Expanding The Moral Circle: From Racism to Speciesism  
 
 
 
 

Abstract 

This paper reviews the argument by Peter Singer that speciesism, the exploitation of other species without regard for their interests, is as morally objectionable as racism and sexism. Objections to this argument by philosophers such as Peter Carruthers, Mary Midgley, and Cora Diamond as well as conventional wisdom about notions of species differences are presented and critically examined. I conclude that Alaine Locke would have supported Singer's expansion of the moral circle.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Albert Mosley

Philosophy Department

Ohio University

Athens, OH 45701 
 

Draft: Comments Invited 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Expanding The Moral Circle: From Racism to Speciesism ¹  
 

Speciesism is the view that the interests of members of the human species are more important than the interest of non-human species. Thus, humans are justified in using non-human species in ways that depreciate the interests of non-humans in favor of the interests of humans. As with racism - where the interest of one race are valued more highly than the interests of another race, and sexism - where the interests of males are valued more highly than the interests of females, in speciesism the interest of humans is more valuable than the interests of non-humans.

This view is deeply rooted in our morals and folk taxonomies, deriving from the two pillars of western culture, religion and philosophy. In the story of Genesis of the Old Testament we are told that God created man in His own image, and all the other species of animals were placed under man's dominion, to be used judiciously to serve human interests. Likewise was woman created from man, to serve as his helpmate and companion. Evil takes root when the woman succumbs to the non-human enticements of the reptile. In classical Greek philosophy, Aristotle argued that because non-humans were incapable of reasoning, they were the natural inferiors of humans, and had value only as the instrument of human decisions. The religious and philosophical traditions were united in Aquinas, who likewise held that non-humans had instrumental, but no intrinsic, value. For Descartes, the founder of modern European philosophy, non-humans were little more than mechanized toys, emitting yelps and cries as humans would. Because non-humans lacked the ability to speak, reason, and act autonomously, they were not members of the moral community.

On the other hand, for Utilitarians like Bentham and Mill, the ability to feel pain and pleasure was sufficient for a being's reactions to be included in the deliberations determining whether an act was morally right or wrong. Peter Singer continues this tradition.² The morally relevant feature establishing membership in the moral community is the ability to feel pleasure and pain. And since chickens are capable of feeling pain and pleasure, we are acting immorally to the extent that we unnecessarily inflict pain on them and deny due consideration to their interests. The pain and pleasure they experience must be taken into account in determining whether the act producing that experience is good or bad.

Singer describes in graphic detail the kinds of conditions under which non-human animals are produced for food on factory farms, and exposes the suffering experienced by some 8-10 billion poultry and livestock each year, merely to provide humans with an unnecessary form of nutrition. Chickens, which normally live three to four years, are forced to mature in six to seven weeks to meet market demand. Livestock consume enough grain to feed all humanity, merely to supply the middle classes with an inefficient source of protein. Subsistence farms and forrest land are diverted to the production of livestock feed, contributing to soil erosion, pollution (from fertilizers, insecticides, and animal waste), and migration from rural to urban areas. ³

In contrast to the mainstream of western philosophy and religion, utilitarians argue that it is morally wrong for humans to ignore the suffering caused to non-humans and humans by the unnecessary habit of meat eating. This does not mean that meat eating is inherently wrong. There are many conditions under which meat eating is justifiable. Jeremy Bentham argued that if an animal lived a meaningful life and died a painless death, there was no suffering caused to the animal and great pleasure derived from eating its flesh. By the utilitarian calculus, more pleasure is thereby produced than pain, and we have primae facie justification to eat meat so produced.

People who eat animals in order to survive are not necessarily committing a moral wrong if there is no other option that would maximize pleasure and minimize pain. Should we find ourselves in a situation where we are faced with starvation, it might be justifiable to even eat another human being in order to survive. But such is not the case with the meat produced on factory farms for commercial distribution. And it is eating meat produced in that manner that is morally wrong, because it results in pain and suffering for non-humans that decreases overall beneficence.

Speciesism justifies using non-humans in ways that discount their interests in favor of the interests of humans. In contrast, the principle of equal consideration of interests dictates that we should oppose speciesism on the same grounds that we oppose racism and sexism. If two beings have similar capacities and needs, it should be wrong to sacrifice the interests of one over the other because of differences of race, sex, or species. It is now generally accepted that a persons race or sex should not be sufficient grounds for disregarding their interests and potential. Nonetheless, we continue to disregard the interests and welfare of billions of non-humans that are sacrificed each year to satisfy habits and test products that we could easily do without.

