, and I sort of built relationships and friendships here that would indeed offer me interests and engagement and some stimulation. And I’ve just used this as a base. And then my accountant kept saying to me, “Joan, for god sakes. I can charge up all the limousines you want to take from Lime Rock to New York, but I can’t charge off the maintenance on your co-op.” So I was, to a great degree, driven by financial security and also by a sense of whole, if you like—W-H-O-L-E.

Sharpless
But you have found work to do here. I mean, you have lots of things that hold your attention here.

Dunlop
And outside, I mean, I’ve been—I counted up the other day—I’m on thirteen to fourteen different boards and committees. Two of them are here and the rest are outside, are either in New York or—it’s CARE, where, apart from being on the board, I’m on two committees with special assignments and I’m chairing one committee. Open Society Institute [OSI]—I got to know George Soros fairly well for a period of time, although no one gets to know George very well. So, he put me on his U.S. board. And then I’ve been on the public health sub-board for OSI and on the Network Women’s Program sub-board. Those take up time. And then International Women’s Health Coalition doesn’t take up a great deal of time. I’m on the advisory committee for the Women’s Rights division of
Human Rights Watch. Adrienne and I are both on that. That could take up a lot of time, but I just can’t—I’ve decided I can’t make that a priority.

And here I’ve been—I think I made a difference in this community by urging the Berkshire Taconic Community Foundation, on whose board I sit, to take on the consequences of a sale of Sharon Hospital to a commercial entity. I won’t get into this in detail because it’s not worth it, but it’s been a long—actually around a two-to-three-year enterprise to get this new foundation created, this health foundation, with the endowment [left after the sale of the hospital]. A not-for-profit endowment from the hospital couldn’t go to the commercial buyer. By attorney general ruling of the state of Connecticut, it had to go to another foundation and I’ve been working on that pretty intently—actually for the last year. But I’m pulling away from that a bit now.

Sharpless

Well—you’ve been very generous with your time these two days. Are there things that we haven’t talked about that you want to talk about?

Dunlop

I’m sure I’ll think of them, but I don’t think so. (laughs) No, I think—

Sharpless

When you came out of the meeting at Cairo and looked at the stars, you said it didn’t get better than that. What are you proudest of? Of the whole thing?

Dunlop

The whole schmear? I am proudest of the International Women’s Health Coalition. I would never have taken the job if I hadn’t been happily married at that moment, because I knew it was a very high risk, and my then husband Ed Deagle I knew would—at the very least, he could pay the rent. So that was an interesting—in a sense, that was a moment. Now, the
marriage went by the board, partly because I put so much energy into the organization. I mean, I basically made choices that took me away from my marriage, there’s no question about that. But if it hadn’t been for that moment—he was wonderfully supportive, and I’d come through cancer in 1980. We got married soon after that. I took over the Coalition in 1984—I was fifty. He was a very important actor both in my life and also by his influence on Adrienne. We went to visit her when she was in Bangladesh, and that was a very productive time, when we’re talking now, ’83 to ’85 maybe, something like that. It may be even ’87, ’83 to ’87, I reckon. So that was luck, if you like, or timing. But that’s what I’m most proud of. IWHC was linked most closely to my own experience having an illegal abortion in London, which was a defining moment. And I managed to translate that into a bigger solution, if you like, which gives me great satisfaction and a sense of accomplishment.

Sharpless  
Well, I am very grateful to you for sharing with me and for the people who will use this in the future, so—

Dunlop  
Well, thank you, Becca. This has been—it’s been a lot of fun. It’s been really interesting, stimulating. I would never have gotten to this without you, that’s for sure.

Sharpless  
Thank you, Joan.

*end Interview 3*