In contrast to Singer, many philosophers have maintained that it is perfectly reasonable for one to oppose racism and sexism, and yet not oppose speciesism:

"..any attempt to equate the 'animal liberation' movement, which claims that animals and humans have equal moral status, with the civil rights and feminist movements is preposterous and indeed insulting ... . Blacks and women have been systematically denied full and equal moral status with whites and men. In effect, they have been prevented from enjoying the full membership in the moral community that is their due, on the basis of morally irrelevant differences - skin color and sex. It is precisely this sort of discrimination that we describe as unjust treatment. Animals, however, are denied full and equal moral status..for reasons that are morally relevant, namely their lack of autonomy and moral agency." ⁴

Since most blacks and women have the ability to reason, excluding them because of skin color and sex is to use criteria that are irrelevant. On the other hand, most non-human animals do not have the ability to reason and utilize complex conceptual systems such as religion, art, and science. Lacking such conceptual potential, they are not capable of entering into reciprocal arrangements with others who are capable of such complex conceptual skills.

To illustrate, two humans, A and B, can agree that if A will not harm the person or property of B, then B will not harm the person or property of A. A's right to be free from interference by B is predicated on B's right to be free from interference by A. If one breaks the agreement, the other is justified in breaking the agreement. But A's pit bull cannot agree that if B's labrador does not attack the pit bull, then the pit bull will not attack B's labrador. Neither the pit bull, the labrador, the veal calf, nor the laboratory mouse can enter into such agreements, and so they are not moral agents.

Because of their inability to regulate their behavior by reference to conventional rules, so this argument goes, non-humans are not moral agents. They may benefit from agreements made between human beings, but they are subjects of rather than agents to the agreement. Beings that cannot control their behavior rationally are not members of the moral community and humans have no obligation not to use them for human interests. There is, in other words, no prima facie injunction against using animals to satisfy human personal, commercial, and professional interests.

Because non-human animals typically live without contemplating past and future, and engaging in counterfactual thinking, philosophers who defend our current use of non-humans argue that they have no concept of themselves, their experiences or their life, and do not ascribe a value to either. Therefore, neither pain nor death is a loss to them. Food producers and experimenters should take the pain and suffering of animals into consideration, and act to decrease suffering whenever possible. But this should be done, as Aquinas would have argued, not for the animals sake, but for human sake. It is better for human beings if they avoid cultivating cruel and inhumane behavior. So long as they are not subjected to "unnecessary" pain and suffering, humans are allowed to use non-humans for human interests in ways they are not allowed to use humans. ⁵

But, as many have pointed out, this position fails to account for the situation of marginal cases, eg., of humans who have less intelligence and motivation than many non-humans, or of non-humans who, because of special circumstances, have acquired the ability to engage in complex conceptual organization. Except for species differences, why should an anencephalic human be given more consideration than a chimpanzee that has been taught to sign. Those who oppose speciesism argue that, in cases where the interests and potential of non-humans equals or exceeds that of humans, we should accord them the consideration normally reserved for humans of that level of ability. We are justified in sacrificing the life or interests of a non-human only if we would be willing to sacrifice a human of similar interests and capacities for the same purpose.⁶

Those who defend a form of speciesism argue that even in the case of a human and non-human with similar interests and abilities, we are justified in favoring the human because we would want other humans to treat us similarly, in similar circumstances. Thus, when I die, I hope my body will not be used for chicken food. I would oppose anyone's using your body in that way, and I hope you would oppose anybody's using my body in that way. By respecting reciprocal arrangements and agreements, we support one another interests.

Be this as it may, we must note that the utility of respecting recripocal arrangements provides no justification for preference purely on the basis of species membership. If the signing chimp is able to enter into reciprocal arrangements, and the anencephalic human is not, then the chimp is a moral agent and the anencephalic human is not. The question as to why we are willing to use non-

humans for purposes that we would not use humans of similar interests and abilities remains.

Mary Midgley argues that members of a species have a special attraction and bond that is much like the bond that develops between family members. Our bond to members of our own species is an emotional one that is totally natural, because "We are bond forming creatures, not abstract intellects." ⁷ If we were pure abstract intellects presumably we would accept the "argument from moral consistency" (amc) asserting a moral transitivity between racism, sexism, and speciesism, so that in opposing racism and sexism, we would be morally obligated to oppose speciesism.

Midgley opposes the amc and believes that while we are justified in opposing racism, we are not for the same reasons justified in opposing speciesism. She argues that while preference for members of a particular race is learnt, preference for members of one's own species is as natural as preference for members of one's own family. And while such preferences may lead to immoral consequences, "The natural preference for one's own species does exist. It is not, like race-prejudice, a product of culture."⁸

Despite our natural affinity for family and species, Midgley believes that evolution, through neoteny, has so enhanced the human tendency for compassion that the human sympathy for other humans naturally extends to certain non-human species as well. This extension of sympathy to other species is the solution Midgley offers for the tendency of people of different cultures (or races) to regard one another as members of different species. Presumably, different species would co-exist in mixed communities, acknowledging their 'natural differences' and the preferential tendencies that individuals would have for members of their own group. A similar solution would apply to members of different races, giving rise to a form of racialism without racism.⁹

But human preference for other humans, like the preference of ants for other ants, is not the kind of species preference that Singer is concerned with. Rather, Singer objects to the use of cows, guinea-pigs, and other non-humans as having no value other than to further human interests:

"We tolerate cruelties inflicted on members of other species that would outrage us if performed on members of our own species. Speciesism allows researchers to regard the animals they experiment on as items of equipment, laboratory tools, rather than living, suffering creatures."¹⁰

Preferring the use of non-humans over humans for food production and experimental purposes merely because of a difference in species ignores the interests of non-humans, and treats them as a mere means to achieving human interests. This is the kind of speciesism which Singer considers just as unacceptable as racism.  "..if the experimenter claims that the experiment is important enough to justify inflicting suffering on animals, why is it not important enough to justify inflicting suffering on humans at the same mental level? What difference is there between the two? Only that one is a member of our species and the other is not? But to appeal to that difference is to reveal a bias no more defensible than racism or any other form of arbitrary discrimination."¹¹

Like Mary Midgley, Cora Diamond takes a dim view of this argument: "The Singer-Regan arguments amount to this: knee-jerk liberals on racism and sexism ought to go knee-jerk about cows and guinea-pigs".¹² For Diamond, the parallel to Singer's argument that we should not experiment on a non-human unless we are willing to do the same experiment on a human of similar interests and capacities would be that we should not eat animals unless we are willing to eat humans of similar capacities and interests. ¹³

But she finds this possibility so absurd as not to deserve further consideration. For Diamond, differences of species just are relevant in ways that differences of race are not.

"Suppose I am a practical-minded, hardheaded slaveholder whose neighbor has, on his deathbed, freed his slaves. I might regard such a man as foolish, but not as batty, not batty in the way I should think of someone if he had, let us say, freed his cows on his deathbed." ¹⁴

Suffice it to say at this point that for both Midgley and Diamond, differences between humans and non-humans are real and grounded in our intuitive responses to natural kinds, while differences in race are at best social constructions, created by the beliefs of a particular culture but lacking objective validity.

Nothing may seem more obvious than the distinction Midgley and Diamond point to between humans and non-humans. However, distinctions like this too often reflect the interests of the categorizer more so than the nature of the categorized. Just as calling a plant a weed tells us that the plant is unusable by us but tells us little about the attributes of the different plants that are called weeds, so calling an animal a nonhuman reflects our interests in using it as property, but tells us little about the animals so designated. ¹⁵

Even when an animal is regarded in its own right, folk taxonomies are often based on striking similarities, rather than careful comparison and contrast. Ordinary judgement, focusing on readily observable similarities, would likely lead us to consider opossums more like mice than like kangaroos. But current scientific judgement, taking into consideration a less obvious but more extensive set of factors, goes in the opposite direction. ¹⁶

In western folk taxonomies, biological species are typically defined in terms of perfect types, of which actual specimens are variations created by the unfortunate intervention of foreign elements. The further from the type a particular specimen is, the less perfect specimen it is. But in the post-Darwinian study of biological species, members of a species are similar, not just because they share easily observable traits, but because they share a common heritage.¹⁷ Darwinism made clear that, in sexually reproducing species, members are expected to vary and no specimen is ideal. There is no genotype that defines what it means to be a member of the kind. In this respect, the 'natural kinds' of physics and chemistry are not like the natural kinds of biology.

"..whereas samples of gold, to be true samples, must all have the same atomic structure, it is not true that domestic cats ... must all have the 'same' genetic structure to be true cats." ¹⁸

From an essentialist point of view, humankind is all and only those who posses a common human nature. This common human nature has alternatively been called the human soul or the rational faculty (mind). But from a post-Darwinian point of view, "The unity of humankind (the biological taxon) does not rest in the possession of a common nature, but in being a breeding population such that my ancestors and my descendants alike may be yours as well."¹⁹ In this sense, humankind is " but an assembly of interbreeding populations like any other species". ²⁰

The point I wish to stress here is that a preference for members of one's breeding population (for the purpose of breeding) does not offer a good reason to violate the interests of those who are not members of that breeding population. One can prefer members of one's family for certain purposes without thinking that they are superior to members of all other families, for all other purposes. ⁰

One way to distinguish the innocuous preference for members of one's own species from the pernicious speciesism Singer condemns is to extend the distinction between racialism and racism, and distinguish what I shall call speciesalism from speciesism. ²² Concomitant with the development of modern notions of race and the racist view that some races are inherently superior to other races, is the view that different races were incommensurately valuable, each contributing a set of tendencies that made a unique contribution to the development of civilization. It is this latter view that is called racialism. While racist beliefs were held primarily by the dominant races, racialism was likely to be held by members of dominated races as well. With respect to the difference between the African and European races, Edward Blyden, W.E.B. Dubois, and Leopold Senghor illustrate the attractiveness of a racialist perspective to African-Americans and Africans as well.²³

Speciesalism need not challenge the legitimacy or necessity of making distinctions between species. But it does challenge the assumption that the interests of the species making the distinctions are inherently more important than those of other species.²⁴ Singer has identified sentience rather than reason as the ability marking membership in the moral community. Whether this is merely a retreat from speciesism to phylumism is debatable.²⁵ More important than the attempt to identify the factor that marks inclusion and exclusion in the moral community, however, is Singer's advocacy of the principle of equal consideration of interests. The attempt to identify the interests of another species does not assume that we know what it is like to be a member of that species. Rather, the principle of equal consideration of interests minimally requires only that we make a sincere effort to consider and respect the interests of other beings that are affected by our actions.

Conclusion

Alaine Locke, perhaps the preeminient African American philosopher of the early 20th century, was an acute critic of essentialism, and held that one of the great fallacies of racism was the assumption that races were manifestations of a permanent type, and that any deviations from that type would eventually regress back to the norm.²⁶ I would also like to suggest that one of the great fallacies of speciesism is the belief that the distinction we make between species reflects differences in ideal types of beings. Such essentialist accounts of human nature derive from a religious and philosophical heritage that is embedded in western folk taxonomies. ²⁷ On the other hand, Darwinian evolution offers an account of the origin and existence of species that does not construe them as physical manifestations of ideal types.

Alaine Locke appreciated that variation was an essential part of any group, and he labeled the "fallacy of the masses" the tendency to use the norm of a group as the standard by which to evaluate each individual in the group.²⁸ Modern biological thinking acknowledges biological variation as natural and inevitable. Acknowledging variation in the ability to deliberate suggests that many humans will be no more rational and autonomous than many non-

humans. More generally, acknowledging variation as natural allows us to appreciate that there is no essential distinction between non-humans and humans, and helps us also appreciate that there is no categorical preference for humans over non-humans. There are many relationships between humans and members of other species (eg., as pets, work partners, mutual providers) that are just as "natural" as the bonds between members of the human species.²⁹

Alaine locke makes the point that racial differences are, like class differences, social constructions rather than natural kinds:

I fancy that it is a fundamental mistake, because, however extreme they may be and seemingly different, race feelings (group sense that moves on racial lines) are only different in degree and not different in kind from class sense and class groupings. In fact, there are some class groupings and feelings that are just as radical just as arbitrary and just as violent as racial feelings."³⁰

I propose that what Locke says about the relationship between race and class also applies to the relationship between races and species.

It is especially important that intellectuals who condemn racism not uncritically accept spurious species distinctions, and conspire in treating other beings only in terms of their usefulness in satisfying parochial human interests. Tragically, even the interests of other human beings are not served by our callous treatment of other species. Locke enjoined us to work for the enlargement of our group loyalties from sect, to race, to nation.³¹ Singer extends the circle one step further, to include equal consideration for all beings of similar interests and capacities, irrespective of race, sex, or species. I believe Locke would have supported this expansion of the moral circle.  

¹Thanks to my colleagues Arthur Zucker and Scott Carson for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

²Peter Singer Animal Liberation (NY: Avon Books, 1990) may be the most widely read philosophy book of the 20th century.

³Flesh, as a source of protein, has been called a "protein factory in reverse": 1 lb. of beef "costs 5 lbs. of grain, 2,500 gallons of water, ...a gallon of gasoline, and about 35 lbs. of eroded top-soil. More than a third of North America is taken up with grazing, more than half of US croplands are planted with livestock feed, and more than half of all water consumed in the United States goes to livestock." A former US assistant secretary of agriculture stated that "merely reducing the US livestock population by half would make available enough food to make up the calorie deficit of the nonsocialist underdeveloped nations nearly four times over. Indeed, the food wasted by animal production in the affluent nations would be sufficient, if properly distributed, to end both hunger and malnutrition throughout the world." Singer also points out that "Over the past twenty-five years, nearly half of Central America's tropical rainforests have been destroyed, largely to provide beef to North America." (Singer, pp.166-169)

⁴Michael Allen Fox, The Case for Animal Experimentation (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1986) p.58. Fox has since repudiated his position, but it remains one defended by, among others, Peter Carruthers, The Animals Issue (NY: Cambridge University Press, 1992) chpt. 3 passim.

⁵"Carruthers (1992, p.196) concludes: "The most important practical conclusion of this book is that there is no basis for extending moral protection to animals beyond that which is already provided. In particular, there are no good moral grounds for forbidding hunting, factory farming, or laboratory testing on animals."

⁶Daniel Dombrowski, Babies and Beasts: The Argument from Marginal Cases (Chicago: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1997), p.2

⁷ Mary Midgley, Animals and Why They Matter (Athens, GA: University of Georgian Press, 1983) p.102

⁸ Midgley, 1983, p.104

⁹ Midgley, 1983, p.99ff

¹⁰ Singer, p.69

¹¹ Singer, p.83

¹² Cora Diamond, The Realistic Spirit (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1995) p.325

¹³ Diamond writes, "This is a totally wrong way of beginning the discussion". Diamond, 1995, p.321

¹⁴ Diamond, p.332. I believe the reason it would be "batty" for a slave owner to free his bovine slaves but not his human slaves is because bovine slaves typically don't want to be freed and human slaves typically do. Certainly, a slave owner that freed his falcons would not be considered batty. Humans are not the only species of beings that value their freedom and autonomy. On the other hand, domesticated cattle place very little value in freedom and autonomy.

¹⁵ Stephen R.L. Clark "Is Humanity a Natural Kind" in What is an Animal ed. by Tim Ingold(London: Unwin & Hyman, 1988) p.17

¹⁶ Clark, p.18

¹⁷ "Members of a taxon are similar because they share a common heritage; they do not belong to the taxon because they are similar." (Ernst Mayr, 1969, Principles of Systematic Zoology, pp.65ff; quoted in Clark, p.20)

¹⁸ Clark, p.23

¹⁹ Clark, p.25

²⁰ Clark, p.30

⁰ . Likewise, one individual may prefer vanilla and another prefer chocolate without either believing that chocolate lovers are inferior to vanilla lovers.

²² S.F. Sapontzis makes a similar suggestion in "The Meaning of Speciesism and the Forms of Animal Suffering", Behavioral & Brain Sciences (1990) 13:1, p.35.

²³ See selections in Albert Mosley, ed., African Philosophy (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1995)

²⁴ Some, like my colleague Arthur Zucker, might question whether it is possible to devise a taxonomy that did not reflect a bias towards the interests of the taxonomist. Rather than assume this possible, Zucker advocates what he calls a "thoughtful speciesism". see Arthur Zucker, "Ferre: Organiscistic Connectedness - But Still Speciesistic", Ethics and the Environment, 1(2):185-190. But this is like arguing that the best alternative to a racist perspective we can devise would be a "thoughtful racist" perspective. I do not see these as the only options in how we compare races, nor do I see the parrallel as the only options with respect to how we evaluate species.

²⁵ My colleague Scott Carson coined the term "phylumism" to charaterize Singer's rejection of species differences in favor of phylumic differences as a justification for favoring some interests over others. In other words, Singer opposes speciesism, but seems to have no qualms about phylumism.

²⁶ Alaine Locke, Race Contacts and Interracial Relations (Washington, DC: Howard Univ. Press, 1992) ed. by Jeffrey Stewart, p.75; and The Philosophy of Alaine Locke ed. by Leonard Harris (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989) p.165ff for a critique of the treatment of races as ideal types

²⁷ Clark, p.31

²⁸ Locke, 1992, p.74

²⁹ Note that preferences are always indexed to a purpose. I would prefer a horse if I were looking for a mate to my horse. I would prefer a human if I were looking for a mate for myself. I would prefer a dog if my need was for a loyal companion. I'd prefer a human who spoke my language if my need was to have a conversation. Clearly, there are many situations in which humans prefer non-humans to humans. But this should not be interpreted as suggesting that only human preferences are important. A horse would prefer another horse if it were looking for a mate. And a dog might prefer a human to another dog if it were looking for a source of regular food and affection.

³⁰ Locke, 1992, p.44

³¹ Locke, 1989, p.151)

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